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YOU’LL NEVER WALK ALONE
”I rarely end up where I intended to go,
but often I end up somewhere that I needed to be.”
Douglas Adams (1952–2001), American writer
Writing a thesis is a journey you go on your own, or at least that’s what you might
think. But you probably won’t ever reach your destination without the constant help,
advice and support from the many people around you. In fact, I think, you wouldn’t
even dare to start such a journey in the first place if you knew that you had to walk by
yourself all the way. Fortunately though, you’ll never walk alone.
First of all, I want to thank my two supervisors, Josef Zweimüller and Rafael Lalive.
Josef initially awoke my interest in economics and introduced me to the fascinating field
of labor economics. Josef also taught me how to frame and think about research questions
and how to use empirical methods in order to find convincing answers to these questions.
I also want to thank Josef for giving me this unique opportunity and encouraging me
to undertake this project. Rafael taught me how to do sound and convincing empirical
research and very much shaped my own way of thinking about empirical research in
general, not the least because he introduced me to the world of evaluation research
and thus to the essential empirical toolkit which I am using in my own research now.
Thankfully, Rafael always had time to answer my many questions about economics and
econometrics.
I also want to thank Rainer Winkelmann for agreeing on being my second referee and
adding valuable comments on my work, but I also want to apologize again for the tight
time schedule. Besides, I also learned a lot about micro–econometrics back when I was
taking his courses as a student. Further, Rainer Winkelmann organized two workshops
on program evaluation methods, taught by Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens, which
proved very valuable for me.
Very special thanks go to Oliver Ruf. We first met back in 2001, when we were
both working as research assistants at Josef’s chair. We not only worked together (and
v
Preface
eventually managed to work on some joint projects) but, haphazardly, I also found one
of my best friends – we are truly birds of a feather. Thank you very much for being
who you are. Very special thanks also go to my friends and colleagues Tanja Zehnder,
Michael Naef and Christoph Eisenegger (good help in biology, by the way), all of whom
were working or are still working on their own theses at the time and thus they went
through all my ups and downs. It would have been much less fun without you! Besides,
I always thought that answering questions strengthens my own understanding of how
things work. Hence, I also want to thank all the four of them for asking me a whole lot
of questions – even if, sometimes, they only asked because they were too lazy to look up
the answer on their own.
I am also deeply grateful for the help and support from my friends and colleagues from
our chair and thankful for all the discussions, either of serious or nonsensical content.
Reto Föllmi and Manuel Oechslin always had an answer to practically any question.
Jean–Phillipe Wüllrich actually dared to move into our office and happily turned out
to be a perfect match. I apologize that he had to undergo quite some turmoils since
then. Christian Hepenstrick is the only person I know who knows how to shut down the
unstable root and thankfully handed me over one of the funniest ”reseach” articles I’ve
ever read (McCulloch, 1985). Claudia Bernasconi and Simone Gaillard have worked and
still work at our secretary and although they didn’t have to do much work for me I know
they would have, if I had just asked them to. I also want to thank Simon Büchi and Bea
Brunner for not shying away from the difficult research questions they were assigned
to do. Besides, Simon has done an awful good job in preparing and documenting a
significant part of the raw data and thus (almost) always has an answer to questions
related to the data. Bea finally proved my prejudices (which I knew to be wrong in the
first place, so they probably weren’t really prejudices at all) to be wrong. Besides, thank
you for always letting the sun shine on me!
While working at the institute, a lot of other people crossed my way. I want to
specifically mention (in random order of appearance): Max Grütter, Urs Fischbacher,
Lorenz Götte, Daria Knoch (sorry you lost), Alois Stutzer, Stefan Schmid (always gave
a helping hand), Daniel Halbheer, Stefan Staubli, Stefan Bühler, Karin Müller (you still
owe me a dance), Christoph Nitzsche, Bettina Petralli, Ursi Meier, Armin Falk, Martin
Brown, Daniel Halter, Adrian Kienast, Tobias Würgler, Andreas Steinhauer, Sandro
Favre, Dirk Drechsel, Julia Casutt–Schneeberger, Sandra Hanslin, Andreas Müller and
Michael Morlok.
I also want to thank several people at the Sociological Institute of the University
of Zurich, where I started my academic journey. Specifically, I want to thank Volker
Bornschier who introduced me to applied empirical work in the first place, back when I
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was taking his lectures on macro–sociology. Felix Keller gave me the unique opportunity
to teach lectures on introductory statistics just after having finished my studies. I also
thank the many students who took (or rather: had to take) my courses on statistics
although most of them, I would guess, did not really enjoy my lectures. Nonetheless, I
almost always enjoyed teaching and I hope that I could teach them some basics about
the proper and sound application of statistics and econometrics.
Since this thesis is essentially an empirical project I wouldn’t have got far without
any data. Thus, I also want to thank the people who provided or helped with the
data. First of all, I thank all the people from the ”Hauptverband der Österreichischen
Sozialversicherungsträger” and the ”Gebietskrankenkasse Oberösterreich”, who provided
and helped with the data used in chapter 2. I also want to thank Alois Fässler from
the Suva, who kindly provided and helped with the data used in chapter 4. And, since
you don’t research for nothing, many special thanks also go to the ”Jubiläumsfonds” of
the Austrian National Bank and the Research Funds of the University of Zürich, who
thankfully provided partial funding of the research presented in this thesis.
Of course, I didn’t spend all the time in my office. Thomas Scheuner introduced
me to minimal music, which I love so much and which always makes me want to move.
Lisa Farmer always had time to have lunch with me and charmed me with her Viennese
accent. Serena Simeone took care that I never got lost in the early morning hours and
always made sure that I didn’t go to bed too late or too early, respectively. Sabine Regel
hopefully knows that I like her because she likes me, my sometimes wacky behavior
notwithstanding. Moreover, thank you for being worried about me in my risk–seeking
times. Steffi Thüler and Stéphanie Zeier both went along with me for quite a significant
time and although we eventually broke up, I’m glad that we shared that time. A special
thank you also goes to Vreni Stadelmann, who gave me one of the most gorgeous gifts
I ever got (no, I won’t tell). I hope you know that I still feel very sorry for what
has happend. Simone Lacher reminded me that it may still be worth taking the risk.
Christian Bächle and Hannes Egli lived together with me for quite some years and thus
they were both involved in my projects, whether they liked it or not. I’m also thankful for
all the happy hours spent with my friends back from college: Lukas, Ruzica, Christoph,
Dario, Pascal, Phillip, Claudia, Thomas and Pascale. Fortunately, we still find together
from time to time.
Music is the one thing I would never want to miss and has always kept me moving,
specifically in the last few nerve–racking days before finally finishing the manuscript.
Special thanks to all the artists (too many to mention) for sharing their wonderful music
with me and for always washing my worries away.
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Finally, I want to thank my brother Thomas and his family, Sibylle, Livia and Alina
for supporting me all the time. Thank you to my beautiful and beloved little niece Alina
for always putting a smile on my face. Maybe you will become a scientist too, someday.
Last but not least, I want to thank my parents, Dorli and Marcel, for always supporting
me and believing in me. I suppose that they don’t really know what I was doing all the
time, which primarily means that I didn’t succeed in explaining them my work properly.
But still they have always been very proud of me, which in turn always made me feel
very special. Thank you very much for always being there for me and for making it all
possible in the first place.
Randomness has indeed a very special meaning to me by now. Of course, this
partially reflects my obsession with econometric toys, where randomness indeed plays
a crucial part (the little ǫ on the right–hand side of the equation). But, and I guess
more importantly, this is also due to the many lucky random twists my life took in the
past few years which led me to where I am now and brought me together with all these
wonderful people.





SWIMMING IN A SEA OF DATA...
1.1 Labor Economist Gone Astray?
”Labor economics studies how labor markets work.”
George Borjas, labor economist
My thesis spans three essays in applied, that is empirical, labor economics. At least
that’s what I claim to do. But, as the attentive reader may have already noticed (if you
didn’t skip the table of contents), the topics of the three essays don’t easily fit into the
realm of labor economics as it is usually discussed in textbooks (see, for example, the
excellent textbook treatment by Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). So, at the outset, I feel a
little urge to argue that all three essays are essentially about labor economics (although
all three essays also get into touch with public economics; something which though is
true for most topics in labor economics). So, before moving on, let me shortly elaborate
on this point.
To start with, let me clarify what probably are the most pertinent questions in labor
economics in my view. I think the two topics most central in labor economics can be
framed as two simple questions, since most specific questions in labor economics are
somehow related to one (or both) of these questions.1 The first question asks: Why it is
that some people work and some other do not (related to this first question is of course
1This statement may sound a little be too simplistic – and, of course, it is. But I am talking about
the very fundamental insights labor economists are striving after. To be precise, by no means do I claim
that the scope of labor economics is confined to these two questions only (which I know not to be true).
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the demand side of the labor market)? The second question is conditional on the first
one (i.e. conditional on a worker being in the labor market in the first place) and asks:
Why is it that we observe so large differences in wages, even if we sometimes think that
people are not that different in the work they are doing? As I will try to point out, the
three essays of my thesis all relate to either the first question (participation in the labor
market) or to the second question (distribution of wages).2
The first essay, ”The Public Health Costs of Unemployment”, more or less directly
relates to the question about labor market participation, although the main research
question relates to a somewhat non–standard issue (from an economist’s point of view),
focusing on potential negative effects of involuntary loss of employment on health (more
specifically health expenditures). The standard static model of labor supply is, at least
from a non–economic point of view, somewhat naive with respect to this question.3
One of the main features of the labor–supply model is, by assumption, that working
(more) only induces (more) disutility, when holding income constant.4 That is, besides
from loosing part of one’s income (due to the fact that unemployment benefits usually
do not replace previous earnings one to one), nothing else is lost. However, there is
abundant evidence suggesting that this might be a somewhat too simplistic point of
view. In fact, there exists a huge number of studies about the subject, dating back at
least to the famous ”Marienthal” study by Maria Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld and Hans
Zeisel (Jahoda et al., 1933), suggesting that many people suffer not only from a loss of
income, but may also suffer from psychological strains. In the first chapter, I thus start
with the premise that people not only work in order to gain income, but also because
they derive utility from working, which may be true for very different reasons. If this
premise in fact is true, then the (involuntary) loss of employment should show up in a
deterioration of health. In fact, economists have recently also joined in exploring the
empirical link between employment and health, and these economic studies show their
strength in using appropriate methods combined with good data (see, for example, two
recent studies that convincingly show that loss of employment may indeed have negative
2The order in which the essays are presented has no deeper meaning at all, it simply reflects the
chronological order in which they were finally finished. The order in which I started these projects, of
course, need not have been necessarily the same.
3Of course, I fully appreciate the usefulness of this model (and economic models in general), which
mainly derives from it’s very own weakness, which is it’s simplicity. And I will never argue about
the fact that the model in fact yields very robust predictions regarding the behavior of individuals,
which derives from its main strength, which also is it’s simplicity. For a convincing example applying
the model of labor supply and testing its predictions empirically, see the book by Grogger and Karoli
(2005) on welfare reform in the U.S. I only want to stress at this point that we might run the risk of
overlooking some important questions, if we take the models too serious.
4To be fair, economists of course know about the shortcomings of their models. Moffitt (1983), for
example, is an interesting study concerned with observed deviations from the predictions of the simple
labor supply model (relating to the fact that not all eligible individuals take–up welfare benefits).
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effects on mortality (Gerdtham and Johannsson, 2003; Sullivan and von Wachter, 2006).
The second essay, ”Subjective Evaluations of Wage Inequality and the Demand for
Redistribution”, clearly has a somewhat non–standard flavor too, but still it strongly
relates to the central question about the distribution of wages. In a way though, I
will turn the question about the shape of the wage distribution upside down. Labor
economists usually focus on the forces shaping the distribution of wages. For example,
much research effort has been put into exploring the effect of schooling on wages (e.g.
Card, 2001), the search behavior of both workers and firms (e.g. Mortensen, 2005) or on
the effect of labor market institutions (see, among many others, DiNardo et al., 1996),
to name but a few important examples. Now, turning the question upside down, the
second essay of my thesis will take the distribution of wages as given and ask whether the
distribution of wages might itself be a force of its own because individuals with different
wages might behave differently (due to differences in their preferences). Such behavior
may potentially (and subtly) feed back into the process of wage formation if it influences
institutions which then directly impact the determination of wages (e.g. preferences over
redistribution may influence the tax and transfer system via voting, which obviously
feeds directly back into the labor market). This ”upside–down” perspective on the
distribution of wages is though common in public economics (Hindriks and Myles, 2006)
and sociology (Neckerman and Torche, 2007). Again, this question departs to some
extent from standard economic models in that I presume that people not only take the
wage they get and live happily ever after, no matter how high a wage they actually get
and independent of the other workers’ wages. More specifically, chapter 3 circles around
the idea that differences in wages drive differences in the demand over the amount of
redistribution, which might itself feed–back into institutional arrangements via voting
behavior. Institutional settings, of course, directly influence the shape of the wage
distribution via their impact on the processes of wage formation. A similar story has
been given be two recent theoretical studies on the relation between preferences and
redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
The third essay, ”Compensating Wage Differentials and the Statistical Value of Life”,
also deals with wage formation. Chapter 4 is in a way the most ’standard’ essay of this
thesis (with regards to what labor economists usually focus on) as it deals with one
of the classic ideas in labor economics (dating back to Adam Smith already, actually),
which is the theory of compensating wage differentials. In economics, most arguments
trying to explain differences in wages either focus on differences in individual attributes
(e.g. differences in education) or institutions and legislations which also influence the
wage distribution (e.g. labor market regulation). The theory of compensating wage
differentials, on the other hand, states that people not only value the monetary payoff
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from working, but also the non–monetary amenities of their jobs (the leading example
being workplace safety). And, the theory claims, firms offering ”bad” jobs will have to
offer higher wages ceteris paribus in order to induce workers to accept such laborious
jobs. The third essay will empirically assess compensating wage differentials for non–
fatal accidents at the workplace in Switzerland, and will present empirical estimates of
the value of a statistical injury based on these estimates.
1.2 Data is All Around You
”Data is not information, information is not knowledge,
knowledge is not understanding, understanding is not wisdom.”
Clifford Stoll and Gary Schubert, computer scientists
In the last about ten or fifteen years, applied labor economics has been profoundly re–
shaped by two parallel trends, both of which were presumably mutually reinforcing each
other and led to the prevalence of empirical research in labor economics (Angrist and
Krueger, 1999). First, the advance in cheap computing power and the availability of
easy–to–use and fast software for statistical purposes nowadays allows us to manage
and process (really) huge amounts of data. At the same time, the electronic revolution
has produced huge amounts of data, some of which are available for scientific research
and on which empirical research crucially rely on. The three essays of my thesis are no
exception in this regard.
In chapter 2, I am working with a really unique set of administrative data, the Aus-
trian Social Security Database (ASSD, see Kuhn and Ruf (2006) for details). These
data cover the universe of private–sector workers in Austria from 1972 onwards, and
they record the individual labor–market career along with information about earnings,
socio–demographic characteristics and information about the employer. Moreover, these
data can be linked to several other micro data sets. Specifically, I will also use data from
a regional health insurance fund that essentially cover all health–related expenditures
covered by the fund and include very detailed additional information about these ex-
penditures (for example, the precise kind of medical drugs).
The third chapter relies on ’typical’ survey data from Switzerland, which were col-
lected as part of an international survey by the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP). Most economists are fully aware of the potential pitfalls of survey data, most
importantly missing data and measurement problems (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001). More often than not, they completely shy away from using such data. However,
4
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as chapter 3 will show, these data on the other hand allow the examination of fascinating
research questions, which otherwise are not accessible to empirical analysis. I will also
argue that the empirical analysis in this chapter tries to make a virtue out of necessity,
i.e. the main focus of the analysis is explicitly based on the fact that people widely differ
in the perception of the real–world.
Chapter 4 builds on a combination of administrative data and survey data (although,
in this case, the survey is administered by the federal statistical office of Switzerland).
With respect to the data, this chapter shows that the quality of the data can make all the
difference in empirical research. First, we have access to the number of accidents within
narrower groups of workers than is usually available to researchers. That is, we observe
accidents not only within industries, but within cells defined over industry×skill–level
of the job. Second, we can capitalize on the (partial) panel structure of the wage data,
which also gives more scope for the econometric analysis.
Although, when reading textbooks on econometrics, you may get the impression that
you don’t really need any data for practicing econometrics, data is of course a necessary
condition for doing empirical work (besides, why bother with econometrics if not because
you want to analyze real–world data?). On the other hand though, the availability of
data is by no means a sufficient condition for doing sensible empirical work. You also
need the modern toolkit of econometrics, to which I turn next.
1.3 The Art of Drawing a Crooked Line
”[Econometrics is] the art of drawing a crooked line
from an unproved assumption to a foregone conclusion.”
Peter Kennedy, econometrician
My own approach to empirical work has been critically shaped by both theoretical and
applied work on evaluation methods and statistical models for causal inference.5 Statis-
ticians and econometricians have long shied away from making bold statements about
causality (on this issue, see the interesting and insightful epilogue in Pearl, 2000), not
the least because evaluation studies have been criticized in not achieving their very own
5To the best of my knowledge, Morgan and Winship (2007) is the only available textbook up to
date dealing exclusively with these models. However, most modern textbook treatments of (micro)
econometrics discuss these methods (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002) in more or less
detail. The survey article by Heckman et al. (1999) also provides a thorough treatment of these methods.
A broader and more general, and much less technical, treatment of the relevant concepts is given by
Campbell et al. (2001).
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objective (e.g. LaLonde, 1986). At this moment though, it seems fair to say that most
statisticians and econometricians alike have settled on a common language, which is most
often labeled the Rubin model of potential outcomes (Holland, 1986), and a very pow-
erful toolkit in order to provide answers about the causal effects of specific treatments.
This work clearly has left its marks in empirical labor economics specifically, in that ap-
plied empirical work in labor economics has partially shifted away from fully–parametric
structural models to simpler methods that make the central issue of identification often
much more transparent (see the insightful discussion presented in Kramarz et al., 2006).
On the other hand, I am also convinced (the objection of Josh Angrist notwith-
standing) that there’s more to empirical labor economics than such clear–cut ”what if”
questions about very specific manipulations, due to the simple fact that a whole lot of
interesting research questions simply do not fit into the framework of causal inference
(because we can’t manipulate anything we would like to manipulate). Consequently, we
may forgo the chance of getting a lot of interesting insights about the social world we
live in (a point of view most statisticians hold, see Gelman and Hill, 2006, for exam-
ple). I am though also aware of the fact that inference in such settings must necessarily
be somewhat shaky, and thus these results will always be more ambiguous. Anyway,
it seems clear to me that in these non–experimental settings empirical methods are at
least as important as in the typical evaluation problem setting, perhaps even more so.
The work discussed in chapter 2 is closest to the program evaluation approach men-
tioned before, and deals with a classical case of an endogenous regressor. Isolating the
effect running from unemployment to health is primarily complicated by the fact that
causation clearly can also run in the other direction, i.e. we cannot rule out on a–priori
grounds that bad health is causing unemployment – rather than the other way around.
What is needed here is a situation generating exogenous variation in the employment
status, i.e. a situation generating variation in the employment status which is not driven
by differences in the health status of workers. I will argue that job–loss due to the shut–
down of the firm provides such a situation of a ”natural experiment” (Meyer, 1995),
although I will also show that there remains the problem that the bankruptcy is not
random across the universe of firms. Under relatively weak assumptions, instrumental
variable (IV) estimation (Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Angrist et al., 1996) can be used
for estimating the effect of unemployment on health.
Chapter 3 clearly departs from the approach taken in the program–evaluation liter-
ature. The research question in chapter 3 simply refutes such an approach, because the
question itself cannot easily be framed in a way such that it fits into this framework.
Second, even if the question could be framed as a causal question, the data that would be
necessary simply are not available. Still, I think, using simple regression models nonethe-
6
1.4. Whereto from Here? Introduction
less makes very much sense in this setting and yields interesting empirical results. Still,
in this case the empirical methods are primarily used as a vehicle for describing complex
and multidimensional data which otherwise would refute interpretation.
The empirical approach in chapter 4 lies somewhere between the approaches taken in
chapter 2 and 3. Again, this mainly relates to the data at hand but also to the underlying
conceptual problem of endogenous sorting of workers (Hwang et al., 1992). Although the
data do not allow for identification of the compensating wage differential via a natural–
experimental situation, we can rely on the (partial) longitudinal structure of the data.
This allows to use standard panel data methods, which are suited for unobserved linear
fixed effects models and make it possible to empirically extract the relevant component
of the observed wage (the component specific to the firm) for subsequent analysis. The
results clearly show that, in this case, the combination of data and methods yield very
different results.
Next, I will now discuss the three essays of my thesis in more detail, stressing specif-
ically the main research questions and the main results.
1.4 Whereto from Here?
”It’s not what you know about something that is important,
but rather how you use it.”
Adrian Pagan, econometrician
In the chapter to follow, ”The Public Health Costs of Unemployment”, I will explore
on the relation between employment status and health. The work presented in chapter
2 studies how unemployment affects public health costs in a typical European welfare
state (which is Austria). Assessing how joblessness affects health costs is difficult mainly
because deteriorating health can as well be a cause rather than a consequence of job-
lessness. We use plant closure as an instrument for unemployment because bankruptcy
is unlikely to be caused by deteriorating health but has a strong impact on workers’
subsequent employment. Our empirical analysis is based on an extremely rich data set
from Austria with comprehensive information on various types of health care costs and
day–by–day work history of individual workers. The central findings of chapter 2 are
the following. First, expenditures on medical treatments (hospitalizations and drug pre-
scriptions) are not strongly affected by joblessness. Second, lack of employment reduces
mental health for men but not for women. Third and finally, sickness benefit payments
strongly increase due to job loss. Our results also show that OLS estimates strongly
overestimate the causal effect of unemployment on public health costs.
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The third chapter is entitled ”Subjective Evaluations of Wage Inequality and the
Demand for Redistribution”. Chapter 3 proposes a simple framework for describing
subjective evaluations of wage inequality and the demand for redistribution, and puts
this framework into action using survey data from the International Social Survey Pro-
gram (ISSP). The empirical analysis suggests that there is both considerable support for
the equalization of wages and broad acceptance of differences in wages due to different
skill levels. It is also shown that the differences in the demand for redistribution are
largely due to different evaluations of what ought to be and to a lesser extent due to
different perceptions of what actually is. More specifically, it is shown that the main
driving source of variation in the demand for redistribution is the wish to cut wages at
the top of the distribution. Further, it is shown that income on its own is a poor pre-
dictor of the desired level of redistribution, but that financial self–interest, social norms
about and perceptions of issues of distributive justice all do simultaneously influence in-
dividual demand for redistribution. Finally, it is shown that demand for redistribution
is a significant predictor of party preference – thus providing a potential link between
beliefs about distributive justice and political outcomes.
The fourth chapter ”Compensating Wage Differentials and the Value of a Statistical
Injury” deals with the compensation for non–fatal accident risk in Switzerland and
presents empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury. We use data from the
Swiss Wage Structure Survey (SWSS) and the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund (SAIF).
The problem of main concern in chapter 4 is that there presumably is endogenous sorting
of workers into jobs with different accident risks based on unobserved differences in
productivity. Such kind of endogenous sorting leads to inconsistent estimates of the
compensating wage differential. We approach this problem twofold. First, we have access
to the number of accidents not only at the level of industries, but within cells defined over
industry×skill–level of the jobs, which allows us to estimate risk compensation within
groups of workers defined over the same cells. Second, we capitalize on the partial
panel structure of the SWSS, which includes longitudinal information with respect to
the employer. This principally allows us to empirically isolate the wage component
specific to the employer. This is of central importance since the theory of compensating
wage differentials essentially relates to the firm–specific component of the wage, but not
necessarily to the observed wage (or the wage component specific to the worker). Our
different approaches to identification in fact yield very different estimates of the value
of a statistical injury. Our preferred estimate though gives an estimate of about 40,000
Swiss francs (per prevented injury per year), an estimate which actually lies within the
range of estimates given by studies for the U.S. labor market. Our results also shed




THE PUBLIC HEALTH COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Joint with Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller
”We never know the worth of water ’til the well is dry.” (Proverb)
2.1 Introduction
This first chapter studies the causal effect of unemployment on public expenditures on
health care in a typical European welfare state. Understanding this effect is important
for at least four reasons. First, while ill health and lack of employment are the two
major risks during an individual’s working life, little is known about the effects of an
individual’s employment status on health. In a society where all employed individuals
are covered by primary health insurance, health care costs are an informative measure
of the costs of health shocks to society. Second, understanding the causal relationship
between unemployment and health care is important for both labor market policy and
health policy. Labor market policies that focus on job creation might be even more
beneficial to society if they are providing employment to job seekers and improving their
health at the same time. Health policy makers can be interested in this relationship to
assess the effects of changing conditions on the labor market on the expenditures for
health care. Third, the effects of joblessness on public health costs may be affected by
institutional rules. The public health care system of a typical European welfare state
does not only cover the costs associated with medical treatment (such as doctor visits,
hospitalizations, and medical drugs) but also provides insurance against income losses in
case of sickness. While costs associated with medical treatment are more closely linked
to a workers’ health status, public health costs associated with replacement of income
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may be driven by institutional rules and by effects on individual incentives. Fourth,
health care costs have risen sharply in the last decades in most industrialized countries
(Hagist and Kotlikoff, 2005) and the dynamics of these costs may be related to job
instability and loss of employment.
This chapter focuses on the case of Austria, which provides a good example for at
least two reasons. On the one hand, health insurance in Austria is mandatory for all
employed individuals (and their dependents). On the other hand, the unemployment
insurance system is more restrictive than in other (European) countries and closer to the
U.S. system: Regular unemployment benefits are paid for at most 30 weeks and the net
replacement ratio (unemployment benefits relative to previous net earnings) is about 55
percent. As a result, job loss may have more severe financial consequences for job losers.
To the extent that financial distress may lead to health problems, such effects should be
more severe in the Austrian context than in other European countries.
Many public health insurance systems do not only cover costs associated with take-
up of health provisions (such as doctor visits, hospitalizations, and medical drugs) but
also provide insurance against income losses. While direct take–up of health provisions
is more informative on the health status of an individual, public health costs associated
with sickness payments are also driven by institutional rules and incentives created by
such rules. Therefore, our empirical analysis will distinguish between costs associated
with take–up of health provisions and costs due to sickness benefit payments.1
Assessing the causal effect of unemployment on public health costs is difficult pri-
marily because deteriorating health status can be cause rather than a consequence of
job loss. In other words, health selection of the unemployed will lead to a bias in the
causal effect of unemployment on health costs in cross-section data.2 To circumvent
the problem of reverse causality, we use job loss due to plant closure as an instrument
for individual unemployment. The experience of a plant closure strongly disrupts a
worker’s employment career but workers’ health is unlikely to cause a plant closure.3
1When we talk about ”public health costs” associated with unemployment, we strictly refer to costs
that are associated with payments by the public health insurance system (sickness benefits and take–up
of health provision). From the point of view of public health insurance, additional costs arise due to
reduced health insurance contributions when an individual looses his or her job.
2Stewart (2001) shows that the more unhealthy are more likely to enter unemployment and hence
the unhealthy are over-represented in the unemployment stock. Martikainen and Valkonen (1996) show
that in Finland the relationship between unemployment and mortality weakened as unemployment rises,
suggesting that health selection varies over the business cycle. See also the discussion on the effects of
health on labor market attachment in Currie and Madrian (1999).
3While this chapter focuses on the impact of individual unemployment on public health costs for
the same individual, a different literature looks at relationships at the more aggregate level. Ruhm’s
(2000) findings of lower mortality rates during recessions are consistent with such a hypothesis. Hence
Ruhm (2000) documents an effect of aggregate (rather than individual) unemployment on individual
health. This is in line with predictions of the economic theory of health production (Grossman, 1972)
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While several other studies have adopted a similar procedure, our study has at least
three innovative features that go beyond the existing economic literature on the effects
of unemployment on health.
First, we study the effects of unemployment on costs associated with the take–up
of primary health-care rather than on the direct effect on a workers (self–reported or
diagnosis–based) health. As the Austrian system provides comprehensive coverage of
health care benefits for all employed workers, the public health care system faces po-
tentially high additional costs associated with unemployment. As a public health care
system is potentially very costly to society, it is of primary interest to policy makers
to have reliable information on the health costs that are causally related to workers’
employment status.
Second, our study aims to give a broad picture of the overall health costs to the
public health insurance associated with the experience of individual unemployment. The
Austrian system does not only cover costs associated with medical treatment (such as
doctor visits, drug prescriptions, and hospitalizations) but also grants sickness transfer
payments both for employed workers (incapable of working due to health problems) and
for unemployed workers (incapable of searching for a new job). In our empirical analysis
we will assess the causal effect of unemployment on overall costs. Moreover, we also
analyze the costs structure, i.e. how these overall costs are divided into the interesting
subcategories.
Third, in contrast to most previous studies, we use a very large and informative data
set. Our data come from the Austrian health insurance register and cover all health-
care related payments to private sector employees in one large Austrian region.4 For
the period 1998–2002, we can link the health cost data with social security register data
(reporting a worker’s employment and earnings history). Our analysis is based on 14,602
plant–closure workers and 39,701 non-plant closure workers. One obvious advantage of
these data sets is their accuracy (not prone to measurement error both with respect
to health– and employment–status information). Another advantage comes from the
fact that all workers have the same health insurance coverage given by a standardized
catalogue of health care benefits that are covered by the public health insurance system.
Hence our measure of health costs is also highly informative on the workers health
status.5
which holds that reduced opportunity costs of time increase incentives to undertake health investments
through time-consuming activities which may improve health during times of high unemployment.
4Our study focuses on Upper Austria which is one of totally nine Austrian states. Upper Austria,
located in the North and bordering Germany and the Czech Republic, comprises roughly one sixth of
the Austrian population and work force.
5The public health insurance system aims at a basic coverage of all major health risks. Individuals
with demand for services not covered by the public health insurance system (mainly better quality, such
11
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Our empirical analysis yields three major results. A first finding is that unemploy-
ment following a plant closure does not cause a significant increase in public health costs
associated with take up of health provisions. Public health costs associated with hospi-
talizations and medical drugs prescription do not increase significantly, and doctor visits
even fall. Second, while overall take–up is not significantly affected, we find that – for
males, but not for females – mental health deteriorates. This result is in line with the hy-
pothesis that, in the short run, unemployment causes mental health problems, whereas
physical health is affected only in the long run. Third, we find that the public health
costs that are associated with payments of sickness benefits strongly increase after a job
loss. One additional day in unemployment increases the costs to public health insurance
by 4.7 Euros (5.8 USD) per year for men and almost 2.5 Euros (3.2 USD) per year for
women in the span of one year. However, this increase in costs does not reflect a dete-
riorating health status of displaced workers but is mainly due to sickness benefit rules:
For employed workers, employers have to bear sickness benefits (for up to 12 weeks,
depending on job tenure) whereas for unemployed workers, the public health insurance
pays sickness benefits.6 Since plant closure workers spend more time in unemployment
than non-plant closure workers this increase in costs is largely mechanical. For males,
we do not find that plant-closure workers do have more sickness days than non–plant
closure workers. For females, however, we find a significant increase in sickness days.
This rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a
brief review of the previous literature. Section 2.3 presents the data and definitions
of the crucial variables. In section 2.4 we provide some descriptive analysis. Section
2.5 discusses the econometric methodology and identification strategy. The econometric
results are presented and discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the causal effect of
individual unemployment on overall cost to public health care. This study is related to
two different strands of the literature.
The first strand studies incentive effects in sickness insurance and the relationships
between unemployment and sickness insurance use. Johansson and Palme (1996, 2005)
as one–bedroom hospitalization, for example) can purchase such services from private health insurance
companies. Private companies cover costs beyond the public system.
6When a worker gets sick during an unemployment spell, the time of regular unemployment benefits
is interrupted and the worker becomes eligible for sickness benefits so each day on sickness benefits
prolongs the maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits.
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study how changes in the income replacement level affect the incidence and duration of
sick leave spells in Sweden.7 Askildsen et al. (2005) argue that the negative relationship
between unemployment and sickness insurance use may be due to worker moral hazard
in a situation of full insurance against income loss. While our study is related to this
literature, we do not assess the incentive effects of health insurance rules. This chapter
contributes to this literature by studying the effects of exogenous job loss on take up of
sickness benefits. Furthermore, access to direct data on health care costs allows assessing
what medical conditions are prevalent among workers going on sickness insurance.
The second large strand of the literature studies the relationship between individual
unemployment and individual health status. An important strand of this literature is
concerned with the impact of unemployment on mortality.8 A large number of stud-
ies have examined the effect of unemployment on mortality. Early influential studies
using individual data are Moser et al. (1987) and Morris et al. (1994) who find that
the unemployed have significantly higher mortality rates.9 These studies were based on
longitudinal data which control for time–invariant individual effects. However, individ-
uals are subject to health shocks over time so health selection may be of considerable
importance. More recent studies have improved upon empirical designs. Gerdtham and
Johannsson (2003) use a Swedish sample of initially equally healthy individuals and
show that unemployment significantly increases mortality. Using administrative data
from two US states Sullivan and von Wachter (2006) estimate a 15-20% excess risk of
death in the 20 years following a job loss. Eliason and Storrie (2006) show similar evi-
dence for job losers in Sweden. Further interesting evidence comes from twins studies.
Nylen et al. (2001) and Voss et al. (2004) examine mortality of Swedish twins in relation
to unemployment. They find that those who were unemployment in 1973 are signifi-
cantly more likely to commit suicide and or die from undetermined causes during the
period 1974–1996.
Other related papers have studied the impact of unemployment on (physical and
mental) health problems. Kessler et al. (1987, 1989) have documented the impact
of unemployment (and re–employment) on self–reported health and Turner (1995) has
looked at particular mechanisms (financial versus emotional distress) by which unem-
ployment may affect health outcomes. However, it is difficult to interpret the results of
7See Henrekson and Persson (2004) for a related study.
8Cook (1985), Morris and Cook (1991) and Jin et al. (1995) survey the early literature. Platt (1984)
documents the effects of unemployment on suicidal behavior. For recent surveys see Kasl and Jones
(2000, 2006).
9An important strand of the literature has studied the impact of aggregate unemployment on mor-
tality. The early work of Brenner (1979) points to a significantly positive relationship. However, the
more recent literature has convincingly demonstrated that recessions and high local unemployment rates
reduce rather than increase mortality (Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2005, Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006).
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these papers as a causal impact of unemployment on health. In contrast, a recent paper
by Burgard et al. (2005) carefully addresses the issue of health causation versus health
selection in a larger sample of involuntary job losers in the U.S. While health effects are
strongest for those who experience a health shock after a job loss or who loose their jobs
for health reasons, adverse health effects are also existent for other workers experiencing
a job loss.
The above studies are based on cross–sectional data and therefore are strongly subject
to the problem of health–driven selection bias. Other studies focusing on the take–up of
health care provision use empirical strategies that are less prone to such a bias. Iversen
et al. (1989) find rising hospital admissions in a sample of Danish workers after a large
shipyard closure and Keefe et al. (2001) report excess risk of cancer registrations and
public hospital admissions in a sample of workers displaced after bankruptcy of a meat-
processing plant. The recent paper by Browning et al. (2006) applies propensity score
matching of displaced and non-displaced workers in a large administrative data set from
Denmark and finds no significant effect of job loss on rates of hospitalization for stress-
related diseases (such as high blood pressure, heart diseases, gastric catarrh, ulcer).
A further related literature studies the impact of unemployment on take–up of par-
ticular public health care provisions, in particular doctor visits. Carr-Hill et al. (1996)
and Field and Briggs (2001) find that the jobless workers in the UK do consult general
practitioners more often than employed workers with similar characteristics. Similar ev-
idence was found after a large furniture plant in Austria (Studnicka et al., 1991). D’Arcy
and Siddique (1985) provide evidence from the Canadian health care survey data that
the unemployed use public health care more heavily than workers with a job. Such
evidence may indicate that unemployment leads to health problems but is also consis-
tent with the economic theory of health production (Grossman, 1972), which predicts
increased incentives to invest in time–consuming health activities during periods of re-
duced opportunity cost of time (such as unemployment). However, other studies find
that the unemployed make less use of the public health care system even when they are
eligible to health care services. Ahs and Westerling (2006) and Virtanen (1993) study
Scandinavian experiences and that find that unemployment is associated with lack of
unmet care needs, particularly among unemployed who suffer from psychological symp-
toms. One possible explanation for such a result is based upon the behavioral model
of health care use (Andersen, 1995) which stresses that take–up of health care benefits
is not only influenced by need of care but also by individual predisposition and social
context.
Further studies have shown that unemployment has a pronounced effect on subjective
well–being. Clark and Oswald (1994) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) docu-
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ment the close relation between unemployment and unhappiness. Theodossiou (1998)
finds that the unemployed suffer more from anxiety, depression and loss of confidence
compared to otherwise similar employed individuals. Bjorklund (1985) finds evidence
that unemployment has detrimental health effects in Sweden. Other studies focus on
youth workers and find detrimental effects of unemployment on well–being, as Goldsmith
et al. (1996) for the United States and Korpi (1997) for Sweden.
2.3 Data and Definitions
2.3.1 Data Sources
We draw on social security register data that can be linked to data covering the take–up
of health insurance provisions form the statutory health insurance fund from a large
region in Austria (”Upper Austria”).10 This data set covers individuals that are em-
ployed in the private sector. Social security register data provide information, on a
daily basis, on the workers’ earnings and employment history (collected for the purpose
of calculating a worker’s old age social security benefits, see Kuhn and Ruf (2006) for
details concerning this data source). Data from the statutory health insurance record
all payments by the health insurance fund related to a worker’s take–up of health care
benefits.
The combination of these two data sets provides enormously rich information and
has two additional features that make it ideally suited for the present analysis.
A first unique feature is that the data cover the universe of the private sector em-
ployees (more than 80% of the active state population) in the region.11 Moreover, each
employed worker can be linked to a particular firm via a unique firm identifier. Because
the data set covers the universe of workers we can perfectly reconstruct firms. A ”firm”
is simply defined as the set of individuals that is observed under a given employer social
security number (”firm identifier”) at a given date. The possibility of linking firm- and
worker–information is particularly helpful for our estimation strategy which relies on a
firm characteristic: the date of shut–down of a firm. Firm information is further helpful
in making plant–closure workers better comparable to employees in ongoing firms and
10The administration of health insurance in Austria is divided into regional units (”Gebiet-
skrankenkassen”, GBKK), and our data set comes from the insurance fund covering the region of
Upper Austria (”Oberösterreich”). Upper Austria is one of the nine Austrian states and located in the
northeastern part of the country. This region covers about one sixth of the total Austrian population
and work force.
11There are separate funds for private-sector employees, self–employed, farmers, public sector workers,
and employees of several public utility firms. The data available to us comprises the universe of private
sector workers only.
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thus allowing to compare samples of workers with similar previous job situations.
A second unique feature is that these two data sets provide high–quality and com-
prehensive information on expenditures associated with a worker’s health status. The
reason is that health insurance is mandatory for all employees in Austria and that cov-
erage is comprehensive and covers all costs associated with primary health care such
as treatment by physicians, drug prescriptions, and hospitalized care. As a result, the
data give a very detailed and broad picture of the health expenditures caused by a given
individual.12
The payments recorded in the data can be broadly divided into the following four cat-
egories (see table A.1 in the chapter appendix for an exact definition of these categories
and further subcategories used in the empirical analysis below):
1. Sick leave transfers:
These are payments to employed and unemployed workers during periods of sick-
ness (when they are not capable of searching for a new job or not capable of
working). When unemployed, sickness benefits are roughly equal to unemploy-
ment benefits. Days of sickness benefits do not reduce the number of (remaining)
days during which an unemployed worker is eligible to regular unemployment bene-
fits. When employed, a worker initially continues to receive her or his wage during
the first up to 12 weeks (depending on previous tenure) in the sick leave spell.
Thereafter the health insurance provides sickness benefits amounting to 80% of
the previous wage. In order to claim sickness benefits, a physician has to approve
and repeatedly check a worker’s impaired health situation.
Our data cover all days on sick leave but only the sickness benefits paid by health
insurance. We therefore provide separate results for sickness benefits and days on
sick leave. Sick leave payments may be higher for workers getting ill after a plant
closure because the bankrupt firm can not continue to pay the wage for the initial
12 week period or because plant closure workers are more likely to enter sickness
insurance from unemployment. Plant closure workers are thus more likely to be
receiving sickness benefits paid by health insurance. The situation is different for
a worker getting ill in a firm that is not going bankrupt. Thus, sickness benefits
can be mechanically higher for workers in plant closure firms than for workers in
12On top of mandatory public health insurance, individuals purchase supplementary insurance of-
fered by private insurance companies. Provisions provided by these companies include higher quality
treatment (e.g. single bedrooms during hospitalization) and specific treatments (e.g. non–standard
treatments not generally accepted by orthodox/traditional medicine). As costs covered by these sup-
plementary insurance contracts are on top of provisions covered by public health insurance, this does
not cause any measurement problems for our empirical analysis.
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continuing firms. However, days on sick leave are recorded in the same manner for
workers leaving bankrupt firms and other workers.
2. Consultations:
Doctors have contracts with the public health insurance and get paid a standard-
ized rate for each consultation.
3. Hospitalizations:
The data record each hospitalization and details the particular reason for the
hospitalization. In particular, it classifies the costs by the main diagnosis of the
hospitalization according to the ICD–9 codes. We aggregate the diagnoses into the
following causes for hospitalization: cancer, heart disease, mental health problems,
respiratory diseases, cerebrovascular diseases, costs related to pregnancies, and
other hospitalizations.
4. Drug prescriptions (including detailed types of prescribed drugs):
The data record all payments to drug stores (or refund to individuals) for pre-
scribed and self-medicated drugs. The data are extremely detailed concerning the
type of drugs. We classify these drugs into a category that is ”specific” to treat
health problems associated with unemployment and a residual category of non-
specific drugs. Among specific drugs we distinguish ”psychosomatic” drugs (tar-
geted at psychosomatic afflictions such as migraine therapeutics, anti-inflammatory
drugs, etc.) and ”psychotropic” drugs (treating psychological distress such as seda-
tives, benzodiazepins, antidepressants, etc.).
Table 2.1 gives an overview of health costs incurred in the year before the reference date
(see the following subsection for the definition of the reference date). Overall yearly
health costs of the workers covered in our sample amount to 456 Euros for men and
469 Euros for women.13 A large fraction of these overall health costs is due to sick–
leave transfer payments. For men, about 45 percent of overall health costs are due to
such transfers whereas for women sickness transfer payments account for less than 20
percent. The main reason for this difference is that sick-leave benefits are closely linked
to previous earnings. Hence the higher payments for men are mainly due to the fact that
males get higher benefits per day on sick leave and to a lesser extent to more days on sick
leave (women spend 10.4 days on sick leave, men remain 11.5 days on sick leave). Other
13Notice that these numbers are based on prime–age workers and are not representative for the whole
population. To be included in the sample, a worker had to be employed at some date during our
observations period (see below). The numbers would be much higher for retirees. Also note that the
mean health costs are much lower than the standard deviation of health costs. This is due to the
fact that most individuals are generating very low or zero health care costs but a small fraction of the
population is incurring very large health care costs.
17
2.3. Data and Definitions Health Costs of Unemployment
health costs arise from medical treatments. The remaining categories health costs caused
by men amount to 81 Euros for doctor consultations, 116 Euros for hospitalizations, and
56 Euros for drug prescriptions. For women, health costs are considerably higher in each
of these categories. Their yearly costs arising from doctor consultations are 156 Euros,
from hospitalizations 136 Euros and from drug prescriptions 85 Euros. This descriptive
analysis shows that public health costs differ strongly between women and men which
suggests analyzing the effects of unemployment on health care use separately for women
and men. The data on transfer payment from the health insurance fund cover the five–
Table 2.1: Health indicators, one year before the plant closure date
Men Women
Overall health costs 455.497 469.108
(2918.971) (1725.697)
Sick leave payments 202.469 92.008
(2662.438) (1314.157)









Notes: The table shows means (standard deviations)
for all variables. All variables (except days on sick
leave) are measured in nominal Euros and cover the
four quarters before the plant closure (reference) date.
See table A.1 in the chapter appendix for the defini-
tions of the various health measures.
year period from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2002. To get information on the the
days not employed as well as on tenure with the current firm, we linked the data from the
health insurance fund with the Austrian social security register data (ASSD) provided
by the central social security agency (”Hauptverband der Sozialversicherungsträger”).14
To link the information of individual health costs and individual unemployment ex-
periences we construct a monthly panel of individuals’ health and employment histories.
Within the period January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2002, we measure the health costs
of an individual by calculating overall health costs and disaggregate these costs into the
14The Central Social Security Administration gets its data from the Funds and processes this infor-
mation for the purpose of calculating of old-age social security benefits. So retrospective data from the
Central Social Security Administration are collected in the same way as the recent data from the Fund.
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above categories (and, in the case of drug prescriptions and hospitalization costs, also
into subcategories). We measure unemployment by the days not employed per month.
This measure is not sensitive to individual’s decisions to eligibility for unemployment
benefits and actual take up decisions. The disadvantage of the days not employed mea-
sure is that there is a mechanical relationship between days not employed and days on
sick leave or days spent in the hospital because these days can not be recorded as days
employed.15 Note, however, that using days not employed as a proxy for unemployment
gives rise to a lower bound on the causal effect of unemployment on health rather than an
upward biased effect. This is because the IV estimator relates the effect of plant closure
on health to the effect of plant closure on days not employed. Using days not employed
as a measure of unemployment inflates the effect of plant closure on unemployment and
therefore provides a lower bound on the causal effect of unemployment on health.
2.3.2 Definition of Plant Closure
In order to assess the causal impact of unemployment on health costs we use plant closure
as an instrument for an individual’s unemployment. The assumption is that workers in a
plant-closing firm loose their job involuntarily, whereas for other job separations it is not
clear whether such separation results from a quit or a layoff. Let us first make precise
how we define a ”plant closure” and how we define a job-loss due to plant closure.
Definition of plant closure firms. To identify plant closure in our data it is partic-
ularly helpful that employer and employee information can be matched. In a first step,
we use this information to identify, a ”plant closure”. A firm is considered as a plant
closure firm if it fulfills the following criteria: (i) There has to be positive employment
through at least 12 months up to some month t and zero employment from month t+ 1
through month t + 12. (ii) If a firm disappears at date t, no more than 50 percent
of the employees switch to the same employer at date t + 1. (This latter criterion is
adopted to rule out misclassification of a take-over as a bankruptcy). Whenever more
than 50 percent of the employees are found under an identical new employer identifier
these observations are excluded from the sample. To make the distinction between plant
closure firms and non–plant closure firms as clean as possible all firms with large and
long–lasting drops in employment (and thus all workers employed in theses firms) are
excluded from the sample.
15There are no important differences between using days not employed or days unemployed from the
perspective of eligibility for sickness benefits. Both registered unemployed job seekers and job seekers
who have exhausted unemployment benefits are eligible for sickness benefits if they are eligible for
unemployment assistance.
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We consider all plant closures that take place between January, 1 1999 and December
31, 2001 (using the 10th of each month as the baseline date). This ensures that we have
at least one year of health insurance information before and after the plant closure date
(recall that the health insurance data runs from January 1, 1998 until December 31,
2002).
Definition of plant closure and non–plant closure workers. Just like plant clo-
sure firms, we define plant closure workers in a narrow sense. Our plant closure sample
(PC) consists of all workers, who are employed in the month of plant closure or who
were employed at least one month during the year before plant closure (but left before
the effective shut–down of the plant). Hence our sample of plant–closure worker covers
”stayers” who are employed in the closing firm in the month before it shuts down but it
also includes ”early leavers”.
Due to the complex structure of the health insurance data, we work with a random
sample of workers employed in non-plant closure firms. Non–plant closure workers are
sampled randomly among all workers employed in non-plant closure firms and non-
distressed firms. Specifically, on each reference date between January 10, 1999 and
December 10, 2001, we take a 2.5 % random sample of from the universe of the control
group of all small firms (3 or 4 employees) and a 0.25 % sample of all larger firms (more
than 4 employees). All employees in firms with less than 3 employees are excluded
from the data. (If such a firm disappears, it is likely that this is just a recoding of
the firm identifier rather than a bankruptcy). This procedure provides a sample of
control workers who were not employed in plant closure firms. Notice that the sampling
procedure allows for workers to be included in the control sample repeatedly.
We measure monthly health care costs and monthly days in unemployment relative
to the plant closure date for plant closure workers and relative to the reference date for
non–plant closure workers. The plant closure date is the 10th day of the month before
the plant closes for ”stayers” and the 10th day of the month before leaving the firm for
”early leavers”.16 The reference date for control workers is the 10th day of the month in
which the control workers are sampled.17 In the following, we use the term ”plant closure
16For instance, suppose a firm is active on the 10th of January 2000 but no longer active in any of the
subsequent 12 months. The plant closure date of workers who are employed in this firm on the 10th of
January 2000 is the 10th of January 2000. An ”early leaver” is a worker who has been employed in this
firm on the 10th of February 1999 (10th of March 1999, ..., 10th of December 1999). The plant closure
date for this worker is the 10th of February 1999 (10th of March 1999, ..., 10th of December 1999).
17For instance, suppose a control worker is included in the random sample drawn on 10th of January
2000. This individual’s reference date is the 10th of January 2000. Moreover, this individual is going to
be used to estimate the counterfactual for all workers employed in plants that close between the 10th
of January 2000 and the 10th of February 2000.
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2.3. Descriptive Analysis Health Costs of Unemployment
date” to identify the plant closure date for plant closure workers and the reference date
for control workers.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the construction of our dataset. On each date between 10th of
January 1999 and 10th of December 2001, we first identify closing firms. In a second
step, we identify the workers employed in the closing firms. In the third step, we we
draw a stratified (by firm size) random sample of workers who are employed in firms
that do not close. The fourth and final step consists of constructing information on
work history and health care costs covering the year before and the year after the plant
closure or reference date.
2.4 Descriptive Analysis
It is interesting to take a first look at the characteristics of the treated (plant–closure,
PC henceforth) and control (non–plant closure, NPC henceforth) groups. Applying the
sample selection procedure described above leaves us with 52,595 individuals of which
12,894 are PC–workers and 39,701 are NPC–workers.
2.4.1 Ex Ante Differences in Health Costs
We first provide in–depth summary statistics on the year before the plant closure date.
This provides a first test of the comparability of workers in PC–firms and workers in
NPC–firms. Table 2.2 reports the health costs per individual in the year before plant
closure, by gender and plant closure status. Clearly, plant closure workers incur some-
what higher health costs than non-plant closure workers. Women who work in firms
that go bankrupt incur about 15 Euros in health costs more – 3% of overall NPC-costs
– than women in the NPC-sample. PC–men generate 68 Euros higher – 15% of overall
NPC–costs – health costs than NPC–men. Thus, female plant-closure and non-plant
closure workers appear to be more comparable than their male counterparts. The dif-
ferences in health costs before plant closure primarily arise because sickness benefits are
higher for PC–workers than for NPC-workers (72 Euros for men, 21 Euros for women,
second row)– primarily due to more days on sick leave (third row). In contrast, the
remaining health cost categories are more balanced. Plant closure workers incur slightly
lower costs due to doctor consultations and drug prescriptions and somewhat higher
costs due to hospitalizations. This pattern is quantitatively and qualitatively similar
for women and men. Thus, PC– and NPC–workers are quite similar with respect to
the consultations, hospitalizations, and drug prescriptions but not with respect to sick
leave. Table A.2 in chapter appendix provides more detailed information on the other
22
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Table 2.2: Health indicators, one year before the reference date
Men Women
NPC PC NPC PC
Overall health costs 438.205 505.810 465.721 480.660
(2747.959) (3367.170) (1645.366) (1975.412)
Sick leave pay 183.928 256.415 87.160 108.542
(2504.585) (3075.511) (1276.383) (1435.563)
Days on sick leave 11.018 12.760 9.944 11.835
(19.872) (21.232) (18.705) (19.684)
Consultations 84.978 70.481 156.622 152.946
(128.325) (111.903) (174.884) (165.596)
Hospitalizations 110.947 129.365 134.092 142.731
(561.246) (613.031) (546.794) (658.760)
Drugs 58.351 49.550 87.846 76.441
(317.279) (268.557) (438.260) (304.736)
n 24,821 8,531 14,880 4,363
Notes: All variables (except days on sick leave) are measured in nominal Euros and cover
the four quarters before the plant closure (reference) date. NPC (PC) refers to the non
plant closure (plant closure) workers. Also see table A.1 in the chapter appendix for the
definitions of the various health measures.
background characteristics, by gender and plant closure status. The majority of male
PC–workers are blue collar workers, relatively young (on average 35.6 years) and earning
a relatively low income (on average about 19,5 Euro during the year before the plant
closure date). The sample of male NPC–workers has a substantially lower fraction of
blue collar workers, is somewhat older (on average 36.9 years) and is earning more (on
average 23,735 Euros during the year before the plant-closure). The differences between
female PC– and female NPC–workers are qualitatively similar. NPC–workers were some-
what less frequently without work during the year before the plant closure date – on
average men were 22.9 days non-employed, and women were 24.4 days non-employed. In
contrast, male PC–workers spent 55.9 days in non–employment and female PC–workers
were 34.0 days non-employed. NPC–workers have also been more continuously employed
with their employer than PC–workers. Average tenure in the last five years is 3.2 years
for men and 3.3 years for women in NPC–firms. In contrast, PC–workers joined their
current employer more recently with tenure amounting to 1.8 years for men and 2.5
years for women. Table A.2 also provides information on firm characteristics, such as
size, industry, and location. The data clearly show that PC-firms are much smaller than
NPC–firms, and that PC–firms tend to be more likely to be in the construction sector
than NPC–firms. There are no important differences with respect to firm location for
those firms employing the men in our sample. In contrast, there is a higher proportion of
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NPC–firms with unknown location employing women.18 Finally, plant closures appear
to be concentrated in December.
2.4.2 Effects on Non–Employment and Health
In a second step, we assess the effects of the plant closure event on the days spent in
non–employment and on health care costs. Figure 2.2 depicts both the evolution of
unemployment experiences for PC– and NPC–workers, by gender. The unemployment
measure used in figure 2.2 is the number of days not in employment per individual
during the last quarter. We see that male PC–workers spent about 15 days per quarter
in unemployment throughout the year before the plant closure date.19 In contrast, NPC–
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Notes: The vertical axis measures, for any given quarter since the date of (to) the plant closure (reference
date), the average number of days not employed among plant closure (PC) and non plant closure (NPC)
workers. For the definition of plant closure date (for PC workers) and reference date (for NPC workers)
see figure 2.1.
workers only spent about 5 days in unemployment per quarter during the last year before
the reference date. After plant closure, unemployment soars for plant closure workers.
In particular during the first six months the nonemployment rises to an average of over
30 days or more. In the third quarter after plant closure, nonemployment decreases to
25 days, and in the fourth quarter, nonemployment decreases to slightly more than 20
days – a level which is still markedly higher than in any quarter before plant closure.
In contrast, unemployment for non-plant closure worker is very similar before and after
the plant-closure date.
18Region and industry information can be missing for firms having several plants across Austria which
are active in more than one industry.
19The difference in the number of days in nonemployment decreases somewhat before the plant closure
date due the fact that each worker in the sample has to be employed on the reference date.
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Women in PC–firms also spend more days in nonemployment (about 8 days) than
women in NPC-firms (about 4 days) in any quarter before plant closure. In comparison
with men, this difference in smaller. Yet, the impact of plant closure is even stronger for
women. In the quarter after plant closure, PC–women remain in non–employment for
more than 35 days whereas there is no effect for NPC–women. The discrepancy in days
non–employed decreases somewhat but even in the fourth quarter after plant closure,
PC-women remain nonemployed for 30 days whereas NPC–women remain nonemployed
for about 4 days. Figure 2.3 shows the corresponding graphs for the evolution of health
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Notes: The vertical axis measures, for any given quarter since the date of (to) plant closure (reference
date), the health insurance costs per worker among plant closure (PC) and non plant closure (NPC)
workers. For definition of plant closure data (for PC workers) and reference date (for NPC workers)
see figure 2.1. Also see table A.1 in the chapter appendix for a description of the health care services
covered by the overall cost measure.
costs. We see that plant closure workers cause slightly higher health costs before the
plant closure date than non–plant closure workers. After the plant closure date, health
costs more than double during the first months after the plant closure and then fall again.
Interestingly, we also find an increase in health costs for non-plant closure workers after
the reference date. One reason for this increase is selection on workers who are employed
(and hence in good health) at the date of plant closure (and most likely during the months
before that date) but may become sick after that date. Therefore it is not surprising that
we see an asymmetric evolution of the health care costs before and after the reference
date. Moreover, the periods under consideration health costs were strongly increasing in
general (in particular, in the years 2000 – 2002) which is reflected in the upward trend
of health costs of non-plant closure workers after the reference (plant–closure) dates.
Overall health costs appear to be strongly affected by nonemployment resulting from
plant closure. However, overall health costs can be misleading because sickness benefits
are recorded differently between PC– and NPC–workers (see section 2.3). Figure 2.4
25
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therefore reports the evolution of overall health costs excluding sickness benefits and sick
leave days (which are not recorded in different ways between PC– and NPC–workers).
The results regarding overall costs (excluding sick pay) indicate that for both men and
women PC– and NPC–individuals are very similar before the plant closure date. Plant
closure increases health care costs only slightly among men in the first quarter after the
plant closure date. In the second to fourth quarter after the plant closure date, health
care costs are even slightly lower for PC–men compared to NPC–men. In contrast, PC–
women are incurring much higher health care costs than NPC–women in the first and
second quarter after the plant closure date. In the third and fourth quarter, PC–women
use slightly less health care than NPC women. Thus, results for health costs excluding
sick leave suggest that the effects of unemployment on health are modest.
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Notes: The vertical axis measures, for any given quarter since the date of (to) plant closure (reference
date), overall health costs excluding costs arising from days on sick leave (upper panel) and the average
days on sick leave (lower panel) among plant closure (PC) and non plant closure (NPC) workers. For
the definition of plant closure date (for PC workers) and reference date (for NPC workers) see figure
2.1. Also see table A.1 in the chapter appendix for a description of the health care services covered by
the cost measure.
The bottom panel of figure 2.4 shows results for days on sick leave. For men there is
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only a small difference in days on sick leave the fourth and third quarter before the plant
closure date. However, in the two quarters immediately before plant closure, days on sick
leave tend to increase for PC–workers whereas they tend to decrease (slightly) for NPC–
workers. The fact that days on sick leave increase already before plant closure might be
interpreted as a sign that the identifying assumption – health status of workers does not
cause plant closure – is not valid. This interpretation is unlikely to hold because workers
spend on average at most 3.5 out of 91 days per quarter on sick leave. This means that
it is unlikely that the deteriorating health of a small group of workers accounts for the
failure of the entire firm. A second interpretation of this fact is that anticipation of plant
closure is already deteriorating health among some PC–workers. Thus, an analysis that
is only looking at the effects of plant closure on health status after plant closure may
provide a misleading picture of the overall health effects of non–employment.
The bottom panel of figure 2.4 also shows that in the first quarter after the plant
closure days on sick leave are considerably higher for individuals formerly employed
in PC–firms than for NPC–individuals. But the difference in sick leave days quickly
diminishes in the second quarter and vanishes completely in the third and fourth quarter
after the plant closure date. The findings for women are very much in line with the
findings for men. Sick leave days increase already two quarters before the plant is
actually going bankrupt. The difference in sick leave days is not persistent, sick leave
days among PC–women reaching approximately the same level in the third and fourth
quarter after plant closure as in the third and fourth quarter before plant closure. Thus,
the evidence suggests that there is a temporary and relatively weak effect of plant closure
on days on sick leave.
2.5 Identification and Estimation
This section discusses our strategy to identifying the causal effect of unemployment on
health (costs) that will primarily capitalize on the exogenous variation in employment
status generated by the shut–down of the employer. We though start discussing identi-
fication in a simple linear regression framework.
Define yit as the payments incurred by the health insurance fund that are associated
with take–up of health insurance provisions of a particular individual i in the year t
where t = 0 is the year before plant closure for workers in firms that close and the
year before the plant closure date for workers in continuing establishments and t = 1
is the year after plant closure for the treated and the year after the plant closure date
for NPCs. Let dit the number of days that the individual i spent in unemployment in
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period t. Suppose dit and yit are related by the following linear relationship:
yit = β0 + β1dit + x
′
iγ + uit (2.1)
where xi is a (column) vector of control variables measured on the plant closure date and
uit is an error term capturing the effect of omitted variables affecting health costs, and
β0, β1 and γ are parameters to be estimated, the parameter of main interest being β1.
The control variables contained in xi are: age, blue collar status, tenure in the current
firm, firm size, and earnings per day worked (wage), a vector of industry dummies,
region dummies, and time dummies (a set of plant closure month and plant closure
year controls). Moreover, estimates are performed separately by gender because labor
market attachment differs strongly between women and men. Industry and time controls
are important because plant closure risk is strongly seasonal, and it differs by industry.
Time controls include a dummy for the year and the month of the plant closure date
to account for the fact that plant closures are more likely in December than in other
months of the year. Note that for workers leaving plant closure firms early – ”early
leavers” – the plant closure / reference date is the date at which the worker is leaving
the firm rather than the date at which the plant closes. Region controls capture the
location of the employer (inside upper Austria, outside upper Austria, or unknown).
Note that the OLS estimate of β1 in equation (2.1) is potentially biased because
of endogeneity of the unemployment variable dit. Days spent in unemployment dit are
likely correlated with uit because a bad health status (that leads to high health costs)
may also affect the duration that an individual spends in unemployment.20
2.5.1 Plant Closure as an Instrument
To tackle the problem of endogeneity we use an instrumental variable approach. This
approach utilizes variation in the treatment variable dit which is generated by some
exogenous (with respect to health) factor. Hence we need to think of a situation where
variation in unemployment is not driven by individuals’ health status. This chapter
uses employment in a plant closure firm as the instrument for the number of days in
unemployment during the year that follows a job loss. The idea is that employment in
a plant closure firm is closely correlated with unemployment in the subsequent period
di1 but unrelated to a worker’s (ex–ante) health status yi0.
We define zi as a binary variable that equals 1 if a person is employed in a plant
closure firm at the plant closure date and equals 0 if a person is employed in a firm that
20A similar endogeneity problem has been discussed in studies estimating the causal effect of education
on health (Chevalier and Feinstein, 2006).
28
2.5. Identficication and Estimation Health Costs of Unemployment
continues to exist after the plant closure date. In order to assess if employment in a
plant closure firm is a valid instrument for the causal effect of nonemployment on the
subsequent health status, several assumptions have to be satisfied (Angrist and Imbens,
1995, Angrist et al., 1996). The first assumption concerns the ignorability (i.e. the ran-
domness) of the instrument. This first assumption essentially states that the instrument
can be viewed as randomly assigned, so that both potential treatments and potential
outcomes do not differ between the two sub-samples. This is a strong assumption in our
case, as we cannot plausibly assume a–priori randomness of the instrument (see section
2.4 above) as there are both differences in the probability of being struck by a plant clo-
sure between different firms and also between different individuals (because firms with
different probabilities of shut–down have not necessarily the same composition of their
work force).
The central identifying assumption of our approach is that plant closure is ignorable
conditional on observed (individual and firm) characteristics xi. The idea is that the
health status of a worker does not lead to the firm going bankrupt once firm size,
firm industry, and worker age, tenure, and gender have been taken into account. This
assumption is essentially an exclusion restriction, that is, the instrument must not have
any direct effect on health costs. The assumption is that job–loss due to plant closure
does not directly affect the health status of a worker. Essentially, we assume that a
worker who finds a new job immediately does not suffer from health problems and hence
does not take up additional health insurance provisions. Any effect on health costs
comes via days spent in unemployment. In principle, plant closure might affect health
in other ways than via unemployment. For instance, areas with many plant closures
might experience reduction in pollution levels thus benefitting health in these areas.
Alternatively, tighter local budgets might imply deteriorating quality of health care
negatively affecting health. We believe that it is unlikely that such spillovers give rise to
direct effects of plant closure on health for two reasons. First, our descriptive analysis
indicate that plant closures are small compared to the average employer within a region.
Thus, plant closures are unlikely to generate regional spillover effects. Second, regional
spillover effects would also be affecting the control group. This suggests that regional
spillovers do not bias our estimates of the effects of unemployment on health.
We parametrically control for xi using two stage least squares. Clearly, the assump-
tion that zi is ignorable conditional on xi can not be tested directly. However, it turns
out that we can assess the plausibility of this assumption by exploiting the panel nature
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of our dataset.21 Specifically, we estimate:
yi0 = π0 + π1zi + x
′
iθ + ǫi0 (2.2)
This regression tests whether plant closure workers are similar with respect to health
care costs in the year before the plant closure date.22 Our results support the claim that
ignorability is a plausible assumption for men but less so for women. We address the
problem with non-balanced health costs in the period before plant closure by introducing
pre-plant closure health status as an additional control variable.
The second assumption is that the instrument must affect the treatment intensity.
Working in a plant closure firm at the plant closure date must increase unemployment
duration during the year following the shut-down of the plant for at least some workers.
As we show in section 2.4, working in a plant closure firm indeed has a huge impact on
unemployment. Hence the empirical evidence shows that this assumption is satisfied.
The third assumption postulates that the instrument has to affect all individuals in
the same way (monotonicity). This assumption states that, for each individual, the (po-
tential duration of unemployment during the year after the plant closure date is longer
when the individual works in a firm that closes due to bankruptcy on the plant closure
day than when the individual works in a regular firm on the plant closure day. Although
this assumption is not verifiable (because it involves potential and thus fundamentally
unobserved outcomes), it has a testable implication in the case of a non–binary treat-
ment, in that the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the treatment variable
does not cross for the two sub-samples (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995).
Figure 2.5 shows the empirical cumulative density of days not employed within the
year preceding or following the plant closure date, respectively. As the upper figure
shows, there is already a difference in the number of days not employed between the
two groups within the year preceding the plant closure date (which is already evident
in figure 2.2 above). But also note that this difference mainly manifests itself in the
lower domain of the variable and that the difference gets smaller for longer durations of
nonemployment. The right panel of figure 2.5 shows the same graph for the year just
following the plant closure / reference date. First note that the graph is essentially the
same for the NPC-group (compared to the year before the plant closure / reference date),
21An alternative approach to exploiting the panel nature of our dataset is to estimate a worker fixed
effects specification or a difference–in–difference specification. Results based on these approaches are
qualitatively similar to those reported in this chapter. The advantage of our approach is that it allows
us to investigate the plausibility of the conditional ignorability assumption using data on the year before
the plant closure date.
22Note that estimating model (2.2) in period t = 1 yields the reduced form – or ”intention to treat”
– effect of the instrument on health care costs.
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and thus there is practically no change in the distribution of the endogenous variable
for these individuals. Compare this to the large shift in the empirical distribution for
the treatment group. Although we see that our instrument has the largest impact on
the probability for somewhat shorter durations of nonemployment, there is also a large
increase in the probability of longer durations of nonemployment. This evidence does
not contradict the assumption that the plant closure event affects the days in non-
employment monotonically.
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Notes: The vertical axis measures the fraction of workers non–employed (unemployed or out of labor
force) for x days or less during the year prior to (upper panel) and after (lower panel) the plant closure
(reference date), separately for PC and NPC workers.
Angrist and Imbens (1995) show that, if all three of the above mentioned assump-
tions hold, the 2SLS estimator measures the average causal effect of non–employment
on health care costs for individuals which are induced to remain non–employed longer
because they have been employed in a plant that closed. The average causal effect de-
pends on both the instrument used and on the distribution of the treatment variable.
This means that any estimated causal effect does not necessarily coincide with health
effects of nonemployment resulting from other sources of job–loss.
2.6 Econometric Results
2.6.1 Ex–ante Differences in Health
Our aim is to study the causal effect of joblessness on public health costs that is based
on a comparison of non–employment experiences of plant-closure and non-plant closure
workers. This is a reliable identification strategy if the two groups do not differ with
respect to their health status ex ante, that is if their health status before the shut–down
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of the firm is identical. To get a first hint whether this is indeed the case, we run a simple
OLS regression on health costs in the year before the plant–closure date on the set of
control variables and include the plant–closure status as an additional control variable.
Table 2.3 includes the treatment dummy (taking on the value 1 for plant closure
workers, and 0 for non–plant closure workers) into this regression for males. We find a
positive point estimate for overall health costs (column 1) suggesting that plant-closure
workers incur higher health care costs than non–plant closure workers. However, the
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This suggests that our assumption
of no differences in average health status between the two groups of workers cannot
be rejected by the data. This conclusion remains unchanged if we look at different
subcategories of health costs. In all cases the standard error is much larger than the point
estimate indicating no significant differences between the two groups for health costs due
to sickness benefits, doctor consultations, hospitalizations and drug prescriptions. The
only exception is when we look at the number of days on sickness benefits (last column).
Here we see that there is a significant and quantitatively important differences between
PC– and NPC–workers. This finding is in line with results in figure 2.4.
The situation is similar for women as far as overall health costs are concerned (see
table 2.4). We find a positive point estimate which larger than that of males but which
is also not statistically different from zero. When we split up costs in subcategories
for different types of health insurance provisions, we find that female PC–workers cause
more costs due to doctor consultations (although quantitatively this effect is not very
large – comparing the point estimate with the mean of the dependent variable at the
bottom of table 2.4 shows that female PC-workers accumulate roughly 5 percent higher
costs that their NPC–counterparts). Just like for males, we see that also for females the
number of days on sickness benefits are higher for PC–workers than for NPC-workers.
Quantitatively, the difference is quite high, amounting to more than 20 percent higher
sickness days than the average worker. There is no significant difference between PC-
and NPC-workers in public health costs associated with the consumption of medical
drugs. Moreover, we see that the PC–coefficient for hospitalization costs is close to
significant and quantitatively important. In contrast, drugs and overall costs excluding
sickness benefits do no show any significant impact on overall health costs.
Tables 2.3 (for men) and 2.4 (for women) also display the partial correlations between
health care costs with the control variables. Column 1 shows that there is an inverse
u–shaped relationship in health care costs with respect to age, tenure and firm size but a
u–shaped relationship between health care costs and income per day. Columns 2 reports
results for the costs of medical treatments. The analysis reveals that there is a u-shaped
relationship between costs due to medical treatments and age, no relationship between
32
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medical costs and tenure, and a positive and linear relationship between medical costs
and firm size. The result for age is very much in line with the fact that older individuals
tend to incur higher costs due to medical treatments. Column 3 reports the results for
sickness benefits. Interestingly, these results are in line with a standard income equation.
This is not surprising since sickness benefits act as income replacement.
The results in table 2.3 and table 2.4 indicate that the plant closure is not directly
related to health care costs before plant closure for men. In contrast, the picture is
somewhat less favorable for women. While only doctor visits and days on sick leave
are significantly higher for PC–women at the 5 percent level, hospitalizations are also
significantly higher at the 10 percent level. This means that it will be important to
assess the sensitivity of our results to additionally controlling for health care costs or to
assessing the changes in health care costs.
2.6.2 The Causal Effect of Unemployment on Health Costs
The Effect of Plant Closure on Nonemployment
Table 2.5 shows the first–stage effect of plant closure on the number of days spent in
non–employment. That is, we run the the following regression, separately for men and
women:
di = ziγ + x
′
iδ + ǫi (2.3)
We see that the instrument is very strong, i.e. the first stage F–statistic is 261.65. The
PC–coefficient is highly significant (the coefficient being more than 75 times larger than
the standard error) and the impact is quantitatively important. The average male plant
closure worker spends 84 days more out of a job than the average non–plant closure
worker. PC–women are even more strongly affected by plant closure remaining 123 days
longer without work than corresponding NPC–women.
IV–Estimates
In what follows we present IV-estimates on the causal effects of non-employment after a
job loss on health costs. The dependent variable (i.e. the various health indicators) now
refers to the years after the plant closure date. To show that it is important to adopt
an IV-strategy to assess a causal impact of non-employment on health indicators, the
following tables list both the IV-estimator of number of days in non-employment, and
the corresponding OLS-estimator from a regression of health indicators after the plant
closure date on the number of days in non-employment during the year after the plant
35
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Age (in years) −3.193⋆⋆⋆ −6.565⋆⋆⋆
(0.291) (0.417)
Age/10 squared 5.176⋆⋆⋆ 8.845⋆⋆⋆
(0.372) (0.558)
Tenure (in years) −6.463⋆⋆⋆ −4.530⋆
(1.189) (1.776)
Tenure/10 squared 67.041⋆⋆ 35.852
(20.836) (30.617)
Blue collar worker 2.549⋆ −5.322⋆⋆⋆
(1.053) (1.550)
Size of firm 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)










Transportation, utilities −15.344⋆⋆⋆ −4.513
(2.147) (4.448)
Wholesale treade −7.880⋆⋆⋆ −7.286⋆⋆
(2.113) (2.775)
Retail trade −8.926⋆⋆⋆ −15.489⋆⋆⋆
(2.193) (2.169)
Information, finance −4.342⋆ −8.842⋆⋆⋆
(1.856) (2.623)
Wage (in 100 )e −0.678⋆⋆⋆ −0.495⋆⋆⋆
(0.019) (0.027)




Regional dummies included? X X




p–value (F–statistic) 0.000 0.000
Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1%
and 0.1% level, respectively. Dependent variable is days not
employed one year after the plant closure date. There are 28
regional dummies and 15 time dummies (year and month).
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closure date.23
Table 2.6 presents the IV-estimator for overall health costs for men. We see that an
additional day in non-employment causes an increase in overall public health costs by
4,85 Euros. This is a large number. To see this recall that, before the plant closure date,
the average health costs of PC– and NPC–worker amount to about 500 Euros per year
and worker (see Table 2.1). The first-stage regression reveals that a plant-closure event
raises days in non-employment by more than 83 days for males (and by more than 120
days of females). Taken together, our estimate suggests that public health costs of the
typical male PC-worker increase by more than 400 Euros (or by 80 percent!).
However, columns 2 and 3 of table 2.6 show that the increase is almost entirely due
to higher sickness benefits payments and not due to costs associated with increased
take–up of health care provisions. The IV–coefficient in column 2 shows that the causal
effect of non–employment on health–related take–up of insurance provisions (consulta-
tions, hospitalizations, drugs) is not only quantitatively very small but also statistically
insignificant. In contrast, column 3 reveals that the increase in public health costs is en-
tirely due to an increase in sickness payments which, for jobless workers, have now to be
borne by the public health insurance system rather than by the employer. Columns 4 to
7 decompose this impact into various health provision subcategories. It turns out that
that non-employment has no significant impact on hospitalization costs and on costs
associated with the consumption of medical drugs. Interestingly, we find a significant
(though quantitatively small) reduction in health costs due to doctor visits. This sug-
gests that doctor consultations cannot be strongly driven by a lower opportunity costs
of time for the non–employed.
In panel B of Table 2.6, we show the corresponding estimates for females. The
picture is very similar. Overall health costs increase, but the bulk of this increase is due
to increased sickness benefit payments. When we exclude these payment from the overall
health costs, the coefficient becomes small and statistically insignificant. However, in
contrast to males, non-employment causes additional health costs for females in various
subcategories, in particular due to increased hospitalization costs and due to an increased
number of sickness days. Similarly to males, however, doctor consultation decreases with
more days in non–employment.
23Regressing health indicators on days not employed before the plant closure date yields qualitatively
similar results with two exceptions (see table A.3 in the appendix). Drug prescriptions for men are not
significantly positively related to days not employed in the year before plant closure. Also, hospitaliza-
tion costs for women are much less strongly positively related with days not employed. This is due to
pregnancy costs which are much more important after plant closure than before plant closure.
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2.6. Econometric Results Health Costs of Unemployment
Comparison Between IV and OLS
For means of comparison, table 2.6 also shows the OLS–estimates. Both for males and
for females we see a consistent picture. OLS–estimates are much higher than the IV–
estimates. All coefficients shown in table 2.6 indicate that more days in non–employment
are associated with higher health costs, the only exception being doctor consultations
for males. While the IV–coefficient rules out reverse causality by the assumption that
plant–closure is unrelated to worker health, the OLS–coefficients may in addition be
driven by reverse causality, as less workers are more likely to become unemployed. We
see that not appropriately accounting for this reverse causality may have a substantial
impact on the estimated coefficient. This underlines the importance of our instrumental
variable approach for identification.
2.6.3 Robustness Checks
Additional Control Variables
One could argue that our IV–coefficients are biased as the health indicators of PC–
and NPC–workers are not completely identical before the plant closure event. To shed
light on this issue and to check the robustness of our previous estimates, table 2.7
reports the IV–coefficients from regressions that enrich the set of control variables. In
particular, to account for differences in employment performance and health indicators
between PC– and NPC–workers before the date of plant closure we include as additional
regressors the number of days in non–employment and the total health costs during the
year prior to that date. It turns out that our main results presented in table 2.6 remain
unchanged when we perform this robustness test. In particular, both for males and
for females the increase in public health costs is driven by sickness benefits payments
rather than an increase in the health status of non–employed workers as measured by
the health costs for hospitalizations, doctor consultations, and medical drugs. For males
and for females we find that doctor consultation decrease rather than increase when the
individual experiences more days in non–employment. For females but not for males,
we see an increase in the number of sickness days. In sum, table 2.7 reproduces almost
exactly our main results presented in table 2.6.
Changes in Health Costs
Table 2.8 shows the main results using the change in health outcomes as the depen-
dent variable. This specification allows for differences in health outcomes that are not
captured with our control variables. Results for men indicate that the strong effects on
overall health costs are primarily due to the effects of non–employment on sick leave
39




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6. Econometric Results Health Costs of Unemployment
pay. In contrast to the main results, estimates that are explaining the change in health
outcomes suggest that doctor consultations are positively affected by non–employment.
This change in results can probably be explained by the fact that PC–men are consult-
ing doctors slightly less frequently than NPC–men before plant closure (see table 2.3).
Panel B reports results for women. There are two important differences between the
results that account for pre existing differences in health outcomes between PC– and
NPC–women and the main results that only focus on the time period after plant closure.
The new results suggest that hospitalizations are only marginally significantly positively
affected (z–value of about 1.95) and that there are no effects on days on sick leave. The
other results are qualitatively very similar to our main results.
The robustness checks suggest that the main results are not sensitive to controlling for
differences in health costs before plant closure. However, the main results are sensitive
to measuring effects on changes in health costs rather than on levels of heath care costs.
The key question is whether this sensitivity in results is due to permanent or temporary
differences in health outcomes before plant closure. Permanent differences suggest that
the main identification strategy fails because these permanent differences can not be
caused by non–employment. In contrast, temporary differences in health outcomes can
arise if health reacts in anticipation of plant closure. We discuss possible anticipation
effects in more detail below (see figures 2.6 and 2.7).
2.6.4 Detailed Results
Hospitalizations
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 look in more detail at hospitalization costs (table 2.9) and on public
health costs associated with the consumption of medical drugs (table 2.10).
Panel A of table 2.9 shows that, for males, hospitalization costs associated with
cancer, stroke, respiratory ailments and other hospitalization are not affected by days
in non–employment. However, we see that hospitalizations due to mental illnesses are
significantly affected by days in non-employment. This is in line with previous research
that has emphasized that, in the short run, the experience of job loss and associated non-
employment may be predominantly showing up in case of mental illnesses where physical
illnesses manifest themselves only over a longer term. Panel B of table 2.9 shows that, for
females, days in non–employment cause a significant increase in overall hospitalization
costs and that this increase is mainly due to hospitalization due to pregnancy and
hospitalizations for other reasons. The results that pregnancies increase following a job
loss is consistent with the hypothesis that there are fertility timing considerations of
women. If a mother plans to have a child, she will choose the timing of a birth when the
41










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6. Econometric Results Health Costs of Unemployment
opportunity costs are low. Interestingly, also the catch-all category other hospitalizations
increase for females which suggests that hospitalization costs are partly also associated
with health problems. Table 2.9 again shows not only IV–coefficients but also OLS–
coefficients. The picture established in Table 2.6 before is confirmed also in table 2.9.
The majority of OLS–estimates is positive and significant, suggesting that more days
in non–employment are associated with higher hospitalization costs. However, with the
few exceptions mentioned above this is most likely the result of reverse causality.
Medical Drugs
Table 2.10 shows a similar analysis for the case of public health costs associated with
the consumption of medical drugs. While overall drug costs are not significantly affected
by days in non–employment, we find that, for males, the consumption of psychotropic
drugs (antidepressants, etc.) treating depressive conditions significantly increases with
more days in non–employment. This underlines the relevance of mental health problems
as a possible effect of non–employment due to plant closure. However, we do not find
a significant impact of the consumption of psychosomatic drugs , neither for males
nor for females. Again, OLS–estimates suggest a positive relationship between days in
non–employment and the consumption of drugs. These coefficients are significant in all
subcategories but most likely driven by reverse causality.
One could argue that the absence of any substantial difference in public health costs
after a plant closure does not mean that health costs are unaffected as workers could
suffer from health shock in anticipation of job loss and the fear of extended periods of
joblessness. Figure 2.6 shows the IV-estimates in each of the four quarters before and
after plant closure. This analysis allows discussing whether health care costs increase
already before job loss due to plant closure. The first row reports the effects of the
days not employed in the year after plant closure date on total health care costs in each
of the 4 quarters before plant closure and after plant closure.24 Results indicate that
there is no significant effect before the plant closure date but a strong and significant
effect in each quarter after the reference date. Results in the second row report the
effect of days not employed on days on sick leave. For both men and women, there
is no significant effect in quarters four and three before plant closure. However, results
clearly indicate that workers enter sick leave already two quarters before the plant closure
date. This anticipation effect is significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover the effect of
nonemployment on plant closure remains significantly positive in the first (men) and in
the first and second (women) quarter after plant closure date. This is consistent with
24Technically, this is a decomposition of the effects reported in the main analysis. Moreover, this
allows assessing whether there are effects already before plant closure.
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Consultations, women
Notes: Each graph shows the estimated coefficient of the number days not employed one
year after the plant closure (reference) date, instrumented by the dummy variable PC (equal
to 1 for PC workers and 0 otherweise), and its corresponding 95% confidence interval. The
dependent variable in the upper panel is overall health costs, for each of the eight quarters
centered around the plant closure (reference) date. The dependent variable in the middle
(lower) panel is the number of days on sick leave (health costs due to consultations). The left
(right) panels show the estimated coefficients for men (women). All regressions include the
full set of control variables as in Table 2.3.
an interpretation that the fear of loosing one’s job can already lead to a deterioration of
health.25 The third row reports the effect of job loss due to plant closure on costs due to
25Note that the results for sick leave and overall costs (reflecting to a large extent sickness benefits)
appear to be contradictory. Recall however, that the first up to 12 weeks of sickness benefits are paid
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doctor visits. Results indicate that there is a significant reduction of these costs in the
second and third quarter after plant closure for men. Women see doctors more frequently
in the two quarters just before plant closure, but less frequently in the second quarter
after plant closure. The result for women is consistent with our finding that job loss due
to plant closure is associated with higher pregnancy hospitalization costs. It appears that
women use periods without employment for family planning. Figure 2.7 provides detailed
results for hospitalizations due to mental health or other reasons, and for psychotropic
drugs. Results for mental health costs for men indicate that there is no effect of non-
employment on mental health for men both before and after plant closure date. The
point estimates after plant closure are, however, consistently positive explaining why
the overall effect is significantly positive as we find in table 2.10. Results for women
indicate that mental health is not affected by job loss due to plant closure. Recall that
hospitalization due to other reasons are significantly affected by job loss due to plant
closure for women. The second row in figure 2.7 indicates that there is an important
upward trend in the effect of nonemployment on health care costs already before plant
closure reaching marginal significance in the quarter just before plant closure. The effects
of non-employment on other hospitalization costs are significantly positive in the first two
quarters after the plant closure date and collapse to zero thereafter. The timing of these
costs is consistent with these expenditures being indirectly related with health conditions
arising due to pregnancies. The pattern of the effects on other hospitalization costs for
men does not indicate any effect of nonemployment. The third row shows results for
psychotropic drug prescriptions. Results for men indicate that the effects are significantly
positive in the third and fourth quarter after plant closure. This suggests that mental
health reacts in a relatively sluggish way to changes in the employment situation. There
is no effect of nonemployment on the prescription of psychotropic drugs among women.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter studies the causal effect of unemployment on public expenditures on health
care in a typical European welfare state. Our empirical analysis focuses on the case of
Austria where public health insurance is mandatory for all employees. To assess the
causal relationship between individual unemployment and public health care costs we
have exploited a unique data set that combines detailed information on a worker’s earn-
ings and employment history (and their firms) with detailed information on payments
by the public health insurance authority associated with take-up of health care benefits
by the employer and will therefore not be recorded as sickness benefits in our data. Thus, the finding
of no effect on overall costs but a strong significant effect on days on sick leave before plant closure can
be explained.
47
2.7. Conclusions Health Costs of Unemployment



























−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
quarter (relative to reference date)























−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
quarter (relative to reference date)



























−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
quarter (relative to reference date)
























−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
quarter (relative to reference date)































−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
































−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
quarter (relative to reference date)
Psychotropic drugs, women
Notes: Each graph shows the estimated coefficient of the number days not employed one year
after the plant closure (reference) date, instrumented by the dummy variable PC (equal to 1
for PC workers and 0 otherweise), and its corresponding 95% confidence interval. The depen-
dent variable in the upper panel is health costs of hospitalization due to mental reasons, for
each of the eight quarters centered around the plant closure (reference) date. The dependent
variable in the middle (lower) panel is health costs of hospitalization due to other reasons
(health costs of psychotropic drugs). The left (right) panels show the estimated coefficients
for men (women). All regressions include the full set of control variables as in Table 2.3.
(both treatment–related health care provisions such as hospitalization, doctor visits, and
drug prescriptions; and sickness benefits). To tackle the problem of reverse causality –
bad health may cause unemployment – we use job loss due to plant closure as an instru-
48
2.7. Conclusions Health Costs of Unemployment
mental variable. Job loss due to plant closure is a meaningful instrument because such
job losses are very closely associated with higher subsequent unemployment. Moreover
it is very unlikely that job losses due to plant closure are caused by a worker’s health.
Our empirical analysis yields several interesting results. First, it turns out that
unemployment following a plant closure does not cause a significant increase in public
health costs associated with take–up of health provisions. Public health costs due to
hospitalizations and medical drugs prescription do not increase significantly, and doctor
visits even fall. Second, while overall take-up of health provisions is not significantly
affected, we find that – for males, but not for females – an increase in public health costs
due to mental health problems. This result is in line with the hypothesis that, in the short
run, unemployment causes mental health problems, whereas physical health is affected
only in the long run. Third, we find that the public health costs that are associated with
payments of sickness benefits strongly increase after a job loss. However, this increase in
costs does not reflect a deteriorating health status of displaced workers but is mainly due
to sickness benefit rules (for employed workers, employers have to bear sickness benefits,
whereas for unemployed workers, the public health insurance pays these benefits). We
do not find that male plant-closure workers do have more sickness days than non-plant
closure workers. For females, however, we find a significant increase in sickness days.
In sum, our results indicate that unemployment is not associated with strong changes
in health care costs arising due to treatment of medical conditions but with strong
changes in sickness transfer payments. There are two lessons from this result. First,
our analysis shows clearly that public health expenditures are fluctuating strongly in a
country that use their health insurance to cover not only the costs of medical treatments
but also to pay out sickness benefits. Second, short work career disruptions do not
appear to deteriorate health in the short run. Future research should therefore focus on
assessing the long-term consequences of prolonged unemployment.
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2.A Additional Tables
Table A.1: Health Indicators, Definitions
Indicator Definition
Consultations Includes all costs1 arising from consultations by a physician
Drugs Includes all costs arising from prescribed or selfmedicated
drugs
Psychosomatic drugs: Includes drugs targeted at treating psychosomatic afflictions
(e.g. migraine therapeutics, antiinflammatory drugs)
Psychotropic drugs: Includes drugs targeted at treating psychological stress
(e.g. sedatives, benzodiazepins, antidepressants)
Specific drugs: Includes psychosomatic and psychotropic drugs
Overall: Includes all drugs
Hospitalisation Includes costs due to hospitalisation. These costs are classified
by the main diagnosis of the hospitalisation (ICD–9 codes)2
Cancer: Includes ICD–9 Codes 140–239
Heart: Includes ICD–9 Codes 391, 392.0, 393–398,
402, 404, 410–429
Mental: Includes ICD–9 Codes 290–319, V70.1, V70.2, V71.0
Respiratory: Incudes ICD–9 Codes 460–519
Cerebrovascular: Includes ICD–9 Codes 430–438
Other: Includes hospitalisation due to all other reasons
Overall: Includes hospitalisation due to any cause
Pregnancy: Includes ICD–9 Codes 630–676
Incapacity to Work Includes all costs arising from being on sick leave (”Krankengeld”)
Overall costs Includes the overall costs from consultations, drugs, hospitalisaiton,
and days on sick leave
1: All variables measured in (nominal) Euros.
2: Classification largely taken from Keefe et al. (2002).
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics, background characteristics
Men Women
NPC PC NPC PC
Individual characteristics
Days not employed 22.858 55.847 24.378 34.044
(59.882) (85.348) (68.013) (79.404)
Age 36.928 35.671 36.137 33.267
(10.374) (10.264) (10.096) (11.044)
Blue collar worker 0.564 0.740 0.315 0.360
(0.496) (0.439) (0.464) (0.480)
Wage (in 100 e) 237.375 195.272 158.165 126.329
(94.611) (103.692) (82.596) (81.566)
Tenure in last five years 3.198 1.800 3.252 2.508
(1.917) (1.791) (1.850) (1.770)
Size of firm (one year before) 669.972 56.537 1075.416 74.154
(2005.737) (74.868) (2954.541) (99.240)
Industry (employer)
Agriculture 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.072) (0.076) (0.070) (0.075)
Mining 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.080) (0.049) (0.038) (0.021)
Construction 0.129 0.299 0.028 0.062
(0.336) (0.458) (0.166) (0.241)
Manufacturing 0.387 0.291 0.200 0.263
(0.487) (0.454) (0.400) (0.440)
Transportation 0.059 0.058 0.025 0.013
(0.236) (0.233) (0.155) (0.112)
Wholesale trade 0.065 0.044 0.067 0.068
(0.247) (0.205) (0.251) (0.252)
Retail trade 0.057 0.047 0.120 0.150
(0.232) (0.212) (0.325) (0.357)
Information, finance 0.094 0.079 0.086 0.043
(0.292) (0.269) (0.280) (0.203)
Other services 0.107 0.073 0.338 0.339
(0.309) (0.259) (0.473) (0.473)
Industry unknown 0.090 0.102 0.130 0.056
(0.286) (0.303) (0.336) (0.230)
Region (employer)
Outside Upper Austria 0.140 0.159 0.099 0.068
(0.347) (0.357) (0.299) (0.252)
Inside Upper Austria 0.780 0.814 0.779 0.924
(0.414) (0.389) (0.415) (0.266)
Region unknown 0.079 0.036 0.122 0.008
(0.270) (0.186) (0.327) (0.092)
Reference date
Year = 1999 0.315 0.415 0.310 0.483
(0.465) (0.493) (0.463) (0.500)
Year = 2000 0.332 0.360 0.327 0.316
(0.471) (0.480) (0.469) (0.465)
Year = 2001 0.353 0.224 0.362 0.201
(0.478) (0.417) (0.481) (0.400)
Month = January 0.072 0.059 0.068 0.051
(0.259) (0.235) (0.252) (0.220)
Month = February 0.082 0.056 0.085 0.058
(0.274) (0.230) (0.279) (0.233)
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Table A.2: Continued
Men Women
NPC PC NPC PC
Month = March 0.083 0.091 0.079 0.094
(0.277) (0.288) (0.269) (0.292)
Month = April 0.077 0.100 0.076 0.084
(0.267) (0.300) (0.266) (0.277)
Month = May 0.087 0.075 0.082 0.079
(0.282) (0.263) (0.274) (0.269)
Month = June 0.087 0.107 0.108 0.090
(0.282) (0.309) (0.310) (0.287)
Month = July 0.086 0.057 0.075 0.047
(0.281) (0.231) (0.263) (0.212)
Month = August 0.080 0.048 0.076 0.049
(0.272) (0.213) (0.265) (0.216)
Month = September 0.082 0.103 0.079 0.080
(0.275) (0.304) (0.269) (0.272)
Month = October 0.087 0.072 0.095 0.043
(0.282) (0.258) (0.294) (0.203)
Month = November 0.083 0.080 0.069 0.042
(0.275) (0.272) (0.253) (0.202)
Month = December 0.091 0.153 0.109 0.282
(0.288) (0.360) (0.311) (0.450)
n 24,821 8,531 14,880 4,363
52








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF WAGE INEQUALITY
& THE DEMAND FOR REDISTRIBUTION
”Lack of money is the root of all evil.”
George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950), Irish writer
3.1 Introduction
One of the primary objectives of the modern welfare state is the redistribution of income
and wealth, either on grounds of supporting certain minimum standards of living for the
less privileged (by providing social welfare, for example), or explicitly stated with the
goal of reducing existing inequalities per se, which often serves as the rationale for pro-
gressive taxation (Barr, 1992; Boadway and Keen, 2000). It does not cause surprise then
that all OECD countries spend huge amounts, both in absolute and relative terms, on
redistribution (see, for example: OECD, 2007; Oxley et al., 1997). In 1996, for example,
the U.S. government spent about 21% of its total budget on social security and wel-
fare; the corresponding figure for Germany is considerably higher and amounts to about
40% (Hindriks and Myles, 2006, p.56). In fact, overall expenditure on redistribution is
arguably even higher than these figures suggest, since the provision of public goods is
also financed by taxes and public goods often also have an implicit redistributive flavor
(if, for example, poor(er) individuals disproportionally often take up publicly provided
services). Thus, the question naturally arises of why so much redistribution takes place,
at least in the western welfare states.1
1Besides, news about (sometimes) spectacularly high salaries of some few top managers more fre-
quently find their way into the media and sometimes lead to heated, even fierce, debates in public and
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Further, it is a commonly hold view in economics that the extent to which redis-
tribution takes place is determined by voting, and is thus ultimately shaped by the
preferences over fairness and redistribution of the electorate itself (see, among others:
Boadway and Keen, 2000; Borck, 2007; Hindriks and Myles, 2006). In fact, inspired
by the well–documented differences in the distribution of earnings (e.g. Gottschalk and
Smeeding, 1997) and differences in the impact of redistributive measures (Kenworthy
and Pontusson, 2005; Milanovic, 2000; Oxley et al., 1997) between countries, recent
theoretical work has pushed forward the idea that the amount of redistribution may es-
sentially be linked to attitudes about distributive justice (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005)
or to the perception of whether income and earnings are due to luck or effort (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006). In fact, as has been pointed out Bénabou and Tirole (2006), it is
difficult to think about the huge differences between countries with respect to inequality
and redistributive policy without any reference to differences in such beliefs. Empiri-
cally though, it remains to be shown that the observed differences in the amount and
efficacy of redistribution is linked to corresponding differences in the demand for redis-
tribution. Although this chapter will not directly address the question of differences
between countries, it provides a simple conceptual framework that can easily be applied
to such questions.
However, much less is known about the forces that shape the demand for redistribu-
tion in the first place, although by now a couple of empirical studies on the issue exists
(see the discussion in section 3.2). Further, we almost completely lack empirical evidence
on the hypothesized link between the demand for redistribution on the one hand and po-
litical outcomes on the other hand. It thus also remains to be shown that this is actually
the case, that is, it remains to be shown empirically that there actually is a link between
the demand for redistribution and political outcomes via voting behavior. Mainly for
this reason, Switzerland is chosen for the empirical analysis, because we expect a clear
link between the individual demand for redistribution and voting behavior, not the least
because the political parties in Switzerland clearly position themselves regarding redis-
tributive issues (and they have to do this quite often, since there are about ten votings
over referenda and initiatives a year at the federal level alone, not counting the votes
at the level of cantons or communities – although, obviously, not every voting is about
redistribution. Also, because of its federal structure, both taxes and expenditures are
to a significant part decided on small–level political units in Switzerland (i.e. on the
level of cantons and communities), giving rise to tax competition within Switzerland and
thereby accentuating this line of argument (Feld, 2000). Second, the Swiss labor market
politics. However, the public discussion has to date had a very limited focus and thus it does not provide
us with a full picture of how overall wage inequality is perceived or of what kind of wage distribution
is regarded as fair.
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is very similar to the U.S. labor market and thus the results of this chapter may, with
respect to this dimension, be compared to the large bulk of existing empirical studies
from the U.S. (e.g. Nickell et al., 2005)2
The primary aim of this chapter is to elaborate empirically on the these issues,
relying on survey data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 1999). First,
I propose a simple empirical framework for measuring individual evaluations of wage
inequality, both with respect to the perception of the factual as well as to the evaluation
of the desired distribution of wages. These two subjective inequality measures (i.e. the
discrepancy between them) are then used for measuring the demand for redistribution at
the individual level. This conceptualization explicitly recognizes that individuals might
differ both in their perception of the factual distribution and in their belief about the
distribution they judge as legitimate. Demand for redistribution, conceptualized in this
way, can thus only arise if the perceived level of inequality does not correspond with the
desired level of inequality. Second, using this framework, I will explore the ’anatomy’ of
redistribution. That is, I will empirically explore whether the demand is primarily driven
by the bottom or the top end of the distribution (or both, eventually) and whether is is
driven by the perception of the actual state of the world or by the belief about how the
world ideally should look like (’world’ in this context means wage inequality). Third, I
will study the importance of various factors in explaining the observed variation in the
support for redistribution. Specifically, I will explore the question of whether and to
what extent these differences can be attributed to either self–interest, to perceptions of
and social norms over distributive justice, or to both of them. Fourth and finally, I will
explore the empirical link between the demand for redistribution on the one hand and
stated preferences over political parties on the other hand and thereby provide indirect
empirical evidence on the hypothesized link between beliefs and political outcomes.
The main empirical findings of this chapter are the following. First, there is con-
siderable support for the redistribution of wages (that is, support for at least some
equalization of wages), resulting from the fact that the desired inequality in wages is
on average considerably lower than the perceived inequality. At the same time though,
people basically accept rather large differences in wages between different occupations
(which, obviously, differ in their prerequisites, associated responsibilities, required ed-
ucational attainment, and so on). Second, self–interest, perceptions of how wages are
determined, and social norms with respect to distributive justice are important in ex-
plaining differences in the individual support for redistribution (a result in line with
2Besides, Switzerland seems to be an exceptional case regarding the evolution of income inequality,
at least with respect to the incomes at the very top. See Dell et al. (2005) and Dell (2005) for a
discussion of the income and wealth distribution in Switzerland over the past century.
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existing empirical studies). There is thus no evidence for an exact match between the
position an individual holds (e.g. the expected gain or loss from redisributive measures
which is associated with this position) and the norms and beliefs regarding distributive
justice of this person. Third, there is some (although rather weak) empirical evidence
on the link between the demand for redistribution and stated party preference.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 to follow discusses some
relevant background literature, mainly focusing on the empirical literature concerned
with behavioral motives for redistribution. Section 3.3 shortly describes the data source
and its main strengths and weaknesses, but the main emphasis of the section is on sub-
jective (i.e. individual) wage estimates for different occupations. These data will be key
for the empirical framework used in the rest of the chapter. Section 3.4 then goes on
to discuss how subjective evaluations of wage inequality and the demand for redistribu-
tion will be conceptualized and measured. Results are presented in sections (sections
3.5–3.7). In section 3.5, I will first present some empirical results describing the demand
for redistribution. Section 3.6 then presents several simple regression models, where the
importance of various determinants of the demand for redistribution is considered. Fur-
ther, the analysis looks along the dimension of perception versus desire and the along
the dimension of top versus bottom of the wage distribution. Empirical evidence on the
link between the demand for redistribution on the one hand and party preference on the
other hand is discussed in section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
In very simple terms, support for redistribution might derive from either selfish or al-
truistic motives. First, an individual might support redistribution because she benefits
from redistribution herself in the end (or, to be precise, her benefits are higher than the
costs incurred by redistribution). As will be discussed below, several different arguments
might induce selfish redistribution. On the other hand, redistribution might arise from
the belief in a just world or likewise considerations about fairness and distributive jus-
tice. That is, an individual may support redistribution because she wants someone else
to benefit (or suffer, potentially) from such policies, without profiting herself from these
policies.
3.2.1 Selfish Redistribution
The ’classic’ economic view on redistribution postulates that the demand for redistri-
bution is directly linked to an individuals’ position within the income distribution (as
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discussed by Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Roberts, 1977; Romer, 1975).3 Important for the
empirical analysis to follow in this chapter is that these models predict that (relatively)
poor individuals will favor redistribution because they will gain disproportionately from
redistribution, and (relatively) rich will oppose redistribution because they will have to
pay disproportionately for redistributive policies.4 We should thus, at the individual
level, expect income to be an important predictor of the demand for redistribution, and
we should expect the more demand for redistribution, the lower one’s income. Moreover,
individuals at the top end of the distribution should oppose any amount of redistribu-
tion. Existing empirical studies though consistently show that income per se is not
a very strong predictor of the support for redistribution (see, specifically, Corneo and
Grüner, 2002; Fong, 2001), quite surprisingly and contrary to the predictions of these
theoretical models. The empirical results of this chapter, as will be discussed later, are
in line with the previous empirical literature on the same subject.
Income Mobility
One proximate explanation for this finding might be the existence of, or at least the
belief in, income mobility (see, for example, Bénabou and Ok, 2001 on the effect of
(the belief in) prospective upward mobility on the demand for redistribution). The
possibility of upward–mobility as well as the potential risk of downward–mobility might
mitigate the relation between income and the demand for redistribution, in such a way
that one’s expectations about future income at least partially determine the support
for redistributive measures (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). This might, for example,
explain the observation that there is no uniform support for income redistribution among
the poor, even if they would immediately gain from such policies (Fong, 2006). On
the other hand, the risk (or fear, respectively) of downward mobility might lead some
rich individuals to support income redistribution as a way of income insurance, if they
are expecting their income to fall in the future (Piketty, 1995; Ravallion and Lokshin,
2000). Rich individuals might thus vote for redistribution in order to insure themselves
against negative income shocks. As pointed out by Fong (2006), although the theoretical
3Chapter appendix 3.A makes the argument explicit in terms of a very simple model.
4At the aggregate level, one would expect higher inequality in factor income (i.e. income before taxes
and transfers) to be related with higher redistribution by the state. Milanovic (2000), for example,
though finds somewhat mixed empirical evidence in support of the argument. One possible explanation
is that political participation is itself an increasing function of income, thus shifting more political
power to the rich individuals (see Bénabou, 2000). Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) in fact show
that voter turnout is related to the amount of redistribution. Alternatively, redistribution might not
always go from rich to poor but rather the other way around. A leading example in this regard is
the public financing of (primarily higher) education since, as pointed out by (Fernandez and Rogerson,
1995), children from wealthier families tend to have a higher probability of attaining higher educational
degrees.
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argument linking prospective upward mobility and the demand for redistribution is very
appealing by itself, the empirical support it has found so far is quite shaky.
Absolute versus Relative Income
As several authors have pointed out, well–being might not only depend on absolute in-
come but also (or perhaps even more so) on relative income, i.e. on income relative to
some reference point (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996; van Praag et al., 2003). A similar
argument might naturally apply to the demand for redistribution: Support for redistri-
bution might be driven by the extent to which an individual thinks that his own pay is
higher (lower) than what he thinks would be appropriate or legitimate, from his very
own point of view (the study by Corneo and Grüner (2002) supports this argument).
It might even be the case that the absolute level of income per se is irrelevant with
respect to the demand for redistribution (or at least, this effect might be mitigated by
this evaluation about the appropriateness of one’s own income), but that the relevant
driving force is the extent to which one is satisfied (or not, respectively) with his own
level of income. That is to say, an individual with low income might not support any
redistribution as long as she thinks that she ultimately gets what she deserves.
3.2.2 Fairness and the Belief in a Just World
Recent research in economics has put forward ideas about the driving factors behind
support for redistribution, which are in a way somewhat less naive (sociologically, at
least). In fact, ample and robust empirical evidence has accumulated showing that, for
one reason or the other, people do care about fairness and distributive justice – beyond
the sole strive after maximizing their own well–being. Fong et al. (2005) provide a good
overview over the relevant lines of argument, Kluegel and Smith (1981) discuss the same
issue from a sociological point of view.
It seems safe to say that two of the most important concepts behind theories of
distributive justice are the ’need principle’ and the ’equity principle’ (e.g. Konow, 2003),
not being mutually exclusive. According to the need principle, resources should be
allocated according to individual need. On the other hand, the ’equity principle’ rests
upon considerations of proportionality and responsibility (Roemer (1998) discusses the
closely related concept of equality of opportunity). Shepelak and Alwin (1986) discuss
related concepts from a sociological point of view.
Another important factor in explaining variation in the individual support for re-
distribution are perceptions about the factual determinants of resources (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2006). That is, individuals who belief that mainly factors outside an individuals’
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control (e.g. ascribed factors like gender or ethnicity) are important for ascending in the
income distribution are presumably more inclined in supporting (more) redistribution
of incomes. On the other hand, individuals who strongly belief that individual effort
and / or skills (e.g. aquired factors like education) are important for why people differ
in their incomes, are less prone to support income redistribution. As pointed out by
Bénabou and Tirole (2006), this belief might be so strong that individuals might even
see an unfair reality as fair, in order that their perception does not conflict with their
own beliefs.5
Of course, it is left to the empirical analysis whether the perception of the allocation
mechanism and beliefs about which factors should be important in determining this
allocation are swamped by the individual’s endowments. But most empirical studies in
fact find that both financial self–interest and social norms and beliefs are important in
explaining the observed demand for redistribution.
Fairness as a Behavioral Motive
Up to date, there is ample experimental evidence showing that individuals are moti-
vated by concerns about fairness and reciprocity. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) provide a
recent and extensive survey of experimental evidence regarding fairness and reciprocity
as behavioral motives. A slightly different perspective is given by Levitt and List (2007),
stressing the fact that insights gained from experimental data do not, normally, carry
directly over into the ’real world’.
First, in the so called ultimatum game two persons have to agree on how to split
a certain amount of money. The first person makes a proposal of how to divide the
money. The second person can then either accept or reject this proposal, without any
possibility of action. In the case of acceptance, the money is split up between the two
persons according to the proposal of the first person. In the case of rejection, neither
of them receives any money at all. The ’standard’ economic prediction is that the
first person will propose the smallest possible amount of money to the other person,
knowing that the second person will accept any positive amount of money offered to
him. However, the robust experimental evidence clearly contradicts this prediction. As
Fehr and Schmidt (2001, p.5) point out, ”a robust result in the ultimatum game, across
hundreds of experiments, is that proposals offering the responder less than 20 percent
of the available surplus are rejected with probability 0.4 to 0.6”. Further, since the
5The leading example probably is that in the United States only a minority of people beliefs that
luck determines income (Alesina et al., 2001). Analogously, a majority in the U.S. thinks that the poor
are poor because they are lazy and don’t work hard enough to get out of poverty. This beliefs though
strongly contrast with the fact that social mobility in the U.S. is not exceptionally high (Solon, 2002).
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probability of rejection decreases in the amount of money offered, these results suggest
that proposals of too low an amount are rejected because they are viewed as unfair.
Second, in so called dictator games people more often than not propose a non–zero
amount of money, although they could keep all the money for themselves without the
threat of being punished for such behavior (as is possible in the ultimatum game). The
typical finding of such experiments is that usually more than 60% of the individuals
propose a positive amount of money – the mean transfer of money on average equal to
about 20% of the total endowment (Levitt and List, 2007).
Further, the pattern of outcomes in these experiments seems to be quite sensitive
to how the initial endowments are assigned, which supports arguments that postulate
that evaluations of fairness depend on the perception of how resources are allocated in
the real world. That is, an individual who perceives that the ’poor’ themselves are to
be blamed for being poor, might oppose redistribution, and vice versa. For example,
Clark (1998) finds that it does make a difference whether the initial endowment in the
experiment is determined randomly or by the relative performance in a knowledge quiz
before the experiment (also see Hoffman et al. (1996) on the effect of framing).
Stated Preferences for Redistribution
Evidence from non–experimental (i.e. survey) data seems to be consistent with exper-
imental evidence in general, but these studies also give some additional insights. The
study by Corneo and Grüner (2002) shows that the support for redistribution is driven
by selfish motives, but not exclusively so. Their empirical results also support the notion
that people, at a very fundamental level, seem to share a belief in distributive justice
(for whatever reason – something which can not be decided on by using survey data).
Third, the study also shows that one’s relative position within the income distribution
is important besides the absolute level of income. Similar results are presented in Fong
(2001), using survey data from the U.S. Specifically, her study also shows that perceived
causes for low income are relevant in explaining the support for redistributive policies.
Corneo and Fong (2006) go one step further and try to estimate the willingness–to–pay
for distributive justice. Interestingly, the study shows that people do not differ with
respect to the (monetary) value they put on distributive justice (although they differ in
the causes they believe to be responsible for differences in endowments).
A number of studies has shown that there are large differences in mean attitudes
towards redistribution between (groups of) countries (see, among many others, Svallfors
(1997)). Closest to my own framework is certainly the recent study by Osberg and
Smeeding (2006). This paper also shows huge variation in in the demand for redistri-
bution, not only with respect to average attitudes, but to the distribution of attitudes
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in general. Interestingly, this study suggest that the United States are not really excep-
tional with respect to such attitudes.
3.3 Subjective Estimates of Occupational Wages
3.3.1 Data Source
The data that are used in this chapter come from the International Social Survey Pro-
gram (ISSP), which is an international collaboration of several survey organizations
aiming at annual cross–national survey collaborations focusing on different main topics
(e.g. environment, work conditions).6 In 1987, the program conducted its first survey
focusing on issues of social inequality, with the largest part of the questions focusing on
the perception of the income distribution and the factors explaining individual incomes,
issues of distributive justice as well as the role of the government regarding the distribu-
tion of incomes. Two more survey projects on the same topic then followed in the years
1992 and 1999, and yet another survey on social inequality is planned for the year 2009.
This chapter uses the Swiss survey data collected in the context of the third survey of
the ISSP on ’social inequality’ dating from 1999.7
3.3.2 Measurement Error in Survey Data
Most economists seem to have quite strong reservations using survey data (instead of
administrative or experimental data), since it is known that typical survey data are
almost always subject to high rates of non–response and presumably prone to consid-
erable measurement error, to name but the two most important problems. The study
by Duncan and Hill (1985), for example, uses administrative data to validate survey
responses for the very same workers. They find measurement error of varying degree,
ranging from small error with respect to annual earnings and tenure to very large error
with respect to hours worked (which obviously leads to large error in hourly earnings,
even if annual earnings are not prone to such error). Moreover, there are more subtle
(and perhaps even more troubling) problems with survey data, a leading example being
that people sometimes express attitudes without really knowing what the questions are
6The ISSP originally grew out of a collaboration between the ZUMA (Zentrum für Umfragen, Meth-
oden, und Analysen) in Mannheim and the NORC (National Opinion Research Center) in Chicago. To
date, 42 countries take part in the program. See the organization’s homepage for further information
and the history of the program (www.issp.org).
7See Stamm et al. (2003) for details regarding the collection of the data and an extensive descriptive
discussion of these data. The data can be obtained from the Swiss Information and Data Archive
Service for the Social Sciences (SIDOS) under study no. 6396.
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about (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). On the other hand, however, survey data
typically include information which open up research questions which otherwise would
not be accessible to empirical analysis at all.
For the purpose of this study though, as will become clear when the conceptual
framework will be discussed, the focus is explicitly on subjective evaluations of different
occupational wages. In fact, the whole analysis would not make any sense if all individ-
uals exactly knew the wages of workers from other occupations because there would be
no variation between individuals regarding these evaluations and subjective evaluations
of wage inequality would collapse with objective inequality for each and every individual
(see section 3.4 below for details). In a way then, the empirical part of this chapter tries
to to make a virtue out of necessity.
3.3.3 Sample Selection
Sample selection, as is is typical for survey data, is primarily driven by missing data
and thus basically by the selection of the variables used in the subsequent analysis. For
reasons of comparability and consistency, all results to follow are confined to the same
sample of observations consisting of these 581 observations providing full information.8
Observations are kept in the sample only if their demand for redistribution could have
been computed (see section 3.4 below) and if they could have been included in all
statistical models to follow (see sections 3.5–3.7 to follow).
3.3.4 Estimates of Occupational Wages
One of the most interesting parts of the survey is a battery of questions about the wages
of ten different occupations, including the respondent’s own occupation.9 Individuals
were first asked to estimate what they thought to be the actual net wage (i.e. wage
net of social security contributions, but before taxes and transfers) per month in Swiss
francs of people working in these different occupations. Second, they were asked to
estimate what they thought these occupations should – in their subjective view – earn
net per month in Swiss francs. These two wage estimates will be referred to as actual
wages (or perceived wages, respectively) and just wages (desired wages) in what follows.
These statements allow examining individual differences between the perceived and the
8Section 3.D.2 in the appendix shows that the quantitative results are not strongly affected by
sample selection due to missing data (and thus the qualitative results are not driven by sample selection
anyway).
9See Kelley and Evans (1993) for an international comparison of similar data on occupational wages
from an earlier survey of the ISSP. Stamm et al. (2003) provide a more extensive descriptive discussion
of these data for the case of Switzerland.
64
3.3. Subjective Wage Estimates Inequality & Redistribution
appropriate level of compensation within different occupations and will further be used
to construct subjective measures of inequality and the demand for redistribution (see
section 3.4 below). Descriptive statistics for these individual wage estimates are given in
Table 3.1: Subjective estimates of occupational wages
Actual wage Just wage Ratio
Low wage group:
Salesman 3, 004.15 3, 977.03 1.35
(573.05) (753.52) (0.26)
[579] [579] [578]
Unskilled worker 3, 110.07 3, 856.08 1.26
(605.63) (708.63) (0.23)
[576] [576] [572]




Doctor 16, 595.30 12, 971.75 0.82
(9, 431.42) (7, 174.49) (0.21)
[575] [577] [572]
Lawyer 18, 178.07 12, 834.86 0.77
(10, 765.18) (7, 676.70) (0.34)
[570] [568] [566]
Federal judge 19, 496.28 15, 396.81 0.83
(9, 086.14) (8, 286.99) (0.36)
[565] [565] [563]
Member of the Swiss Federal Council 23, 649.28 18, 433.99 0.83
(13, 370.67) (10, 826.30) (0.39)
[554] [562] [550]
Owner of a factory 25, 046.85 16, 492.11 0.73
(17, 176.31) (11, 516.05) (0.45)
[555] [558] [549]
Member of the administrative board 32, 623.05 24, 304.17 0.79
(21, 126.94) (16, 962.14) (0.28)
[538] [552] [535]
Respondent’s occupation
Coworker 6, 329.60 6, 788.64 1.13
(5, 732.13) (5, 189.09) (0.30)
[581] [581] [581]
Notes: The table shows mean estimates of actual and just net monthly wages in Swiss francs
(i.e. wages net of mandatory social security contributions, but before taxes and transfers).
The third column shows the ratio of just over actual wage. Standard deviations are given
in parentheses, the number of observations in brackets. The number of observations varies
somewhat between different cells, since not all individuals gave estimates for all occupations.
The maximum number of observations is 581 (which corresponds to the sample used in the
analysis). Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
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table 3.1. The first column shows mean estimates of actual wages, and the second column
mean estimates of just wages for the ten different occupations. The third column shows
the average of the ratio between just and actual wages. Focusing on mean estimates10,
Figure 3.1: Estimates of occupational wages
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Notes: The upper panel shows mean values of the actual / perceived (trian-
gles) and just / desired (circles) wage estimates for the different occupations.
The lower panel shows the mean percentage difference between desired and
perceived earnings. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
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actual wages exhibit quite a wide range – from a low of about three thousand (wage of
a shop assistant) to a high of more than 30 thousand Swiss francs (wage of a chairman
of a large national company), thus giving a perceived range of actual wages of about ten
on average. Further, note that there is a clear distinction between the occupations in
terms of their actual wages – reflecting the distinction between three low–skilled and six
high–skilled occupations. Consequently, since the average respondent lies somewhere in
between, the actual wage of one’s coworkers lies between the wages of these two groups
(about 6,300 Swiss francs).
A first remarkable feature of the data is thus the fact that individuals seem to accept,
at least on average, rather large differences in wages between different occupational
groups, presumably reflecting considerations of proportionality and responsability (see
section 3.2 above). In fact, focusing on individuals who gave estimates for all nine
occupations, only two of them gave the same estimate for all occupations (they also
gave the same estimate for the wage of their coworkers). This feature of the data is
more easily seen in figure 3.1. Compared to actual wages, just wages exhibit a smaller
but still a broad range – the highest average wage (owner of a factory) is still about six
times as large as the lowest average wage (unskilled worker in a factory). It thus seems
fair to say that people do accept wage differences due to differences in skill or educational
level or differences in the degree of responsibility, although to a varying degree. At the
same time though, most people are prone to equalize wages to a quantitatively important
degree (see the last column in table 3.1 and the lower panel in figure 3.1). Average just
wages are higher than average actual wages for those three occupations with the lowest
estimated actual wages (i.e. salesman, unskilled and skilled worker). The reverse is true
for the occupations with estimated high average actual wages. Specifically, as table 3.1
shows, there is one group of occupations (unskilled worker, skilled worker and salesman)
for which there is a positive average difference between the two estimates and another
group of occupations (all other professions, leaving out one’s own occupation) for which
this difference is negative on average. In what follows, the first group of professions will
be referred to as the low wage group (or, interchangeably, bottom group) and the second
is referred to as the high wage group (top group, respectively). As will be discussed in
detail below, the measurement of subjective evaluations of wage inequality will be based
on the disctinction between these two groups regarding the estimates of their actual and
just wages.
10Figure E.1 in the chapter appendix provides a more detailed description of the distribution of these
estimates, not exclusively focusing on averages.
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3.3.5 Coworkers’ Wages
Estimates about the coworkers’ wages are interesting on their own right, since these
estimates can be used as an evaluation of the fairness of one’s individual wage. Following
Jasso (1999), I define individual i’s justice evaluation of the wage of his coworkers (as a






denotes i’s estimate of the desired level of compensation, and y(i)coworker
denotes the perceived wage level. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of je(i) in the sample.
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Notes: The variable is defined in equation (3.1) in the text. Own calculations,
based on ISSP (1999).
The main feature of the distribution clearly is the fact that most individuals tend to judge
the wage of their coworkers (and thus, presumably, also their own wage) as appropriate
(independent of the absolute level). In fact, about 38% of the individuals gave exactly
the same estimate for the actual and the desired wage of their coworkers.11 This result is
somewhat surprising at first sight, since individuals were not given any restriction with
respect to these estimates. Even more surprising perhaps is that (although very few)
individuals state that their coworkers’ wage should be lower than what they perceive it to
11Another quesion in the survey directly asked ”Do you think that your wage corresponds to your
effort and your skills?” More than 50% of the individuals in the sample think that their wage is
appropriate in this sense.
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actually be. Still, most respondents would like a higher wage than perceived, the average
respondent would judge a wage about 13% higher than his actual wage as appropriate
for him– or herself (for his coworkers, respectively). On the other hand, we can compare
these estimates with the information the individuals provided about their own income,
checking whether people give accurate estimates of their actual remuneration when asked
about the wage of their coworkers. Focusing on individuals working full–time, their mean
personal income is estimated to be about 5,900 Swiss francs – which is lower than their
mean estimate of their coworkers’ actual wage of about 6,500 Swiss francs.
3.3.6 Comparing Subjective Estimates and Actual Wages
At this point, it seems obvious to compare these subjective wage estimates with actual
wages. The problem though is that, at least for some of these occupations, it is difficult
to get reliable information about wages on the occupational level. One possibility though
is computing average wages within different occupational groups using the ISCO (In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations) code which is available in the data.
To be specific at this point, actual wages per se are not observed, only incomes.12 This
procedure though does not give us reliable estimates of actual wages for the four top
occupations (e.g. the chairman of a company) and is a bit shaky for the other wages too,
because they are estimated using only a very small number of cases. Table 3.2 shows
actual incomes from the ISSP data. The top panel (panel A) shows mean incomes by
groups according to the major ISCO–classification (only for those groups which cover
at least one occupation shown in table 3.1). The first major code certainly includes the
two managerial occupations, and the second major code includes the two professional
occupations. Salespersons are included in major code five. Although ambiguous, an un-
skilled worker certainly belongs to major code nine. A skilled worker again is ambiguous
and might belong to either major code seven or eight.
The lower panel (panel B) of table 3.2 shows actual wages for the three occupations,
which can unambiguously associated with an ISCO code on a more detailed level –
something that is possible for salespersons, doctors and lawyers only. The average
estimate for a salespersons’ wage is surprisingly accurate (the average estimated wage of
about 3,000 Swiss francs versus actual wage of about 3,200 Swiss francs). In comparison,
the average estimates for the wages of a doctor and a lawyer are about twice as large as
the actual wages estimated from the sample.
Below the line, the data seem to support four observations. First, individuals give
surprisingly accurate wage estimates for the low–skilled occupations (i.e. salesperson,
12At least for the lower skilled occupations, this should though not make a huge difference. For the
high skilled occupations, it presumably does so though.
69
3.3. Subjective Wage Estimates Inequality & Redistribution
Table 3.2: Actual income, by occupation (ISCO–code)
Occupational group Actual income n
A. ISCO–code (1 digit)
1: Legislators, senior officials and managers 6, 205.539 73
(2, 949.714)
2: Professionals 5, 948.748 199
(3, 077.408)
5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers 3, 219.752 162
(2, 470.527)
7: Craft and related workers 4, 511.771 135
(2, 130.938)
8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers 4, 205.814 50
(2, 721.436)
9: Elementary occupations 3, 560.370 29
(1, 798.359)
B. ISCO–code (2 or 3 digits)
222: Health professionals (excl. nursing) 8, 550.815 10
(5, 045.615)
242: Legal professionals 8, 000.000 6
(2, 258.318)
522: Salespersons and demonstrators 3, 192.768 75
(2, 030.446)
Notes: Table entries are monthly average incomes by respondents’ ISCO–code. Standard
deviations in parentheses. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
skilled and unskilled worker in a factory). Second, people seem to have a tough time
estimating the wages of high–skilled occupations, the exception being the wage of a
member of the federal council and presumably also the wage of a federal judge. Third,
the wages of the two professional occupations (i.e. doctor and lawyer) seem to be strongly
overestimated. Fourth, statements about the estimated wages of the two managerial
occupations must necessarily be quite shaky since it is very difficult to get accurate
data about real salaries of these occupations – still it seems fair to say that even these
estimates are not entirely made out of thin air.
3.3.7 A Little Twist
There is a little twist in using these data for evaluating the demand for redistribution
because both actual and just wages are asked for before taxes and transfer payments
(since net wage in Switzerland corresponds to gross wage net of mandatory social security
contributions only).13 The total amount of desired redistribution in occupational wages
13One could make the argument, although it might not be wholly convincing, that these data actually
do cover the overall amount of desired redistribution – given that individuals implicitly make the relevant
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would be given by comparing actual gross wages with desired net wages (i.e. wages
after taxes/transfers), which would capture the total desired reduction (or increase,
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, with τ(y) being the sum of the tax and transfer
rate for some given gross income y. But, because we can only compare wages before
taxes/transfers, we can only capture redistribution on top of the redistribution already





. Under a flat tax rate (i.e. τ(y) = τ), for example, we will
tend to underestimate the desired reduction in wages for the case of cutting high wages
(the deviation is due to the fact that the taxation of the gross just wage is not taken into
account). In the more realistic case of nonlinearities in the redistributive system (e.g.
due to progressive taxation), it is more difficult to evaluate the magnitude of under– or
overestimation.
3.4 Conceptual Framework:
Subjective Measures of Inequality
The evaluation of whether the distribution of wages is judged as fair is ultimately in
the eye of the beholder, since – as we already have discussed in section 3.2 above –
the existing empirical evidence suggests that inequality aversion is relative to some fair
reference point, which does not normally coincide with absolute equality. Moreover,
both perceptions and beliefs may differ to a considerable degree between individuals.
It thus seems reasonable to conceptualize the demand for redistribution as the dis-
crepancy between the perception of the actual distribution (’the actual state of the
world’) and the evaluation of the just distribution of wages (’the desired state of the
world’), since people potentially can (and actually do) differ on both dimensions. As
pointed out by Sen, ”people’s attitudes towards, or reactions to, actual income distribu-
tions can be significantly influenced by the correspondence – or lack thereof – between
(1) their ideas of what is normatively tolerable, and (2) what they actually see in the
society around them” (Sen, 2000, p.60). In a similar vein, Alesina and Angeletos (2005)
model social injustice as the discrepancy between the actual and the just state of the
world. This actually allows for the possibility that people differ in their support for
redistriubution – even if they share the same perception of the factual inequality – if
they differ in their evaluation of the just inequality.
On the other hand, individuals with different evaluatons of the just level of wage
comparison between gross and net wages.
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inequality may differ in their support for redistribution because they do have different
perceptions about the factual distribution of wages. Support for redistribution may
arguably only arise if these two evaluations differ from each other, but differences between
individuals might either be driven by differences in perception or by differences in the
evaluation of what constitutes an appropriate compensation (or both).
3.4.1 Setting the Stage
We now turn to the discussion of a simple framework suited for describing subjective
evaluations of wage distributions, wage inequality and the demand for redistribution.14 A
useful, and natural, starting point is the measurement of wage inequality in an objective
sense. Let yn be the vector of (ordered) individual wages for some random sample of
size n (i.e. yn corresponds to the wage distribution within the sample):
yn = {y1, . . . , yi, . . . , yn} (3.2)
with y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yn−1 ≤ yn
Principally, it is thus sufficient to observe yn for measuring inequality in wages for a
given sample, since inequality measures are some function of the vector of wages yn (see
Cowell, 2000, for example).15
Measuring subjective wage inequality is conceptually very simple and intuitive, in
that we now allow the vector of wages yn to depend on the evaluation of individual
i, reflecting the fact that inequality (like beauty) ultimately lies in the eye of the be-
holder. In the simple symmetric case where each individual i estimates the wages of all
individuals within the sample (including his own wage), we thus have:
y(i)n = {y(i)1, . . . , y(i)j, . . . , y(i)n} (3.3)
Where y(i)j corresponds to i’s evaluation of individual j’s wage, yielding a matrix of
wage estimates of size (n × n). Since in this case the whole distribution of wages is
evaluated (”estimated”), we can compute individual measures of inequality and thus get
a distribution of inequality measures over a sample of individuals. The obvious problem
is now a practical one: Each individual i would have to estimate n (potentially) different
14Jasso has done related work in a series of papers (1978; 1980; 1999). More recently, Osberg and
Smeeding (2006) have used an empirical framework similar to the one proposed here.
15For simplicity, I will leave any sampling issues aside here, focusing exclusively on conceptual issues.
It is obvious though that under simple random sampling and as the sample size grows, the sample
distribution yn converges to the population wage distribution y. This in turn implies that sample
inequality measures also converge to the corresponding population inequality measures.
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wages – a task which surely is not feasible in practice for even moderate sample size n.
One possible solution is to reduce the number of different wage estimates one specific
individual i has to make, i.e. to reduce the dimension along index j. Going back to
objective inequality, note that we may approximate the distribution of wages, as given
by equation (3.2), even if we only observe some average wages for a number of groups
k < n (again, ordered by within–group wage in ascending order):
yk = {(y1, f1), . . . , (yj, fj), . . . , (yk, fk)} (3.4)
given we observe both the average within–group wages yj as well as the appropriate
weights fj (i.e. fj corresponds to the fraction of individuals in group j).
16 Knowledge
of yk allows us to approximate the individual wage distribution yn, and thus allows us
to approximate wage inequality in the sample without the need to observe the whole
distribution of wages.
Again, measuring subjective evaluations of the wage distribution implies that we
make the vector of wage estimates yk dependent on i’s evaluation:
y(i)k = {(y(i)1, f(i)1), . . . , (y(i)j, f(i)j), . . . , (y(i)k, f(i)k)} (3.5)
Note that the reduction in the dimension of the number of estimates per individual k now
introduces the problem that the weights of the different groups must also be estimated
by individual i, if we want to make any statements about the wage distribution as a
whole. Because, in the following, we want to exclusively focus on differences in the
evaluation of wages and because people seem to be notoriously uncertain in estimating
such shares, we can again simplify the problem by fixing the population weights between
individuals:17
y(i)k = {(y(i)1, f1), . . . , (y(i)j, fj), . . . , (y(i)k, fk)} (3.6)
We now have considerably simplified the original task (given by equation (3.3)), since
now each individual i only has to estimate k (instead of n) different wages. In the most
16In the limit, as k → n, we obviously have yk → yn. For a given number of groups k < n, the
approximation is better, the less within–group variation in wages there is. If there were no within–
group variation in wages at all, then yk is the same as yn, even in the case where the number of groups
k is smaller than the number of observations n.
17In terms of equations (3.3) and (3.5), fixing the weights may simply be understood as requiring
that each individual estimates the wages for the same sample of individuals. From this point of view,
is is quite natural to fix the population weights across individuals.
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simple case, only two different groups are considered:
y(i)2 = {(y(i)1, f1), (y(i)2, f2)}
= {(y(i)1, f1), (y(i)2, (1 − f1))} (3.7)
In this case, each individual i only has to estimate two different wages. Furthermore,
since the sample weights must always sum up to 1, only one weight needs to be fixed
explicitly. In the following section, I will discuss how the subjective estimates of occu-
pational wages (see section 3.3.4) will be used to approximate the right hand side of
equation (3.7).
3.4.2 Occupational Wage Estimates Reconsidered
The occupational wage estimates from the ISSP (1999) almost perfectly fit into the
framework laid out in the preceding section. Moreover, these estimates may not only be
used for computing individual estimates of the perceived (actual) distribution of wages,
but also for computing the desired (just) distribution of wages. In the following, let y(i)
denote the vector of i’s estimates of actual occupational wages:
y(i) = {y(i)Shop assistant, y(i)Unskilled worker, y(i)Skilled worker, y(i)Doctor, y(i)Lawyer,
y(i)Judge, y(i)Minister, y(i)Factory owner, y(i)Chairman} (3.8)
Analogously, let y⋆(i) be the vector of i’s evaluation of just occupational wages. However,
note that these occupational wage estimates do not directly fit into the framework laid
out above, because they do only cover a part of the distribution of occupations, and
consequently only cover part of the wage distribution (i.e. we only observe a part of the
right–hand side of equation (3.5)).
However, we may still use these data for approximating the average wages of larger
groups (e.g. we will assume that some subsets of the nine occupations are each somehow
representative of specific parts of the whole population wage distribution). As already
discussed in section 3.3 above, there is a clear distinction between the nine occupations
(excluding coworkers’ wages) for which wage estimates were asked for. Specifically, let
us group the nine occupations into two distinct sets:
bottom = {shop assistant, unskilled worker, skilled worker} (3.9)
top = {doctor, lawyer, judge,minister, owner of a factory, chairman} (3.10)
Where the first group of occupations (bottom) consists of the occupations with low
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actual wages (both relative to the occupations in the other group, but also in absolute
terms) and desired wages above actual wages (or, in other words, the occupations in
(3.9) have, on average, higher just than actual wages, and vice versa for the occupations
in (3.10)).
We then use the occupational wages for estimating the mean wages of individuals at
the top and the bottom of the wage distribution:18
y(i)bottom =
∑
j I(j ∈ bottom)y(i)j
∑




j I(j ∈ top)y(i)j
∑
j I(j ∈ top)
(3.12)
Where I(. . .) denotes the indicator function. The analogous measures can be computed
for the distribution of just wages, i.e. y⋆(i)bottom and y
⋆(i)top if we replace the vector
of actual wages y(i) with the vector of desired occupational wages, y⋆(i). Descriptive
statistics for these variables are given in table 3.3.
By construction (i.e. due to the grouping of the nine occupations, see equations
(3.11) and (3.12)), mean wage estimates of the bottom group are on average lower than
mean wage estimates of the top group, both with respect to the actual and the desired
wage distribution. Now, due to the specific choice of occupations, the two group averages
describing the actual wage distribution seem to be somewhat off target – primarily due
to the fact that only occupations from the two ends of the distribution were included
in the wage estimates (but no ’typical’ occupation from the ’middle’, so to say).19 For
comparison, if we look at table 3.1 again, we see that the average estimate of coworkers’
wage (about 6,300 Swiss francs) is considerably higher than the corresponding average
estimate given in table 3.3 (about 5,400 Swiss francs).
18There are at least four different reasons for aggregating the occupational wage data. First, in any
case do I have to make some additional assumptions about the frequencies of the different occupations
in order to fit the framework laid out before. However, this is most easily and plausibly done for two
broad groups only. This seems to be especially true because some of the occupations have obviously
very low (or almost zero) frequency in the whole population (e.g. member of the Swiss Federal Council).
Second, estimates for some specific occupations may be largely off the mark, but the average over several
occupations may still give a reliable estimate of what an individual perceives to be the wage of a larger
group. Third, the problem of missing data on the dependent variable can to some extent be mitigated
as averaging over several occupations allows me to compute subjective inequality measures as long as
an individual gave at least one wage estimate for each of the two sets of occupations (also see chapter
appendix 3.D.2). Fourth, one might also argue that people often implicitly make this differentiation
between the bottom and the top (rather between several occupational groups).
19To be precise, we do not expect correspondence between objective and subjective wage distributions;
to the contrary, it would be surprising not to observe at least some difference between estimated and
actual wage (incomes, respectively). Here, I am only pointing to the fact that the specific choice of
occupations might generate some of the observed difference between the objective wage distribution
and subjective evaluations of the wage distribution.
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A. Actual (perceived) wages
Low wage group, ybottom 3, 451.32 552.33 0.16
High wage group, ytop 22, 745.61 10, 114.35 0.44
Overall, y 5, 380.75 1, 183.85 0.22
B. Just (desired) wages
Low wage group, y⋆bottom 4, 273.78 681.77 0.16
High wage group, y⋆top 16, 805.74 8, 378.07 0.50
Overall, y⋆ 5, 526.98 1, 092.86 0.20
C. Subjective inequality measures
Actual inequality, gc 0.31 0.10 0.32
Just inequality, gc⋆ 0.19 0.09 0.47
Demand for redistribution, dr 36.95 21.68 0.59
Notes: The definitions of the variables are given in the text. The number of observations
equals 581 throughout. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
Given individual estimates of the mean wages of the bottom and top of the wage
distribution, there remains one piece of information before we have individual approxi-
mations of the wage distributions and thus can compute individual inequality measures.
The remaining parameter is the population share of the bottom of the distribution
fbottom (or the population share of the top, respectively – see equation (3.7)). As already
mentioned, we fix the two population shares between individuals, so that we only have
to fix one specific value for fbottom. One obvious choice is to estimate fbottom from the







I(ISCOi ∈ [3, 9]) (3.13)
Whereas ISCOi corresponds to the one–digit (main) ISCO–code of i’s occupation. The
top of the distribution thus only comprises ISCO–codes 1 (legislators, senior officials
and managers) and 2 (professionals), all other occupations are subsumed into the bot-
tom category. Note that, because the population is divided into two groups only,
ftop = (1 − fbottom). In the sample at hand, fbottom evaluates to approximately 23%.
Given the ’unusual’ composition of occupations (some occupations in this group are ex-
ceptional both with respect to their wages as well as to the frequency within the overall
occupational distribution) within the top group, I will correct this number downwards
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and ”guesstimate” fbottom as 10%.
20
Leaving problems of missing data aside at this point (section 3.D.2 in the chapter
appendix takes the problem of missing data up again), we thus now observe for each
individual i the two triples:
y(i) = (y(i)bottom, y(i)top, fbottom) (3.14)
y⋆(i) = (y⋆(i)bottom, y
⋆(i)top, fbottom) (3.15)
Where y(i) now describes individual i’s evaluation of the actual wage distribution and
(corresponding to the ’actual state of the world’), analogously, y⋆(i) describes individual
i’s evaluation of the desired wage distribution (the ’desired state of the world’) – both of
which exactly fit the conceptualization exemplified in equation (3.7) above for the case
of two different groups only. Again, note that fbottom is treated as a fixed parameter, as
it does neither very between individuals not between the evaluation of the actual and
the desired wage distribution.
3.4.3 Subjective Measures of Wage Inequality
Given the estimates for group–specific mean wages (equation (3.11) and (3.12), respec-
tively) and the population weights of the groups (equation 3.13), is is now straightforward
to construct an overall estimate of the population mean wage by appropriately weighting
the wage estimates of the two groups:
y(i) = y(i)bottom · fbottom + y(i)top · ftop (3.16)
Again, y⋆(i) provides an estimate of individual i’s evaluation of the desired overall wage.
Because the two weights are the same not only between individuals but also for the
evaluation of the actual and the desired distribution, differences between y(i) and y⋆(i)
must necessarily be due to differences in the underlying wage estimates. Descriptives for
these overall mean wages are also given in table 3.3. One point noteworthy is that the
average overall wage for the actual distribution is almost the same as the overall wage
of the just wage distribution, although the group wages markedly differ (I will take up
this point in section 3.4.4).
Furthermore, and more importantly, these three statistics are sufficient for computing
20In the year 2000, the fraction of people with a university degree in Switzerland has been 15.8%
for people aged 25–64, which presumably still gives an upper bound for fbottom. Section 3.D.1 in the
chapter appendix takes up the issue of how the empirical results change when different assumptions are
made regarding the two population weights.
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y(i)bottom · fbottom + y(i)top · (1 − fbottom)
)
(3.17)
Given population and wage shares of the two groups, we are ready to compute inequality
measures. One can easily show (see appendix 3.C) that the Gini coefficient is given by
the following simple expression in the case of two different groups only:
gc(i) = fbottom − q(i)bottom (3.18)
Since the population share fbottom is the same for all individuals, all variation in the
subjective Gini coefficient gc(i) is due to variation in the evaluation of occupational
wages.22. Equation (3.18) also directly shows that changing the estimates of the two
population weights changes the subjective inequality measures, although it does not
change the ranking of individuals with respect to these measures (this point is further
discussed in chapter appendix 3.D.1). Now, we can also compute the Gini coefficient
related to the desired wage distribution gc⋆(i), simply by replacing actual wage estimates
by just wage estimates (i.e. using the desired wage share instead of the actual wage share
of the bottom group):
gc⋆(i) = fbottom − q⋆(i)bottom (3.19)
We may then, at this point, define the demand for redistribution simply as the desired
percentage reduction in the perceived level of wage inequality:








The redistribution measure dr(i) combines the perceived and the desired level of wage
inequality and fits our basic intuition about the demand for redistribution.23 Demand
for redistribution increases, ceteris–paribus, when the perceived wage inequality is high
or when the desired level of wage inequality is low. At the same time, no matter how
high or how low the perceived level of inequality is, redistribution is only supported if
21And, since the wage shares of the two groups have to sum up to 1, the wage share of the top group
is given by q(i)top = 1 − q(i)bottom.
22Note that the Gini coefficient could actually be negative in this framework if the wage share of the
bottom group would be larger than fbottom, which is not ruled out a priori. Empirically though, this
case is not observed at all. Also note that, in the case of two groups only, the ranking of individuals in
their evaluation of wage inequality is unambiguous.
23Alesina and Angeletos (2005), for example, also model social injustice as the deviation of the actual
state from some reference point.
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there is any discrepancy between the perceived and the desired level of wage inequality.
This variable measures the extent to which people would like to decrease (or in-
crease, eventually) the level of wage inequality, as a percentage of the perceived factual
wage inequality. Descriptive statistics for these three variables measuring subjective
wage inequality and the demand for redistribution are given in table 3.3, which shows
descriptive statistics for the average estimates of the actual and the just wages of the
low wage group and the high wage group respectively, as given by equations (3.11) and
(3.12). Further, descriptives for the two subjective evaluations of the wage distribution
and the demand for redistribution are also shown (equations (3.18), (3.19), and (3.20)).
As already discussed, the average overall actual wage is lower than the overall just
wage for the low wage group. That is, the average individual would like to increase the
mean wage of this group. On the other hand, people would on average like to decrease
the mean wage of the high wage group. The average person would like to decrease the
ratio of the two mean wages from about 6.5 to about 4. It is further interesting to note
that the variation relative to the mean decreases slightly for the low–wage group and
does increase for the high–wage group (in both cases, it is about as three times as high
for the high– as for the low–wage group). Actual wage inequality is estimated as 0.30
on average. Interestingly, this number is not too far off actual estimates of the income
inequality, which is estimated to be 0.30 for the sample at hand. The estimated actual
wage inequality is higher than the just wage inequality, which is about 0.19. The mean
of the demand for redistribution must therefore be positive, as one might have expected
on a–priori grounds. The mean desired reduction in wage inequality is estimated to
be about 37%, a considerable number (note though the large standard deviation). The
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Perceived wage inequality
 
Notes: The figure on the left shows kernel density estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel
function and the ’optimal’ bandwith. Figure on the right: The x–axis shows the perceived
wage inequality measure and the y–axis the desired wage inequality measure, as defined in
equation (3.19) and (3.18), respectively. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
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investigate further, figure 3.3 shows both the density estimates for the two subjective
gini coefficients and their joint distribution. The figure on the left shows the estimated
univariate distributions of the two wage inequality measures. The comparison clearly
shows both a shift of the distribution to the left as well as a change in shape. Perhaps
more interestingly, the figure on the right shows that almost all individuals desire a lower
level of wage inequality than what they actually perceive. By construction then, most
people have a positive demand for redistribution, i.e. most people would favor a more
equal distribution of wages.24
3.4.4 The Costs of Redistribution
Another interesting point in question is whether and to what extent people (implicitly)
make redistributive statements which are budget–neutral, i.e. whether we can evaluate
if the desired reduction in inequality is associated with any additional costs (in terms
of the wage sum needed to adapt to the desired wage level of both the low– and the
high–wage group) or whether people are aware that, for example, higher wages at the
bottom of the distribution must somehow go hand in hand with lower wages at the top.
The results considered thus far suggest that people are aware that wages cannot simply
be set at will, and that an increase of the wage at the bottom of the distribution must
be financed by eventually decreasing the wages at the top. Further scrutiny of the data
does indeed suggest that, at least on average, people tend to balance increases at the
bottom with decreases at the top.
We can again empirically approach the question of how much resources, in terms of
the actual wage distribution, are needed in order to obtain the desired level of of wage








This measure can be used for evaluating whether and how much (or less, possibly)
resources are needed in order to attain the desired level of wage inequality and thus can
be used for evaluating whether people, at least implicitly, acknowledge that there is a
constraint on the amount of redistribution possible. Note that cr(i) need not be positive,
24The right–hand side of figure 3.3 also shows that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there are some
individuals for whom the just wage inequality is higher than the perceived inequality, resulting in a
negative demand for redistribution. Further scrutiny of these 39 observations though shows that the
reason for their negative demand for redistribution is not that they want to redistribute from the bottom
to the top. What actually happens here is that these individuals want to increase not only the wage
of the low–wage group, but also the wage of the high–wage group (and the desired increase of the
high–wage group is higher than the desired increase of the low–wage group).
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although most individuals seem to have a desire to level up the wages at the bottom
of the distribution, because at the same time most people would like to cut the wages
at the top such that the second term in the nominator is most often negative. Which
of the two terms dominates, however, is an empirical question. Table 3.4 shows various
Table 3.4: The costs of redistribution
Mean Standard Coefficient
Redistribution from (to) deviation of variation
A. In absolute terms
Bottom group 822.46 507.91 0.62
Top group −5, 939.87 6, 852.69 −1.15
Bottom group (weighted by fbottom) 740.22 457.12 0.62
Top group (weighted by ftop) −593.99 685.27 −1.15
Overall 146.23 736.35 5.04
B. In relative terms
Bottom group 0.14 0.10 0.67
Top group −0.10 0.10 −0.99
Overall, cr 0.04 0.13 3.26
Notes: See equation (3.21) in the text on how the variables are constructed. Note that panel
A only refers to the numerator of equation (3.21). Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
statistics for the absolute and relative extent of redistribution of wages, following from
the difference between actual and just wage estimates. On average, the mean wage of
the low wage group is increased by only about 740 Swiss francs, whereas the mean wage
of the high wage group is decreased by almost six thousand Swiss francs. Taking the
population weights into account and re–expressing the extent of redistribution in terms
of the overall actual wage, one gets the result that the additional wage sum (about 14%
of the overall actual wage) needed to raise the wage of the low wage group is almost
offset by the wage sum freed up by decreasing the wages at the top (about 10% of the
overall actual wage). Taken literally, these results imply that the implementation of the
desired redistribution of the average individual would incur additional costs of about 4%
of the overall wage sum.
3.5 The Anatomy of Redistribution
3.5.1 Additional Empirical Moments
Since we observe several occupational wage estimates for most individuals, we may
also compute some additional moments describing more specific features of individual
evaluations of the wage distribution on top of the overall wages and wage inequality.
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Again, let y(i) denote individual i’s estimate of actual occupational wages, and let
y⋆(i) denote i’s evaluation of just occupational wages (see equation (3.8)). I will now
argue that there are two important dimensions, which specifically merit further empir-
ical scrutiny. First, we will explore, with respect to the desired distribution, whether
differences in the demand for redistribution are driven by differences regarding ethical
bounds on bottom and top wages. Second, I will take a look at redistribution along the
bottom–top dimension. That is, I will look at whether redistribution is mainly driven
by desired wage changes at the top or at the bottom of the distribution. In order to get
more specific, let’s first define some additional measures.
First, we define the ethical floor f(i) as the minimum wage regarded as fair, relative to
the just average wage (in order to make these statements comparable across individuals,







Analogously, we define the ethical ceiling c(i) as the maximum wage regarded as fair,







These two measures describe, in a way, the lower and upper bound of the desired wage
distribution for each individual.
A second interesting aspect describes the equalization of wages, which can occur
both by either increasing wages at the bottom or by reducing the wages at the top of
the distribution. We define as a measure for the wish of leveling up u(i) the wages at







Analogously, we define d(i) as a measure for the wish for leveling down wages at the







Table 3.5 shows descriptive statistics for these additional four measures, along with
the overall wage estimates (which we already know to be more or less the same on aver-
age, see table 3.3 again). Panel A of table 3.5 shows moments describing the perceived
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Table 3.5: Empirical moments describing subjective wage distributions
Mean Standard Coefficient
deviation of variation
A. Perceived wage distribution
Overall wage, y 5, 380.75 1, 183.85 0.22
Maximum, max(y(i)) 38, 766.27 21, 034.52 0.54
Minimum, min(y(i)) 2, 843.72 515.53 0.18
Ratio, max(y(i))/min(y(i)) 14.03 7.98 0.57
B. Desired wage distribution
Overall wage, y⋆ 5, 526.98 1, 092.86 0.20
Maximum, max(y⋆(i)) 27, 416.01 17, 410.63 0.64
Minimum, min(y⋆(i)) 3, 693.98 683.41 0.19
Ratio, max(y⋆(i))/min(y⋆(i)) 7.67 5.15 0.67
C. Additional moments
Ethical floor, f(i) 0.68 0.12 0.17
Ethical ceiling, c(i) 4.73 2.34 0.49
Level up, u(i) 1.28 0.27 0.21
Level down, d(i) 0.71 0.27 0.38
Notes: The exact definitions of the variables are given in the text. The number of
observations equals 581 throughout. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
distribution of wages across the different occupations. Not surprisingly, evaluations of
the highest wage have the highest variation across individuals, much higher than both
the evaluations of the overall wage and the lowest wage within the group of occupations.
The ratio of highest to lowest wage (within individuals) is on average about 14, which
again underlines the fact that people perceive large variation in wage (presumably higher
variation than there actually is, as discussed in section 3.3.6).
Panel B shows the same moments as the first panel, but now with respect to the
desired distribution of wages. Although there is no large difference of the desired overall
wage to the perceived overall wage, both the lowest and the highest wage significantly
differ from the respective moments in panel A. The highest desired wage is about 10,000
Swiss francs lower than the corresponding number for the perceived distribution. At the
same time, the desired lowest wage is about 800 Swiss francs higher than the perceived
lowest wage. On average, the ratio of highest to lowest desired wage is only about 7.5
(half of the corresponding number regarding the actual distribution of wages).
Finally, panel C shows the four additional moments of primary interest here. The
first two measures, again, show that people accept differences in wages. The average
individual though puts a lower limit on wages of about 70% the overall wage and an
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upper limit of about 4.8 times the overall wage. Moreover, attitudes are much more
similar regarding the lower tail of the wage distribution (comparing either the standard
deviation or the coefficient of variation). The other two variables show that, on the one
hand, the average individual would like to push up the wage at the bottom by about one
third. On the other hand, the desired change regarding the upper tail of the distribution
mirrors the desired change at the lower tail. On average, top wages of about 70% their
perceived level are judged as appropriate.
3.5.2 The Mechanics Behind Redistribution
Having established that most people do actually favor some redistribution (i.e. desire
at least some reduction in wage inequality) and before turning to the question of whom
wants to redistribute, we ask the related question of which feature of the wage distribu-
tion is most responsible for this outcome.
First, one wonders whether the demand for redistribution is primarily driven by the
perceived wage inequality or by the desired level of wage inequality. This essentially boils
down to the question of whether people have different perceptions about the real wage
distribution or different beliefs about what a fair distribution of wages would ideally
look like (or, eventually, both). Figure 3.4 shows the relation between the demand for

















































































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
Desired wage inequality
Notes: The y–axis shows the demand for redistribution as defined by equation (3.20), the
x–axis shows the perceived wage inequality as defined in equation (3.18) (figure on the left)
and the just wage inequality as defined in equation (3.19) (figure on the right). Number of
observations equals 581 in both figures. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
wage redistribution and the two subjective gini coefficients. Interestingly, there is almost
no correlation (r = 0.0677) between the perception of the actual wage distribution and
the demand for redistribution. On the other hand, there is a clear negative correlation
(r = −0.6302) between the evaluation of the desired wage inequality and the demand for
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redistribution. These two figures together do suggest that the desire for redistribution
of wages is primarily driven by the evaluation of the just distribution and to a lesser
extent by the perception of the actual inequality.25



































































































































































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Leveling down
Notes: The y–axis shows the demand for redistribution, as given by equation (3.20) in the
text. The x–axis shows the variables defined in equations (3.22)–(3.25). The number of
observations equals 581 in all figures. Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
Second, one can ask whether the wish for redistribution is driven by desired changes of
the lower or the upper tail of the wage distribution (as has been discussed in section 3.5.1
above). Because most people gave several (i.e. more than two) estimates of occupational
wages, we can explore this issue in more detail. Specifically, we now look at the four
additional moments mentioned at the beginning of this section. I will primarily look at
25Figure E.1 in the chapter appendix plots some of the moments describing subjective wage distribu-
tions over deciles of the redistribution measure. The top panel shows moments of the actual distribution
and the lower panel shows moments of the just distribution. The top panel shows that the extent of
redistribution is by and large independent of the perception of the actual wage distribution – even
when considering the distinction between the upper and the lower tail of the distribution (which, of
course, is consistent with figure 3.4 above). The lower panel of figure E.1 on the other hand shows that
the desired wage distribution is driving the observed variation in the amount of redistribution desired.
More specifically, the figure shows that high levels of redistribution are first and foremost associated
with different beliefs regarding the upper tail of the wage distribution.
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the four moments defined in section 3.5.1. Figure 3.5 shows a simple scatterplot of each
of these moments against the demand for redistribution.26 The relations all look as one
might expect. A higher ethical floor (ceiling) goes hand in hand with a higher (lower)
demand for redistribution. On the other hand, the higher the desired leveling up of the
wage at the bottom of the distribution, the higher the demand for redistribution (and
vice versa, as expected, with respect to the leveling down of the wages at the very top).
We can actually be somewhat more precise regarding the ’anatomy’ behind the de-




iβ + ǫi (3.26)
Where dri corresponds to the demand for redistribution, and mi is a vector of variables
describing various moments of the subjective wage distribution of individual i, either
along the dimensions of perception–versus–belief or along the dimension of top–versus–
bottom of the wage distribution. These regression models give the possibility to look
at the simultaneous correlations among the different measures. There is no need to
put any assumptions on the error term ǫ at this point, because we use these regression
models explicitly as a descriptive tool describing the mechanics behind the demand
for redistribution only. Also note that we can run these regressions only because the
dependent variable is not directly a linear function of any of these moments (we must
though be careful not to include too many regressors in order to maintain some useful
ceteris–paribus interpretation of the individual regressors).
The resulting estimates are given in table 3.6. The first two models look at the
perceived and the desired distribution separately. Column 1 essentially shows that, con-
ditional on the overall wage estimate, only the perception of the lower bound of the
distribution systematically correlates with the demand for redistribution, but not the
perceived upper bound.27 Also note that the predictive value of this model is essentially
non–existent (which though is in line with figure 3.4). Column 2 shows that the demand
for redistribution is empirically linked to the desired wage distribution both through
the bottom and the top of the corresponding wage distribution (again conditional on
the respective overall wage estimate, also note that in this case the R–squared jumps to
0.425).28 Next, the model in column 3 simultaneously estimates the effects of all four
26Figure E.2 in the chapter appendix shows the full matrix of bivariate scatterplots.
27The perceived floor and ceiling are defined exactly as the ethical floor and ceiling (as given by
equations (3.22) and (3.23), only that instead of y⋆(i) the vector of actual wages y(i) is used.
28Normally, of course, one would not care too much about the R–squared. But here interest lies in the
mechanical, so to say, relations between the variables and thus in this specific context the R–squared
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3.6. Who Wants to Redistribute? Inequality & Redistribution
variables. This model in way only reflects the construction of the dependent variable, of
course. But still, this model shows that all for moments at the same time determine the
observed variation in the demand for redistribution. Interestingly, in this case the overall
wages are not statistically different from zero any more. And although in this model the
two moments describing the bottom and top of the actual wage distribution do have a
practically and statistically significant effect, an equal (hypothetical) change in one of
the two moments describing the desired distribution still induces a larger change in the
demand for redistribution. Next, column 4 regresses the demand for redistribution on
the two variables describing the equalization of wage (via increase (decrease) of either
the wage at the very bottom and top). The estimates suggest that the variation in
the demand for redistribution is more tightly correlated with variation in the desire for
equalization via decreasing the top wages than with variation in the desire for leveling up
wage at the other end of the distribution. Finally, model 5 simultaneously estimates the
effects of the two moments describing the desired distribution and the two moments de-
scribing the desired changes at both ends of the wage distribution (this model obviously
more or less corresponds to the model given in column 3, with a slightly different focus
though). Again, all four parameters (of interest) are statistically significant and have
the expected sign. This last model shows that the wages at the top are correlated with
the demand for redistribution primarily via the channel of leveling the top wages down
(the coefficient of the ’ethical ceiling’ is practically zero). At the same time, the wish
for leveling bottom wages up correlates with the amount of desired redistribution; the
coefficient of the ethical floor though still remains large (both in practical and statistical
terms).
The bottom line is that the extent of redistribution is a function of both the perceived
and the desired distribution of wages. Interestingly, the absolute level of the wage
distribution is only important regarding the perception, but not the desire. Differently
put, the results of table 3.6 suggest that the variation in the demand for redistribution
is simultaneously driven by both the perception of how the distribution of wage actually
looks like and by the desired distribution. Viewed from another angle, both leveling up
of bottom wage and leveling down of top wages drive the variation in the amount of
redistribution desired.
3.6 Who Wants to Redistribute?
This section addresses the second question of main interest, namely: Which factors help
explain the variation in the desired extent of redistribution. First, we look at various
delivers useful information about the correlational structure of the data.
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determinants of the demand for redistribution pushed forward by previous literature,
with main focus on financial self–interest and norms about distributive justice as well
as perceptions of the causes generating inequality. Second, we will explore in some
detail the channels by which different variables influence the amount of redistribution
demanded by looking along the dimension of perceived versus desired inequality and
along the dimension of top versus bottom of the wage distribution (analogous the the
moments described in section 3.5).
3.6.1 Financial Self–Interest, Distributive Justice,
and the Perception of Wage Determinants
As discussed in section 3.2 above, there are several potential explanations for the ob-
served variation in the demand for redistribution between individuals. The empirical
analysis tries to approximate as closely as possible the potential explanatory factors
discussed there. In order to assess the importance of different factors in explaining the










i δ + ǫi (3.27)
Where dri is the redistribution measure as defined in equation (3.20), sinteresti is a
(column) vector containing several variables capturing the effect of ’selfish’ motives (that
is, the vector contains relative personal income, the justice evaluation variable, and
an index of mobility)29. normsi is a also a column vector, containing two variables
approximating the two primary norms about distributive justice (e.g. the principle of
need and the principle of effort, as discussed in section 3.2). The vector beliefsi contains
two variables which are meant to capture the perception of individuals of how resources
are actually allocated in the real–world (the two variables are meant to describe whether
the respondent thinks that either acquired skills or ascribed skills are actually the driving
forces behind the determination of wages). xi is a vector of additional control variables.
30
α, β, γ and δ are the corresponding vectors of parameters. ǫi is an error term assumed
to be i.i.d. and mean independent of all regressors. Now, although our aim is not (or
29The variables are defined in chapter appendix 3.B.
30The following variables are included as additional controls: Age in years, age squared, educa-
tion (highest attained level, in years), female dummy, foreign–born dummy, residence in the german
speaking part of Switzerland, living in an urban area, two dummy variables for unemployment and
nonemployment (employment as reference category), dummy indicating whether a person is employed
full–time (versus part–time), perception of conflicts, standard international occupational prestige scale
and political orientation. See appendix 3.B for the exact definitions of these variables.
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cannot be, given the structure of the data) estimating any causal parameter, we still have
to think about unobserved factors contained in the error and which potentially bias our
estimates of primary interest (which are α, β and γ). We thus adopt a somewhat agnostic
control function approach, in that we try to control for as many potentially important
factors as possible in order to minimize biased estimation of the main parameters. By
additionally including age, gender and education (among others) as regressors, I hope to
mitigate as far as possible confounding by both unobserved factors (e.g. risk aversion)
and potentially only weak proxies (e.g. mobility).
Several regression models are estimated, the results of which are given in table 3.7.
Since my interest mainly focuses on the two groups of variables describing (i) financial
self–interest with respect to redistribution and (ii) social norms about distributive justice
and perceptions of the wage generating process. I run separate regressions in which
either only one group is included as regressors or either both are included. All models
are estimated with and without additional control variables given by the vector x.
The first model simply regresses the redistribution measures on relative personal
income. The parameter estimate has the expected negative sign. Note though that the
implied quantitative effect is not very large (i.e. doubling the personal income reduces
the demand for redistribution by about 8.5 percentage points), and that the predictive
power of income by itself is rather low (R–squared of 0.054), which is consistent with
previous empirical studies (Fong, 2001). More importantly still, note that the predicted
demand for redistribution is positive over the whole range of observed income, even
for individuals with the highest income. Next, the fairness evaluation of one’s own
wage and a mobility variable are added to the regression. The coefficient of income
changes somewhat, but still is significantly negative. The fairness evaluation of one’s
income and the mobility index both have the expected sign. The higher the perception of
financial underreward, the higher is the demand for redistribution (holding actual income
constant). Personal mobility has, as expected, a negative effect, although this effect is
only significant after controlling for additional variables. Including additional control
variables does not change the parameter estimates of the variables of main interest by
much, but the model fit is significantly increased.
In a second step, various variables describing social norms about distributive justice
and perceptions of which factors are important in explaining differences in pay are in-
cluded as regressors. Again, all variables enter with the expected sign. Individuals who
stronlgy belief that income should correspond to needs more strongly favour redistribu-
tion of earnings. On the other hand do people with a strong belief in the principle of
effort show significant less support for redistribution. The two variables capturing the ef-
fect of different perceptions of which factors are important in determining the allocation
90










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.6. Who Wants to Redistribute? Inequality & Redistribution
of resources also show the expeced sign and are significant, even after including several
control variables. Individuals who perceive ascribed (acquired) skills to be important in
determining pay, tend to have lower (higher) demand for redistribution.
Including all variables at once does not change the results in any important way, al-
though some variables get statistically insignificant. This supports the view that neither
financial self–interest nor perceptions and social norms are sufficient for explaining the
overall variation in the support of redistribution. In particular, the results presented
here do not support the view that perceptions and social norms are unimportant, once
self–interest in redistribution is controlled for. On the contrary, both sets of variables
are important in explaining differences in the support for redistribution.
3.6.2 Perceived versus Desired Level of Wage Inequality
Table 3.8 presents separate regression results for both the demand for redistribution (the
models are exactly the same as the model given by equation (3.27), only the dependent
variable is the perceived or the desired level of wage inequality, respectively). That is,









i δ + ǫi (3.28)
Where gci corresponds to either the perceived inequality in wages (gci) or the desired
inequality in wages (gc⋆i ).
Results are given in the first two columns of table 3.8. There are some interesting re-
sults concerning the explanation of the subjective income inequalities. First, it seems to
be much more difficult to explain differences in the perception of the income inequality
than differences in the desired level of earnings inequality (the R–squared from the ex-
plaining the desired level of wage inequality is more than twice as large as the R–squared
from the regression explaining the perceived level of wage inequality). Thus perceptions
may be more idiosyncratic tha evalutions of what is seen as appropriate; at least given
the considered set of variables. The only variables enterning with a statistically signifi-
cant coefficient are the two variables about the perception of which factors actually are
important in getting ahead. The perception of the allocation mechanism is relevant a
factor in explaining differences in the perception of the factual income inequality, but
not for explaining the desired level of wage inequality. On the other hand, almost all
variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign in explaining the just
level of earnings inequality (with the exception of the two perceptual variables and the
mobility index). Interestingly then, there are not systematic differences in the percep-
tion of wage inequality between individuals with different incomes – but they do differ
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3.7. Linking Beliefs to Outcomes Inequality & Redistribution
with respect to their evaluation of what distribution is seen as appropriate.
3.6.3 Additional Moments
As already discussed in section 3.7, additional information can be gained by looking at
the top and the bottom of the subjective wage distributions and the desire for equalizing
wages via changes at the bottom and the top of the distribution. Table 3.8 thus also









i δ + ǫi (3.29)
Here, mi is one of the four moments discussed in section 3.5.1 (again, besides the de-
pendent variable, equation (3.29) exactly mirrors the model from equation (3.27)).
The results of these four models are also shown in table 3.8 (columns 3–6). These
models also yield some interesting additional insights. First, the evaluation of the wages
at the bottom of the distribution seems to be somewhat more structured than the wages
at the top. Looking at the effect of income, table 3.8 reveals that income primarily
affects the desired distribution of wages, and has the strongest effect on the spread at
the top of the distribution. The same is true for the fairness evaluation of one’s own
income. Interestingly, norms with respect to distributive justice in this case only have
a significant effect on the bottom of the desired wage distribution (note though that
the point estimates are larger for the top of the distribution, but the estimates are not
statistically different from zero). Finally, and consistent with results already discussed,
the two variables describing the perception of how wages are formed in reality affect
redistribution mainly through their effect on the top of the perceived distribution.
3.7 Linking Beliefs to Outcomes
As discussed in section 3.2 at the beginning, it is of main interest whether subjective
beliefs about the fairness of the wage distribution and the demand for redistribution may
translate into political outcomes and thus may indirectly be linked to the actual (i.e.
observed) amount of redistribution. Switzerland is an interesting case in this respect,
because there potentially is a direct link between norms about inequality and political
outcomes through voting in general and party preference in particular. Moreover, the
political parties in Switzerland explicitly position themselves publicly regarding issues
which very often have a redistributive aspect.
Table 3.9 presents some simple models of stated party preference, where the depen-
dent variable is the stated preference for some political party and our main interest lies
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on the effect of the demand for redistribution, or alternatively some other moment of
subjective evaluation of the wage distribution.31 Again, we are not making claims about
causal relationships here, but nonetheless it presumably is more plausible that beliefs
and norms are determinants of party preference, rather than the other way around. I will
thus try assess empirically the link between (stated) party preference and the various
measures describing different aspects of both the perceived and desired wage distribu-
tion. To keep things as simple as possible (econometrically), I simply run a series of











iδ + ǫi (3.30)
Party preference is mapped on a binary indicator function for each of the five political
parties. mi is a vector containing a (sub)set of the subjective measures already discussed
in the preceding sections. sinteresti, normsi, beliefsi and xi are the same (column) vectors
of control variables as used in equation (3.27) above. ζ is the parameter vector of main
interest in this case, capturing the effect of subjective wage evaluation on the stated
party preference.33
However, the preceding section has shown the the various moments describing sub-
jective evaluations of the wage distribution are clearly correlated with at least some of
the control variables. I thus also run the same regressions on a restricted set of control




′ + x′iδ + ǫi (3.31)
Table 3.9 shows (parts of the) regression results for stated party preference and the
demand for redistribution.34 Panel A shows results for a model as given by equation
(3.30), that is with the full set of control variables. Panel B shows the corresponding
estimates when only the restricted set of controls is used (see equation (3.31)). First
31Only the five largest (with respect to voting shares) parties are considered here. These are the
liberal–democratic party (FDP, ”Freisinnig Demokratische Partei”), the christian democrats (CVP,
”Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei”), the right of center conservative Swiss people’s party (SVP,
”Schweizerische Volkspartei”), the social–democratic party (SPS, ”Sozialdemokratische Partei der
Schweiz”), and the left of center green party (GPS, ”Grüne Partei der Schweiz”).
32One might of course use a more sophisticated statistical model like a multinomial logit. For the
sake of simplicity with respect to the interpretation of the results, I will nonetheless rely on simple OLS
estimation.
33I also estimated a model in which the dependent variable is an indicator taking on the value one, if
any party preference is stated. In this case, no statistical effect whatsoever is found and thus I do not
report these results here.
34Full regression results and results including other moments of subjective wage distributions are
available upon request.
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3.8. Conclusions Inequality & Redistribution
note that the difference between panel A and B is as expected, in that in the models with
the full set of control variables a significant part of the effect of m on party preference is
absorbed by the controls. Otherwise, the point estimates are as one would expect them
to be. The demand for redistribution has a negative effect on the probability of stating
preference over the liberal party (FDP), but a positive effect on stating preference for one
of the two left of center parties (SPS, GPS). Interestingly, the amount of redistribution
desired also has a positive effect on stating preference for the right of center party (SVP)
– although this corresponds with what is known about voter turnout of the different
parties.
Table 3.10 shows basically the same models as table 3.9, only that the vector mi now
includes the two subjective inequality measures instead of the demand for redistribution.
Again, the top panel shows regression results using the full set of controls, whereas in the
regressions shown in the lower panel only the restricted set of controls is used. Again,
there are no significant effects regarding the preference for the christian–democratic
party whatsoever. Party preference for one of the other four parties is however correlated
with either the perceived or the desired wage inequality (or both) and consistent with
the results from table 3.9. First, preference for the liberal–democrats is significantly
shaped by both the perceived wage inequality and the desired wage inequality. That
is, individuals who perceive wage inequality to be high whose desired wage inequality
is small tend to state less preference for the FDP. In the case of the three remaining
political parties (that is, SVP, SPS and GPS), the estimated parameters of the two
moments switch sign.
In sum, the results of this section are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, there
clearly is some evidence on the link between subjective evaluations and perceptions of
the wage distribution. Moreover, the results presented in this section are consistent
with what is known about party affiliation in Switzerland. At the same time though,
the empirical evidence is rather weak (with respect to the quantitative effects).
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a simple and intuitive empirical conceptual framework for de-
scribing subjective evaluations of wage distributions, both with respect to the perceived
as well as to the desired distribution of wages. This conceptualization also naturally
leads to a simple measure of the demand for redistribution as the discrepancy between
an individual’s perceived and desired distribution of wages.
The main empirical findings of this chapter are the following. First, these is con-
siderable support for at least some redistribution, which in most cases comes about as
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a combined effect of a desired increase of the wages at the bottom of the distribution
and a decrease of the wages at the very top. Still, most individuals do accept large
differences in wages, presumably reflecting the fact that people think that occupations
differ in their educational requirements, responsibilities, and so forth. Second, there is
some empirical evidence that selfish motives partially explain differences in the amount
of redistribution desired, i.e. individuals with higher wages demand less redistribution
(but still they also demand on average some positive amount of redistribution). Personal
income alone though is a remarkable weak predictor of the support of redistribution of
wages. Norms about distributive justice and beliefs about how wages are determined in
reality also explain some of the observed variation in redistribution, even conditional on
selfish motives. This result is in line with the existing empirical literature using non–
experimental data. Third, there is some empirical evidence on the hypothesized link
between the demand for redistribution and political outcomes (via party preference),
in that all effects with respect to stated party preference have the expected sign, i.e.
individuals with higher demand for redistribution tend to vote for left of center parties
(and vice versa).
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3.A A Very Simple Model
The exposition here essentially follows Hindriks and Myles (2006). Suppose that indi-
viduals derive utility from income y and from a lump–sum public good g provided by
the government. The public good is financed by a linear income tax with tax rate τ :
ui(y, g) = (1 − τ)yi + b(g) (A.1)
Where we assume that b′(g) > 0 and b′′(g) < 0, such that the marginal utility from
the public good is positive, but decreasing in g. Further assuming that the government
budget is balanced, the government’s budget restriction is simply given by (the number
of individuals is normalized to 1):
g = τ · µ (A.2)
Where µ corresponds to the average income in the population. Using (A.2), i’s utility






yi + b(g) (A.3)






+ b′(g) = 0 (A.4)
The optimal level of the public good thus depends on the individual’s income relative





Because, by assumption, the marginal utility from g is decreasing in the level of g, the
demand for (i.e. the optimal level of) the public good g is decreasing in individual
income yi.
35
35Majority voting over any pair of alternative levels of g (and thus of levels of τ) necessarily leads
to the solution that the median voter will be decisive, because each individual chooses the alternative
closer to his optimal level of g and thus the median voter will choose whatever alternative is ’closer’ to
this individual optimal level of redistribution.
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3.B Definitions of Variables
This section gives the definitions of the variables not already explained in the main text,
unless their measurement is obvious anyway (e.g. age).
Relative income: Relative income is defined as (yi/y), where yi is the personal net
monthly income of individual i and y is the average net monthly income in the
(analysis) sample.
Justice evaluation, coworkers’ wage: This variable is measured as the ratio be-
tween just and actual wage for i’s coworkers, that is (y⋆(i)Coworker/y(i)Coworker), where
yi denotes the actual net monthly income of one’s own occupation, estimated by
individual i and y′i denotes the ’just’ net monthly income for one’s occupation.
This variable closely corresponds the justice measures proposed by Jasso (1999).
Mobility: The only information about individual mobility is contained in two questions
about the self–perception of the position today and the position ten years ago.
Both are measured on a scale from 1 (bottom) to 10 (top). Mobility is simply
defined as the difference between the two scores (position today minus position
ten years ago).
Needs: This variable is meant to capture the extent to which an person thinks that
one’s needs should be important in determining their income (need principle). This
variable is constructed as an univariate scale from the following two questions about
which factors should be important in determining one’s pay: (i) having a family
and (ii) having kids.
Effort: This variable is meant to capture the equity principle. This variable is con-
structed as an univariate scale from five questions about which factors should be
important in determining pay: (i) the effort and time needed to aquire education,
(ii) having to supervise others, (iii) how ’good’ one does his job, and (iv) how much
effort one exerts in his job.
Ascribed skills: This variable measures the extent to which a person beliefs in as-
cribed factors as being important in determining the amount of compensation.
This question relates to the perception of individuals of which factors actually are
important for getting ahead: (i) have a wealthy family, (ii) know the ’right’ people.
Acquired skills: This variable is the sum of over the two following questions: (i) people
are paid according to their skills (ii) people are paid according to their effort.
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SIOPS: This variable measures occupational prestige according to the Standard Inter-
national Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS), as suggested by Treiman (1977).
Also see Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).
Conflict: This variable measures the perception of conflicts. Included items are ques-
tions about the existence of conflicts between: (i) rich and poor people, (ii) blue–
and white–collar workers, (iii) managers and subordinates, (iv) young and old
people, (v) people at the top and at the bottom.
Political scale: This variable measures the self–rated position on a scale between 0
and 10, where 0 (10) indicates the leftmost (rightmost) position.
3.C Derivation of the Gini Coefficient



















Where the k groups are ordered by their average within–group wage. Fj denotes to the
accumulated population share up to (and including) group j and qj represents the wage
share of group j. If there are only two groups (i.e. k = 2), the computation simplifies
considerably. Denoting j = 1 = bottom and j = 2 = top we immediately get:
gc = [(0 + Fbottom)qbottom + (Fbottom + Ftop)qtop] − 1
= [(0 + fbottom)qbottom + (fbottom + 1)qtop] − 1
= fbottomqbottom + fbottomqtop + qtop − 1
= fbottom(qbottom + qtop) + qtop − 1
= fbottom − qbottom (C.2)
The first equality of equation (C.2) follows from the fact that F0 = 0, F1 = Fbottom =
fbottom, and F2 = Ftop = fbottom + ftop = 1. The last equality follows from the fact that
(qbottom + qtop) = 1 and thus (qtop − 1) = −qbottom.
36This formula reflects the geometric interpretation of the Gini coefficient, being the ratio of the area
between the curve representing equal distribution of wages and the Lorenz curve to the area under the
curve representing equal distribution (which is equal to 0.5 by construction).
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3.D Sensitivity Analysis
3.D.1 Sensitivity With Respect to Relative Population Shares
One obvious concern of the measures proposed in section 3.4 is that they all rely on
the the assumption about the proportion of ’poor’ individuals in the population. The
subjective gini coefficient can be written as (supressing the indexing by i and denoting
fbottom = f and qbottom = q for the sake of simplicity):

























, the Gini coefficient gc is a nonlinear function of f .





















































Which itself is also a nonlinear function of f . The second term on the right–hand side is
equal to the partial derivative ∂q
∂f






















monotonically increases with f . Further, because ∂q
∂f
necessarily
crosses the value 1 once, ∂gc
∂f
first increases and then decreases in f and has a single
maximum.37 Figure D.1 shows the mean values of the two gini coefficients over the
whole possible range of f (’simulated’ by brute force for the whole sample). Figure
D.1 also shows that actual inequality is (on average) always greater than the desired
inequality, although gc
actual
could principally be higher or lower than gc
just
, depending on




. This implies that the average demand for redistribution is
always positive, regardless of the chosen value for f . Figure D.1 further shows that the
average demand for redistribution is monotonically increasing in the population share
of the bottom group f .38
Table D.1 shows estimation results for different (reasonable) values of fbottom for the






38This is the case because, conditional on f , gc further depends only on the ratio of the two group
wages (that is, on the wage shares of the two groups). Empirically, as discussed in main text, the desired
wage share is higher than the perceived wage share of the bottom group, such that for each f ∈ (0, 1)
the gc for the actual distribution is higher than the gc describing the just distribution.
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Notes: The figure on the left shows sample averages for the two subjective inequality measures
over different values for fbottom. The figure on the right shows the average demand for
redistribution for different values of fbottom.
main empirical model (see table 3.7 in the main text). The two rows at the top show that
not only the mean, but also the variance of the redistribution measure monotonically
increases with the population share of the bottom group f . Most importantly though,
table D.1 shows that the qualitative pattern of the estimates does not depend on the
value of f .
3.D.2 Sensitivity with Respect to Sample Selection
Another point in question is whether the inequality measures or the regression results
depend on the the sample of observations chosen. Table D.2 reports parameter estimates
for the main model, estimated over different samples of observations. The first column
of table D.2 replicates the main result from the main estimation model (see table 3.7).
Columns two and three show estimates for the same model, but each with an additional
sample restriction. Column 2 adds the restriction that only individuals are included
which gave estimates for actual and just wages for the same group of occupations. Col-
umn 3 restricts the sample to individuals who gave estimates for all (nine) occupations.
Since there are considerable within–subject differences concerning the extent of occupa-
tional compensation, the subjective inequality measures might depend on the pattern
of occupational wage estimates (that is, measures describing the actual and the desired
wage distribution might differ, for the same individual, because the pattern of available
wage estimates differs).
In the remaining three columns of table D.2, an attempt is made to increase the
number of observations by a very simple method of missing data imputation. For each
regressor, missing values were replaced by the mean value of the corresponding variable,
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and an indicator variable is created for each regressor, taking on the value 1 if the
observation has missing information about that variable (and 0 otherwise).39 Comparing
columns one and four, we see that this procedure increases the sample size by more than
50%, without changing the qualitative pattern of estimates. The same is true if we only
consider observations with specific patterns of occupational wage estimates.
Below the line then, although a lot of observations is lost due to missing values on
all or part of the regressors, the qualitative pattern of the main regression model is not
changed.
39This way of dealing with missing data on covariates essentially maximizes the sample size without
imputing missing values.
105


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.E. Additional Figures and Tables Inequality & Redistribution
3.E Additional Figures and Tables
Figure E.1: Moments of subjective wage distributions, over deciles of the demand for
redistribution




























Notes: The figures show the distribution of actual (top) and desired (bottom)
wages within deciles of the demand for redistribution (given by the y–axis).
Own calculations, based on ISSP (1999).
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Notes: All variables are defined in the main text. Own calculations, based on
ISSP (1999).
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Table E.1: Summary statistics
Analysis sample Whole sample
A. Financial self–interest & mobility
Net monthly income (SFr.) 5029.98 4467.16
(2904.78) (2717.41)
Fairness evaluation (coworkers’ wage) 0.13 0.14
(0.30) (0.35)
Mobility index 0.57 0.42
(1.61) (1.63)





Ascribed skills 3.02 2.98
(0.76) (0.75)
Acquired skills 3.32 3.31
(0.61) (0.64)
C. Additional control variables
SIOPS 46.65 44.52
(12.35) (12.04)
Employed full–time (dummy) 0.58 0.44
(0.49) (0.50)
Employed (dummy) 0.85 0.67
(0.36) (0.47)
Not employed (dummy) 0.13 0.30
(0.34) (0.46)
Age (years) 43.27 45.15
(13.44) (14.82)
Female (dummy) 0.41 0.54
(0.49) (0.50)
Education (years) 13.45 12.86
(2.64) (2.61)
Urban residence (dummy) 0.65 0.66
(0.48) (0.47)
Living in German–speaking part (dummy) 0.73 0.71
(0.44) (0.45)
Foreign citizenship (dummy) 0.14 0.16
(0.35) (0.36)
Political self–assessment 4.78 4.86
(1.68) (1.66)
Perception of conflicts 2.33 2.38
(0.48) (0.52)
Notes: The first column shows mean values of the control variables for the subsample which
is used in all analyses, the second column shows mean values of the control variables for
the whole sample. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table E.2: Full regression results
Demand for redistribution
Relative income −6.731⋆⋆⋆ −7.035⋆⋆⋆
(1.453) (1.920)








Ascribed skills 2.053⋆ 2.288⋆
(1.230) (1.193)




Employed full–time (yes = 1) 0.815
(2.375)
Employed (yes = 1) −4.063
(4.339)










Living in urban area (yes = 1) −1.951
(1.840)











Adjusted R2 0.110 0.164
p–value (F–statistic) 0.000 0.000
Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level






& THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL INJURY
Joint with Oliver Ruf
”A life which included no improbable events
would be the real statistical improbability.”
Poul Anderson (1926–2001), American writer
4.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized in economics that differences in wages are not only due to the
fact that individuals differ in their productivity–relevant characteristics (e.g. education),
but also due to the fact that the jobs offered to workers differ enormously along various
dimensions (workplace safety being only one important example). Workers presumably
not only value the monetary payoff from working, but also the non–monetary charac-
teristics, potentially giving rise to compensating wage differentials (Rosen, 1986). This
means firms offering jobs with ”negative” characteristics, that is, attributes to which
workers attach a negative value, must attract workers by paying them higher wages ce-
teris paribus, thus ”compensating” them for the negative aspects of the job (and vice
versa for ”positive” workplace characteristics). Non–monetary characteristics of jobs
are of course manifold, most empirical studies though focus on workplace safety, that is
on the risk compensation for both fatal and non–fatal accidents (e.g. Viscusi and Aldy,
2003).
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The theory of compensating wage differentials has inspired a huge number of empir-
ical studies trying to pin down the compensation for undesirable workplace attributes.
Due to the implicit trade–off between job amenities and wages, observed (or rather, es-
timated) compensating wage differentials can be used to assess the value of a statistical
life or injury, respectively. These empirical results in turn may directly influence public
policy, since cost–benefit analyses with respect to safety regulations need empirical as-
sessments on the monetary value of such regulations (this applies not only to regulations
of safety at the workplace, but also to environmental regulations for example).
Yet, the intuitive appeal of the theory notwithstanding, empirical studies face some
fundamental problems concerning the identification of compensating wage differentials.
The main problem is rooted in unobserved productivity differences between individuals
and the thereupon based sorting of workers into jobs with different risks (due to the
positive income elasticity of the value of a statistical accident). This presumably explains
the rather large variation in the estimated compensation for risks on the one hand, but
also the fact that many empirical studies report no compensation for risk or even report
compensating wage differentials having the ”wrong” sign (at least with respect to non–
fatal injury risks). For example, the survey by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) reports a rather
wide range of estimates for the value of a statistical injury from about $20,000 to $70,000
(for the United States only).
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the compensation for non–fatal acci-
dent risk in Switzerland, using a data set compiled from two different sources (which
we will discuss in detail below). Our study has three main features. First, we will
exclusively focus on non–fatal accidents. This focus reflects the fact that most acci-
dents have (fortunately) non–fatal consequences and thus, from the viewpoint of public
health and safety, merit the most attention.1 In the year 2004 (the year of our empir-
ical analysis), for example, the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund reports about 246,000
non–fatal accidents related to work but only 188 fatal accidents. Second, we observe the
number of non–fatal accidents not only within entire industries, but also within cells
defined by industry×skill–level of the job. This is a tremendous advantage from an
empirical point of view, since risks at (too) high levels of aggregation mix the risks of
very different groups of workers and different willingness to pay for avoiding risk, which
might lead to biased estimation of the compensation for risk in the workplace. Third,
we capitalize on the availability of longitudinal wage information, which allows us to
use simple panel estimation methods in order to isolate the firm wage component. We
believe that our empirical approach, on the one hand using the number of non–fatal
1Our focus though is also due to the available data on non–fatal accidents as well as the empirical
approach we take, as we will discuss in detail in section 4.3 and section 4.4 below.
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accidents within narrower cells than usually available, and on the other hand combining
panel data estimation methods with simple non–parametric stratification, transcends
the typical hedonic wage function approach often used in the literature on the subject.
The main findings of our empirical analysis are the following. First, we find that
a simple hedonic wage regression, where the observed log wage is regressed on the risk
measure (and additional control variables) yields a compensation for non–fatal accident
risk which is statistically zero, a result that is in line with some previous empirical studies.
The leading explanation for this result (which runs counter to theory) is presumably the
sorting of workers which differ in their unobserved productivity. Second, moving on to,
in a sense, more sophisticated (but, we believe, in this case also more reliable) methods,
we find a positive point estimate for the compensation of non–fatal accident risk. Our
preferred point estimate yields an implicit value of a statistical injury of about 40,000
Swiss francs (which lies well within the range given by studies from the U.S. labor market,
as well as from studies outside the U.S.). On the other hand, using different estimation
methods yields considerably different values for the value of a statistical injury. As we
will discuss later, a significant cause of this wide range of estimates is the difference in
the estimation methods used. Third, comparing the different estimation methods may
shed some light on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with different
risks, which presumably yields biased estimates for the compensation of risk. Our results
are in fact in line with the argument supported by Hwang et al. (1992), among others,
that such endogenous sorting gives rise to severe underestimation of risk compensation.
Fourth, we find significant differences between men and women on the one hand, and
between smaller and larger firms on the other hand with respect to the compensation
of non–fatal accident risk. Fifth and finally, our results also show that the kind of risk–
data available can make an important difference for the empirical assessment of risk
compensation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We start with a discussion of the
relevant literature on compensating wage differentials, focusing on empirical studies es-
timating the compensation for non–fatal accident risk. In section 4.3, we discuss the two
data sources we rely on, discuss the construction of the variables of main interest – along
with some descriptive statistics. We then expore issues of identification and estimation
in section 4.4. Specifically, we will discuss three different approaches to identification and
estimation. We start with a simple hedonic wage regression model, where the wage is
simply regressed on individual– and firm–specific characteristics. The second approach
is based on the idea that we can control for unobserved heterogeneity of individuals
by appropriately stratifying the sample. The third approach we take capitalizes on the
longitudinal structure of the wage data. We isolate the wage component, which is spe-
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cific to the firm and then use only this part of the wage to estimate risk compensation.
The results of the different estimation methods are presented and discussed in section
4.4. Based on our econometric results, we further present estimates of the value of a
statistical (non–fatal) accident in Switzerland. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
4.2.1 Compensation for Workplace Accident Risk
There is a large number of empirical studies which try to pin down the compensation for
accident risks, as well as for a wide range of other job amenities and disamenities (the
surveys by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Viscusi (1993) are of special interest here; see
also the more recent, but less thorough survey by Ashenfelter (2006)).2 Most empirical
studies find a positive compensation for fatal accident risk, often yielding high implicit
values of a statistical life. For example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report that half of the
studies from the U.S. labor market surveyed in their article give a value of a statistical
life within the range of $3.8–$9.0 million (in 2000 dollars), the median estimate being
about $7 million. Most studies from outside the U.S. labor market give estimates within
the same range. It is difficult to assess the exact reasons for this wide range of estimates,
since the studies differ in various ways, for example with respect to the available data
and risk measure3, or in the econometric methods applied.
The evidence on the compensation for non–fatal accident risk is much less coherent,
which is somewhat surprising since most studies that present estimates of such compen-
sation are based on the same data as estimates for the compensation for fatal accident
risk. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report, for both the U.S. as well as other labor markets, a
probable range for the value of a statistical injury of about $20,000–$70,000 per injury.
4.2.2 Endogenous Sorting
The main problem from the empirical point of view is the potential sorting of workers into
jobs differing in their risk of accidents. Hwang et al. (1992), among others, argue that
the problem of main concern are differences in unobservables which in turn relate to the
2Compensating wage differentials have also been found, for example, for the risk of unemployment
(Lalive et al., 2006; Moretti, 2000), for shift work (Kostiuk, 1990), and uncertainty with respect to
future earnings (Feinberg, 1981).
3Most importantly perhaps, some studies rely not on direct measures of risk (i.e. number of ac-
cidents), but base their analyses on tradeoffs outside the labor market, e.g. on the tradeoff between
traffic accidents and the price of automobiles (Dreyfus and Viscusi, 1995) or fatalities related to bicycle
accidents and the prize of bicycle helmets (Jenkins et al., 2001). Other studies have used subjective
assessments of risk, as for example Viscusi and O’Connor (1984) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001).
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productivity of workers and thus may lead to sorting of workers into jobs with different
risks. The sorting of workers in turn is endogenous due to the fact that the income
elasticity of the value of a statistical life or injury is positive, i.e. more productive workers
sort themselves into less risky jobs by accepting ceteris paribus lower wages. Viscusi
and Aldy (2003), for example, report an income elasticity of about 0.5–0.6. On the
other hand though, Shogren and Stamland (2002) argue that the bias in estimating the
compensating wage differential could run in the other direction, assuming that workers
not only differ in their productivity, but also with respect to their skill in avoiding
accidents. Thus, workers in risky jobs could be either more tolerant to risk or more
skilled in avoiding risk (or both). Thus they show that the estimated risk compensation
might actually be upward biased, rather than downward biased.
Some studies have tried to approach the problem of endogenous sorting by using
instrumental variables (DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Garen, 1988, for example,). The study
by Garen (1988), for example, tries to correct for the endogeneity of job risk by using
a system of simultaneous equations where marital status and the number of dependents
are used as instruments for the preference over risk.
4.2.3 Measurement of Risk
Another empirical issue concerns the measurement of the risk of an accident. First, as
pointed out by Mellow and Sider (1983) for example, typical survey data are more often
than not plagued by measurement error, i.e. it seems to be the case that workers often
misreport their industry affiliation and/or their exact occupation. Assuming that this
kind of measurement error is random, this causes the compensating differential to be
biased towards zero. Second, there clearly is a trade–off of the following form. On the
one hand, risk measurements at a low level of aggregation are preferred, as otherwise one
might mix workers with very different occupations into the same risk categories. On the
other hand though, risk measures at a low aggregation level run into the problem that
many cells will have zero risk, at least for shorter periods of time. This is specifically
true for fatal accident risk, yet obviously also applies to non–fatal injuries.
4.2.4 Estimation
The most prevalent approach in the empirical literature is via estimation of hedonic
wage functions, that is, by running regressions of the wage on characteristics of both
the workers and jobs. As we will make explicit in section 4.4, this approach is likely to
fail identification because it is unlikely that this approach can effectively deal with the
problem of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs (as pointed out above, some studies
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have tried to instrument endogenous sorting by using family characteristics).
As we will discuss in detail in section 4.4 below, our empirical approach of choice
relies on the panel structure of the wage data. Thus, our study also relates to work
on matched employer–employee data (e.g. Abowd and Kramarz, 1999) as well as the
panel data estimation methods in general (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). We cannot directly
apply the methods of Abowd and Kramarz (1999) though, because our wage data has
a longitudinal structure only with respect to the employer, but not with respect to the
individual worker.
4.2.5 Empirical Evidence for Switzerland
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a single published study on the compensation
of accident risk for Switzerland by Baranzini and Ferro-Luzzi (2001), focusing on fatal
accident risk only. They report estimates for the value of a statistical life ranging from
about 12 to about 32 million Swiss francs. Besides having a different focus (our focus
in on non–fatal accident risk only), our study differs in at least two further ways. First,
we have access to the number of non–fatal accidents not only within industries, but
within narrower cells, defined over industry×skill–level of the job. Second, we do not
primarily and exclusively rely on simple hedonic wage regressions for the estimation of
risk compensation, instead we use the longitudinal structure of the wage information in
a first stage in order to deal with the endogenous sorting of workers.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data Sources
We use two different data sources. The first data source is the Swiss Wage Struc-
ture Survey (SWSS; ”Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE)”), which is a biannual survey among
firms which is administered and made available by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
The SWSS is one of the two largest official surveys in Switzerland focused mainly on
employment–relevant information.4 The SWSS is a survey of firms, covering the popu-
lation of large firms along with a random sample of small firms. We use three different
waves of the SWSS (from the years 2000, 2002, and 2004) and we extract individual
4The second important labor market survey is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS; ”Schweizerische
Arbeitskräfteerhebung (SAKE)”). The two main advantages of using the SWSS over the SLFS are the
following: First, the SWSS allows isolating the wage firm fixed effect, which is the part of the observed
wage where risk compensation should show up. Second, the SWSS is (opposed to the SLFS) mailed
to employers, and thus misclassification of occupations and industries should only be of minimal order
(the same is arguably true for wages).
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monthly earnings along with several individual–specific characteristics (see section 4.3.4
below) on details.
Our risk measure corresponds to the number of non–fatal accidents within cells de-
fined over industry (forty different industries on a two–digit level) and skill–level of
the job (four different levels). The data have been provided by the Swiss Accident
Insurance Fund (SAIF; ”Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt (Suva)”), which is
the most important accident insurance fund in Switzerland. The number of non–fatal
accidents within industry×skill–level cells are available for the year 2004.
4.3.2 Definitions
One of the main features of our analysis is that our risk measure rk gives the number
of non–fatal accidents per year and per 1,000 workers within a given industry×skill–
level cell k (instead of within–industry only). Data on the absolute number of non–fatal
accidents for the year 2004 is available within cells defined over industry×skill–level of
job. Now, because the SAIF does not directly have the number of workers within these
cells and because workers are not uniformly distributed over these cells, we also need
to know the distribution of workers over these cells in order to compute the risk of a
non–fatal accident. To this end, we simply use the distribution of workers in the SWSS
(from the year 2004), and then approximate the population distribution of workers by
multiplying the number of workers within a given cell with the total number of workers
which are covered by the SAIF (about 1.827 millions in the year 2004).
Note that there is a fundamental trade–off with respect to the risk measure chosen:
On the one hand, risk measures on a highly disaggregated level are preferred, such that
we do not pool accident risks of individuals working in very different occupations and
jobs. This has been pointed at, for example, by Viscusi (1993, p.1928), noting that ”[t]he
main deficiency of industry–based data is that they pertain to industry–wide averages
and do not distinguish among the different jobs within that industry [...]”. On the other
hand, accidents observed at a very low level of aggregation also give rise to estimation
problems, because the number of accidents tends towards zero for most cells if we shrink
the size of the risk–relevant cells. That, in fact, is the reason why we decided not to use
the information about fatal accidents for this study. Disaggregating the number of fatal
accidents over the skill–level of job actually yields far too many cells with zero number
of accidents.
The SWSS includes average gross monthly wages for full–time employment (i.e. 172
hours per month), including mandatory social security contributions and extra pay (e.g.
for night work, 13. monthly wage). The SWSS also includes several socio–demographic
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characteristics (e.g. age, gender, tenure, educational attainment (highest degree), citi-
zenship), but also different firm characteristics (most importantly, the size of the firm
along with the geographic location).
4.3.3 Measurement Error
One main advantage of our data is that measurement error in the risk data and industry–
affiliation of workers is arguably of minor significance (as already mentioned in section
4.2, Mellow and Sider (1983) have pointed out the problem of misclassification of both
industry and occupation). This is important because measurement error in the risk
variable tends to bias the compensating wage differential towards zero (measurement
error in the dependent variable (i.e. wage) is, of course, also common but of less concern).
We are confident that the measurement error for both our risk measure and industry–
affiliation is of no great importance, since the SWSS does not involve employees but
obtains the data from the employer directly (such that misclassification of either industry
and/or occupation is unlikely to occur). For the same reason, we also believe that
our wage information is more reliable than the information available in typical survey
data (although presumably less reliable than administrative data). Additionally, our
risk measure is directly obtained from administrative sources and should thus cover all
relevant accidents.
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for both the overall sample as well as the sample
of individuals in jobs of the lowest skill–level (that will be used in the empirical analysis
discussed below). In both samples, we only consider workers aged between 16 and 64
(for men) and between 16 and 61 (for women). A second restriction applies to the size
of the employer. Because we are estimating wage fixed effects for each firm, we also
restrict the sample to workers from firms which have at least ten workers in each of the
four job skill–levels in each year. The overall sample includes more than one million
individual workers, the subsample of workers in the lowest skill–level (with respect to
the job, not with respect to the educational attainment of the worker) consists of about
300,000 individual workers. In both cases, there are about 3,500 different firms (due
to the restriction on firms). As we will discuss in–depth in section 4.4 below, our
preferred estimation approach will focus exclusively on workers within a given skill–
level as collected in the SWSS, as we believe that such a stratification of the workers
yields more reliable estimates of the compensating wage differential.
We begin with describing the overall sample, which is representative of the Swiss labor
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market as a whole. The typical worker in the Swiss labor market has gross earnings equal
to 6,300 Swiss francs a month, is about 40 years old and has about 9.5 years of tenure
and is more likely to be a man. The average employer has more than 2,800 workers
(reflecting the sampling structure of the SWSS as well as the restriction with respect
to the selection of the employers). About two thirds of the workers are married, the
other third single. The distribution of workers with respect to educational attainment
highlights two important characteristics of the Swiss labor market in terms of education.
First, compared to other countries, the number of workers with tertiary education is
rather low (e.g. only about 5.5% of the workers have a university degree). Second,
about half of the workers hold a vocational training. Another important characteristic
of the Swiss labor market is the large fraction (about 20%) of workers without Swiss
citizenship. Focusing on individuals working in jobs with the lowest skill–level (columns
3 and 4 of table 4.1) yields the expected result that some groups are overrepresented in
the analysis sample relative to the overall sample of individuals (although this subset
of individuals is similar to the overall sample with respect to some characteristics, for
example age and size or the geographic location of the employer).5 Here, average monthly
earnings are only about 70% of the overall average earnings (about 4,500 Swiss francs).
Moreover, a worker from skill–level four is more likely to be a woman, more likely to be
married and much more likely not to have Swiss citizenship, compared with a worker
from the overall sample. The most striking difference between the overall sample and the
lowest skill–level sample though is the distribution of workers with respect to educational
attainment. As table 4.1 shows, there are practically no workers with an educational
degree above vocational training. This, in fact, is a desired result with respect to the
empirical approach we take (see section 4.4 below): Given that education (of course
not exclusively) reflects differences in productivity, focusing on workers with similar
educational attainment also implies that these workers are more similar with respect
to unobserved productivity–relevant characteristics (compared to workers from all job
skill–levels). We believe that the variance of unobserved productivity is presumably
lowest within the group of workers in the lowest skill–level (although this presumption
obviously is fundamentally empirically untestable).
As table 4.1 also shows, the typical worker in the year 2004 was faced with the risk
of a non–fatal, work–related accident of about 8.8% (88 accidents on average per 1,000
workers). In the sample of workers with lowest skill–level, the average risk was about half
(about 43 accidents per 1,000 workers). Figure 4.1 shows a simple scatterplot between
the average logarithmic monthly wage and the number of non–fatal accidents for workers
5The distribution of workers over the skill–level of jobs looks as follows: About 6% work in the
highest level, about 20% in the second–highest level. 46% work in skill–level 3, and the remaining 28%
of the workers are in jobs of lowest skill–level.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Skill-level 1 Skill-level 1-4
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly wage 4526.63 1069.26 6371.88 3466.72
Natural logarithm of monthly wage 8.39 0.23 8.68 0.38
Non fatal accident risk (per 1,000 workers) 45.40 59.13 93.01 150.42
Age 40.19 11.66 40.71 11.14
Female 0.54 0.50 0.42 0.49
Tenure 7.63 8.18 9.06 9.12
Size of the firm 2714.94 7820.84 3108.01 7890.73
Marital status
Single 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47
Married 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.49
Others 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
Education
University degree 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.23
College of higher education 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.21
Higher professional degree 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.26
Teachers’ certificate 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07
High School 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14
Finished professional education 0.27 0.45 0.50 0.50
Firm intern professional education 0.14 0.34 0.07 0.25
Secondary school 0.48 0.50 0.18 0.38
Other degree 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.22
Citizenship
Swiss citizenship 0.52 0.50 0.68 0.47
Short tem residence authorization 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08
Long term residence authorization 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.23
Permanent recidence permit 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.37
Cross-border commuter 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
Others 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
Geographic region
VD, VS, GE 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
BE, FR, SO, NE, JU 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
BS, BL, AG 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
ZH 0.24 0.42 0.27 0.44
GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, ZG 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
TI 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Number of Firms 3,533 3,533
Number of Observation 130,976 468,328
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 refer to the subsample of workers in jobs of lowest skill–level, columns 3 and
4 to the full sample of workers. Sources: All variables are taken from the SWSS, except the number
of non–fatal accidents. Risk measure gives the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per
year, within cells over industry×skill–level. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF
(2004).
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from the lowest skill–level jobs at the level of industry×skill–level. The scatterplot shows
no relation whatsoever between the two variables (if anything, the correlation goes the
”wrong” way), which is underlined by the estimated slope coefficient from a regression
of the average log earnings on the number of accidents – yielding essentially a zero point
estimate, both in economic and statistical terms (t–value is approximately zero). This
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Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = −.0001 ; t−value = −.4
Notes: The y–axis shows the average logarithm of monthly gross earnings
and the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers
in lowest job skill–level only. Table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the
corresponding numbers. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF
(2004).
result is not especially surprising though since average wages within industries clearly
may not only reflect differences with respect to accident risks, but also differences in the
composition of workers and jobs. We thus now move on to issues of identification and
econometric estimation.
4.4 Identification and Estimation
We now discuss issues of identification and estimation of the compensating wage differ-
ential for (non–fatal) accident risk. We start with a simple hedonic wage regression of
the following form:




jγ + δrk + uijk (4.1)
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Where yijk is the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage of individual i, working
in firm j and industry×skill–level cell k. x is a (column) vector of individual character-
istics including citizenship, educational attainment, age (and its square), tenure (and its
square), a gender–dummy and marital status. z is a (column) vector of characteristics
describing the firm (and thus reflecting the characteristics of the job), and includes the
size of the firm (and its square) and the geographical location of the firm. r is our risk
measure, corresponding to the number of non–fatal accidents in industry×skill–level cell
k per 1,000 workers in the year 2004. uijk is the unobserved error term, upon which
identification of the compensating wage differential obviously critically hinges.
α, β, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated from the sample data at hand. The
constant term α is, of course, of no special interest but simply serves the purpose of
scaling the expected value of the error term to zero. The two parameter vectors β and γ
are also, for the purpose of our analysis, of no particular interest. The parameter of main
interest is δ, which, under appropriate assumptions, corresponds to the compensating
wage differential for non–fatal accident risk.
As explained in section 4.3, the number of non–fatal accidents is only available for a
single point in time, so that we can essentially only run a cross–sectional hedonic wage
regression6 (but we do have a partial panel structure with respect to wages, which we
will try to capitalize on later; see section 4.4.4 below).
4.4.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Worker Sorting
Parameter δ (as are the other parameters) is identified if we are willing to assume that:
E(u|x, z, r) = E(u) (4.2)
This means, if we can safely assume that the error term uijk is mean independent of
(x, z, r), then all the parameters of the regression given by equation (4.1) are identified.
However, as has been pointed out by several authors (e.g. Hwang et al., 1992) and
discussed in section 4.2, there is good reason to act on the assumption that there is
unobserved individual heterogeneity related to wages (that is, these differences somehow
reflect differences in productivity not taken into account for by observed variables) and
that ”safety” is a normal good (i.e. the demand for ”safety” increases as income rises).
Thus, workers of high productivity sort themselves into less risky jobs by accepting lower
6Many, if not most, other empirical studies face the same problem of not observing the relevant
risk measure over time, as pointed out by Hwang et al.: ”While studies of this sort [i.e. panel studies]
represent improvements over standard cross–sectional studies, their applicability is restricted by the
availability of longitudinal data sets that include the relevant nonwage job attribute variables. In most
cases, this is a binding constraint.” (Hwang et al., 1992, p. 836).
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wages ceteris paribus. To stick with the model from equation (4.1), the hedonic wage
regression with unobserved individual heterogeneity made explicit can be written as:




jγ + δrk + θi + ǫijk (4.3)
where (θi + ǫijk) corresponds to the error term uijk in equation (4.1) whereby now we
make the problem of individual heterogeneity explicit (for simplicity, θ is rescaled such
that the partial of effect of θ on y is equal to 1).7 Now, even if we can assume that ǫijk
is mean independent of (x, z, r), identification of the compensating wage differential δ is
only achieved if the unobserved effect θ is also mean independent of (x, z, r). Whenever
there is reason to believe otherwise, parameter δ is not identified (and neither are the
other parameters identified, but that is of minor importance for our purposes, since we
are not per se interested in these parameters).
As discussed in section 4.2, the leading reason for a correlation between θ and the
accident risk r is that θ reflects unobserved productivity, which is obviously related to
the wage y. If the demand for safety actually increases with income and if we are, at
the same time, unable to adequately control for productivity differences, then this could
quite plausibly lead to a correlation between θ and r. That is, more productive workers
(i.e. workers with above–average θ) sort themselves into less–risky jobs by accepting
lower wages, which in turn leads to a correlation between the productivity measure θ
and the risk measure r, meaning that identification of the risk compensation parameter
δ must ultimately fail.
In the following, we will discuss three different empirical approaches in turn, all of
which are intended to mitigate the worker–sorting leading to biased estimates of the
compensation for risk.
4.4.2 Control Function
The first approach, which we might label control–function approach, is to basically stick
with the hedonic wage regression, but to try to control for as many observable charac-
teristics (both at the individual and the firm/job level) as possible. In fact, controlling
for the appropriate set of observed variables might entail identification of δ, depending
on which variables are observed, and thus can be controlled for in the regression model.
Under ’typical’ circumstances however, this approach is prone to fail identification, since
the data sources usually available do not include enough control variables or the critical
control variables, respectively. Nonetheless, we will also estimate hedonic wage regres-
7Note that the error term ǫijk potentially also includes unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the
firm. We will take up this issue in section 4.4.4 below.
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sions, mainly for reasons of comparison. We stress here that we would not place much
confidence in the resulting estimates for the parameter δ. The bottom line is that this
approach to identification crucially hinges on the availability of enough control variables
(describing both the workers and the jobs).
4.4.3 Sample Stratification
A second related approach is to stratify the sample in such a way as to minimize the
variation in the unobserved error component θ (see equation (4.3)). That is, we run
the very same hedonic wage regression as given by equation (4.1), but only on a narrow
subset of individuals. Ideally, this subset consists of individuals presumably as similar
as possible with respect to θ. That is, stratification is the simple non–parametric coun-
terpart of the control function approach. However, since most often it is very difficult to
control for θ, we think that stratifying the sample is probably a more fruitful approach.
Our stratification variable of primary interest is the skill–level of the job, which is
recorded in the SWSS. Let sij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} be the skill–level of individual i working
in job j, where s = 1 (s = 4) corresponds to the highest (lowest) skill–level of a given
job. We thus run the same hedonic wage regression as in equation (4.1), but only on a
subset of individuals within a given skill–level s. Specifically, we will run the following
regressions:




jγ + δrk + uijk sij ≥ s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (4.4)
Note that this approach to estimation is basically the same as the control function
approach, the main difference being that stratification allows all parameter estimates to
vary between different subsets of the sample8. However, we think it plausible that the
main advantage of the stratification is that we can minimize variation in θ in this way,
which ideally renders a consistent estimate of the compensating wage differential δ.9
8That is, the control function approach yields the same estimates as sample stratification if all
parameters would be interacted with the variable on which stratification is based on. However, such
a fully interacted regression model is, due to the large number of parameters to be estimated, often
difficult to interpret.
9As we will show later, our stratification approach actually reduces the differences between groups
of workers with respect to the observed wage (on this point, see table 4.5). For example, in the overall
sample the difference in mean monthly earnings between men and women amounts to about 1,700 Swiss
francs (about one third relative to the female average). In the subsample of workers within the lowest
skill–level, the difference in average earnings amounts to only about 630 Swiss francs (relative to the
female average, a bit less than 15%). Although this is only suggestive evidence, we still believe that
this exactly what one would expect if the presumption holds that the variance in θ is lower in the lower
skill–levels of jobs.
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4.4.4 Wage Decomposition and Firm Wage–Component
Our third approach to identification and estimation is based on quite another idea, which
tries to capitalize on the availability of panel data (with respect to the firm).10 Still,
we can use the additional source of variation in wages stemming from the fact that the
SWSS has a longitudinal structure (at least with respect to the firm) such that we can
apply simple panel data methods (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002).
To start with, let us assume that the observed natural logarithm of the wage yit of
individual i in a given year t can (conceptually) be decomposed in a linear model as
follows:
yijt = λt + φi + ψj + ǫijt (4.5)
Abstracting from the time fixed–effect λt, equation (4.5) states that individual i’s wage
is the sum of an individual wage fixed–effect φi, a firm wage fixed–effect ψj, and a
remaining random error component ǫijt. The critical assumptions in this simple linear
fixed effects model are the assumptions about the time invariance of both the individual
and the firm fixed effect. However, since we are using panel data spanning only a
short time period we believe that these assumptions are innocuous for our application –
nonetheless allowing us to resort to the power of panel data methods. Importantly, note
that the theory of compensating wage differentials essentially makes statements about
the wage component specific to the employer (i.e. ψj), but not to the individual–specific
part nor the random part of the wage.
This simple representation of the wage essentially states that the wage of a specific
individual i in a given year t is the sum of an aggregate time effect (e.g. aggregate
shocks), an individual–specific component (which is assumed to be time–invariant), a
firm–specific part (also assumed to be time–invariant) and a random error term (varying
over time, firms, and individuals). If it is possible to consistently estimate the wage
firm fixed effect ψj from the available data, we can essentially get rid of individual
heterogeneity by simply running a hedonic wage regressing using the estimated wage
firm–fixed effect ψ̂j instead of the observed wage yijt on our risk measure r, although
we can not directly control for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the hedonic wage
regression (because, remember, the risk measure is not observed over time and because
there is no person–identifier in the SWSS).
Thus, in a first stage, we run a simple regression model using the three consecutive
10Of course, we could capitalize on repeated individual observations using for example the techniques
proposed by Abowd and Kramarz (1999), but as explained in section 4.3, we only have temporal
information about the employer but not the individual workers.
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waves of the SWSS:




jtγ + λt + ψj + uijt with sij = 4 (4.6)
Here, again, x and z are vectors of observed individual and firm characteristics and
the parameter λt captures aggregate wage shifts over time. The vector x of observed
individual characteristics is important here because we essentially use x to proxy for
otherwise unobserved individual heterogeneity. Moreover, we run this regression on a
subset of individuals working in jobs with the lowest skill–level only, such that we can
further dampen the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.
The regression model given by equation (4.6) is only of interest here because it allows
us to estimate the firm wage fixed effects, represented by the vector ψj. Practically, ψj
is estimated from the data by including a separate dummy variable for each firm in the
sample.
In the second stage, we run a regression very similar to the hedonic model from
equation (4.1):




jγ + rkδ + uijk with sij = 4 (4.7)
where now the dependent variable is the estimated firm wage fixed effect ψ̂ijk of individ-
ual i working in firm j. Note that the unit of observation is still the individual worker,
although the firm fixed effect obviously does not vary between individuals working in the
same firm. This procedure, though, directly applies the right weighting scheme. Again,
rk is the non–fatal risk measure in industry×skill–level cell k. Note that we still have
to include both vector x and z, because the estimated wage firm fixed effect ψ̂ is not
independent of x and z. The main point is that the estimated wage firm fixed effect ψ̂
should have been separated from the unobserved individual–specific component θ.
4.5 Econometric Results
We now present the econometric results, starting with some simple hedonic wage re-
gressions. We then go to discuss the results from stratifying the sample by skill–level,
which yields results in the expected direction. Next, we present results from our pre-
ferred approach, regressing firm wage fixed–effects instead of individual wage on accident
risk. Finally, we present empirical estimates for the statistical value of a injury (i.e. a
non–fatal accident related to workplace activities), which are implicitly given by the
estimates of the different econometric models.
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4.5.1 Hedonic Wage Regression
Estimated parameters of the hedonic wage function, as given by equation (4.1), are given
in table 4.2 (column 1). The point estimate of the non–fatal accident risk is negative
(-0.00005), although statistically not different from zero (t–value of about less than one
in absolute value). This result is in fact in line with either endogenous sorting of workers.
Note also that the other regressors have the expected sign. As discussed in section 4.4,
the leading explanation for the ”wrong” sign of the risk variable is endogenous sorting of
workers into jobs with different risks. As we do not put much confidence in this simple
hedonic wage regression, so we quickly move on to the next results.
4.5.2 Sample Stratification
Columns 2 to 4 in table 4.2 also show parameter estimates from a simple hedonic wage
regression, but only for a subset of workers each. As we narrow the range of the skill–
level, the point estimate of risk compensation moves towards the expected direction.
Focusing on workers in the lowest skill–level only yields a positive point estimate on
the risk measure (0.00024), which moreover is almost statistically significant on the 10%
level (t–value of 1.63). The decrease in the R–squared of the model reflects the fact that
the stratification of the sample absorbs a large part of the variation in the regressors
(e.g. educational attainment; see section 4.3), which otherwise explain a significant part
of the variation in wages.
4.5.3 Wage Firm Fixed Effects
The last column in table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the estimated firm wage
fixed–effect by industry (at the two–digit level, only for the lowest skill–level of jobs). As
shown in figure 4.2, a simple scatterplot of the average firm wage fixed–effect (averaged
within industries) versus the number of non–fatal accidents now shows a clear positive
relation between the two variables (as opposed to figure 4.1, which showed no relation
between the two measures at all). A simple regression of the average wage firm fixed
effect on the number of non–fatal accidents yields an estimated slope coefficient of 0.0034,
which marginally reaches statistical significance (t–value of about 1.6). Column 1 of
table 4.3 reproduces, for the purpose of comparison, the simple hedonic wage regression
using workers from the lowest skill-level only (see section 4.5.1 above). As it turns out
(see column 2, table 4.3), the point estimate of the risk parameter more then doubles
when using ψ̂ instead of y directly as the dependent variable in the regression, yielding
a point estimate of 0.00067 (with a t–value of more than 2). This result is in line with
the story of workers sorting into jobs based on their (partially) unobserved productivity,
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = .0034 ; t−value = 1.6
Notes: The y–axis shows the average of the wage firm fixed effect and the
x–axis the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers
in lowest job skill–level only. Also see table A.1 in the chapter appendix. Own
calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
because the main difference between columns 1 and 2 of table 4.3 is that variation in y
still reflects to a large part variation in unobserved productivity, whereas variation in ψ̂
much less so.
4.5.4 Detailed Results
We present some additional results for different subgroups of the sample, based on both
the simple hedonic wage model and on models using the wage firm fixed effect as the
dependent variable. The estimates of these additional models are given in table 4.4.
These additional estimates are consistent with our main result, since in each case the
model using the wage firm fixed effect as the dependent variable yields a higher risk
compensation than using the observed wage. Panel A of table 4.4 simply reproduces the
result from table 4.3 discussed above for easy comparison with the other results.
Additionally, these estimates may shed some light on the question of the sorting of
workers into firms with different risk compensation and possibly on differences in risk
aversion between groups of workers.11 Note that, by construction, the estimated firm
wage fixed effect ψ̂ijk is the same for all individuals working within a specific firm j.
11We also split the sample by marital status (i.e. married versus single individuals). We did not find
(statistically) different results and we thus do not present these results.
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Table 4.3: Observed wage versus wage firm fixed effect (skill–level 4 only)
ln(monthly wage)
Observed wage (y) Firm fixed effect (ψ̂)
Non fatal accident risk 0.00024 0.00067⋆
(1.63) (2.41)
(Plant size / 100) 0.00148⋆ 0.00189⋆
(2.16) (2.10)




Age squared −0.00019⋆⋆⋆ −0.00005⋆
(−9.18) (−2.68)
(Tenure / 10) 0.11261⋆⋆⋆ 0.03799⋆⋆
(6.65) (2.80)






Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level,
respectively. Robust t–values in parentheses. Only workers in jobs of lowest
skill–level. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
It thus must be the case that differences in the estimated risk compensation between
subgroups of workers somehow reflect differences in risk compensation between firms.
We will be more explicit on this point below when discussing the results.
First, we split the sample by gender (panel B of table 4.4). The hedonic wage
model gives positive point estimates for both men and women, although both are not
statistically different from zero. Interestingly, the point estimate of the compensating
wage differential is larger for women (δ̂ = 0.00046) than for men (δ̂ = 0.00015). Using
the wage firm fixed effect yields, in both cases, a higher point estimate than using the
observed wage (δ̂ = 0.00038 for men, and δ̂ = 0.0015 for women), but now in this
case both coefficients are statistically different from zero. Still, the estimate for women
remains about three times as large as the corresponding estimate for men.
We believe that such a pattern is informative with respect to the underlying sorting
of workers into firms with different risk compensation. The results essentially state that
women ask a higher risk compensation than men for a given change in the statistical
non–fatal accident risk. This result is in line with empirical evidence on differences in
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risk aversion between men and women (Sunden and Surette, 1998).
Table 4.4: Wage firm fixed effects, detailed results
Log–Wage Firm fixed effect













C. By size of firm








Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1%
and 0.1% level, respectively. Robust t–values in parentheses. Own
calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
Second, table 4.4 (panel C) also shows separate results for smaller (that is, less than
500 employees) and larger (500 or more employees) firms. The simple hedonic wage
regression for smaller firms gives us a positive and significant point estimate for risk
compensation (δ̂=0.00031, t–value of about 3.3). For larger firms, we find no effect of
accident risk on the firm wage fixed effect (the point estimate is even negative). Moving
on to the fixed effects regression, we again get a larger point estimate for the smaller
firms (δ̂ = 0.0007, t–value of about 3.4) and larger firms (δ̂ = 0.00055), although for
larger firms the estimate remains statistically insignificant.
This result states that smaller firms have to pay higher risk compensation for any
increase in the risk of non–fatal accident than larger firms do. This difference in risk
compensation might reflect underlying differences in the wage setting process between
firms of different size. Specifically, one might argue that wages in smaller firms are more
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likely to reflect competitive wages than in larger firms, where rent sharing is presumably
more prevalent than in smaller firms. Another possible explanation for this finding is
that workers may perceive working at larger firms per se as more safe (for whatever
reason). In statistical terms, in fact, larger firms do not pay any risk compensation at
all, which possibly means that larger firms have to guarantee workplace safety anyway
because they are presumably under stricter monitoring, whereas smaller firms have more
discretion with respect to workplace safety and thus to risk compensation.
4.5.5 The Value of a Statistical Injury
Given an estimate for the compensation for non–fatal accident risk, we can easily com-
pute the value of a statistical injury (i.e. non–fatal accident). Because all our estimates
of the risk parameter are based on semi–logarithmic regressions, the estimated risk coef-
ficient corresponds to the relative wage which 1,000 workers are willing to forego in order
to prevent one non–fatal accident (and thus is independent of the time period chosen).
Thus, multiplying the estimated risk parameter by 1,000 yields the estimated relative
value of a statistical injury (VSI):
VSI = δ̂ · 1, 000 (4.8)
Since our risk measure refers to non–fatal accident per year, we will phrase the VSI in
terms of average annual earnings (that is, we multiply VSI additionally with the average
annual earnings in the corresponding group of workers). Table 4.5 shows estimates
for the value of a statistical injury computed from the different estimation methods
discussed above (given in terms of the average annual earnings in the sample). The
main estimates are based on the point estimate of the risk variable. Lower and upper
bounds on the value of a statistical injury are based on the 95% confidence interval of
each point estimate of the parameter δ. The simple hedonic wage regression actually
yields a negative estimate for the value of a statistical injury (per injury per year).
Only using the upper bound of the confidence interval yields the expected positive value
(although still small).
Stratification of the sample yields a higher value of a statistical injury, the narrower
the sample. Focusing on workers in the lowest skill–level only gives an estimate of about
14,000 Swiss francs (the estimate based on the lower bound of the confidence interval
though still gives a negative estimate).
Using the wage firm fixed effect finally gives a consistent positive value of a statistical
injury (even if we use the lower bound of the corresponding confidence interval). Using
the point estimate, we get an estimated value of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss
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francs per non–fatal accident averted per year. This value fits into the range reported
by most other studies (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, again).
4.6 Conclusions
We provide empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury for Switzerland for
the year 2004, using non–fatal accident risk within industry×skill–level cells and apply-
ing different approaches to identification. Specifically, we try to statistically isolate the
firm–specific wage component, to which the theory of compensating wage differentials
conceptually applies most directly. Further, we try to mitigate the problem of endoge-
nous worker sorting as far as possible by combining appropriate data and methods.
The empirical method actually makes a huge difference with respect to the estimation
of risk compensation. Simple hedonic wage regressions actually yield negative or zero
compensation for non–fatal accident risk at the workplace. Moving on to methods we
believe are more reliable (i.e. consistent) pushes the risk compensation in the ”right”
direction (i.e. yielding positive compensation for accident risk). Our preferred estimation
method, based on a restricted sample of workers in jobs of lowest skill–level only and
using the wage firm fixed effect instead of the observed wage, gives an estimate for the
value of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss francs, which is within the range given
by both studies from inside and outside the U.S. labor market.
Our analysis, by comparing the magnitude of risk compensation, may also shed
some light on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers based on their (unobserved)
productivity–relevant characteristics. The more attention we pay to mitigating unob-
served productivity differences, the larger the estimates for risk compensation we get.
This pattern seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that high–productivity workers
select into lower–risk jobs by accepting lower wages.
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4.A Appendix
Table A.1: Main variables, by industry (lowest skill–level only)
Industry Workers Earnings Accidents FFE
Petroleum refining and processing 4692 5,560.13 0.14 0.78
Office material production, data processing 4288 4,302.83 0.59 -0.62
Information technology services 6237 3,933.30 2.39 -0.76
Shipping 55 5,467.47 3.57 0.96
Metal production and processing 7201 4,781.81 5.46 -0.53
Aviation 12 5,496.25 6.22 -0.44
Production of leather goods and shoes 229 3,628.01 8.94 -1.57
Production of clothes and fur goods 270 3,741.27 9.89 -1.87
Insurance industry 2086 5,300.57 10.53 1.38
Production of medical technology 7421 4,523.07 11.55 -0.26
Retail business 19118 4,090.10 12.26 -0.22
Tobacco processing 636 5,977.87 12.70 3.61
Production of furniture, jewellery, musical intruments 1743 4,329.91 14.86 -0.27
Machinery/mechanical engineering 5441 4,851.64 20.24 -0.07
Textiles 1350 4,436.00 20.83 -0.73
Automobile industry 1075 4,508.15 22.73 -0.39
Energy– and watersupply 496 5,504.46 25.59 1.79
Traffic support 1502 4,360.78 26.35 -0.53
Credit business 3059 5,833.48 28.60 0.91
Paper and carton production 2153 4,917.06 29.64 -0.22
Credit business and insurance industry 70 5,373.94 29.76 0.86
Printing, publishing and distribution industries 3013 4,833.14 36.99 -0.21
Research and development 202 5,478.94 39.78 1.34
Whole sale 7621 4,683.02 41.36 -0.34
Wood processing 810 4,950.09 43.53 0.11
Transportation 2236 4,724.08 46.89 -0.29
Rubber and plastic production 2657 4,511.65 48.12 -0.60
Mining 80 5,277.08 50.33 2.03
Agriculture 6756 4,310.73 57.05 -0.96
Mining 1217 4,821.76 59.91 -0.26
Health and welfare system 19642 4,582.02 65.31 0.92
Hotel and restaurant industry 9676 3,743.90 76.98 -0.01
Real estate 581 4,784.07 95.10 0.69
Information transmission 55 4,707.71 111.04 0.05
Entertainment 814 4,208.07 113.46 -0.44
Education 744 4,394.47 221.19 0.64
Personal services 238 4,318.43 233.62 2.31
Waste management 95 4,953.19 242.00 0.37
Lobby, associations, organizations 512 5,067.35 264.88 1.22
Construction 4893 4,965.64 289.03 0.25
Notes: Table entries show sample averages within industries. Non–fatal accident risk is the number of non–fatal
accidents per 1,000 workers. Wage is the average logarithm of gross monthly earnings. Wage firm fixed effect is the
average firm fixed effect, as given by equation (4.6), and is (in the table) standardized to mean 0 and variance 1.







”Statistics are like bikinis.
What they reveal is suggestive,
but what they conceal is vital.”
Aaron Levenstein (1911–1986), business economist
”Seeing through statistics” (which is the title of a wonderful textbook on statistics (Utts,
2004)) actually is often not that easy, but still I think that empirical methods, combined
with suitable data, can shed light on practically any research topic. In a nutshell, the
three main lessons I learned while working on my own projects are the following. First,
good empirical research is a combination of good data, a clever design and appropriate
econometric methods. Second, more often than not, some ambiguity will remain at the
end of the day. And third, one has to prepare for the unexpected and should not let
oneself be misdirected by one’s own preconceptions.
For example, chapter 2 has shown that beside the data the design of a study is of
crucial importance for causal inference. However, I also think that both ingredients
are about equally important. That is, sophisticated methods will never rescue garbage
data (”garbage in, garbage out”, as the proverb goes). Fortunately, I’m convinced that
all three essays presented in this thesis rely on high–quality data although, of course,
all the data I use suffer from some shortcomings. In the end, you will always have to
compromise when doing empirical research either way (Hamermesh, 2000). For example,
in chapter 4, although we have access to more detailed data than most previous studies
we still would have liked even more detailed data (i.e. ideally we would have used wage
data with a longitudinal structure not only with respect to the employer, but also to
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the individual workers). This, of course, is also true regarding the data used in chapter
3. These data exemplify both the strengths and weaknesses of typical survey data.
On the one hand, these data tend to be very rich in that they provide many different
variables that normally are not available in administrative data sources. On the other
hand, such data in most cases suffer to some extent from measurement problems and
sampling problems (due to missing data). Still, I think, they give empirical researchers
the opportunity to explore fascinating questions which administrative (or experimental)
data would otherwise not allow.
On the other hand, even if the data seem to fit (more or less) perfectly your question,
you still need appropriate econometric methods to handle the data. That’s especially
true for the results presented in chapter 2, which clearly shows that ”simple” methods in
this case fail to account for the problem of reverse causality. In some cases then, simple
methods give presumably not the right answer to your question. But, because there is
no ”free lunch” in statistics, you need access to more information (i.e. more data) than
is usually available in typical data sets in order to use more powerful techniques.
Another simple fact of empirical research is, and that’s a point everyone knows who
has ever done empirical analysis, that seemingly simple questions often turn out not to
be that simple. That’s a lesson I especially learned while working on chapter 2. We
started with the premise that unemployment (at least if not involuntarily chosen) is
”bad” for most people. And, at first sight, the data indeed suggested this premise to be
true, as the data showed a huge increase in overall health costs after the date at which
workers lost their job (relative to workers not losing their jobs). However, as we dug
deeper, we found that a significant part of this increase in health costs was presumably
not driven by deteriorating health per se, but rather by a ”mechanical” effect, in that
many workers seem to go on sick leave before entering registered unemployment. This
effect in turn most likely is due to the fact that sick leave payments are higher than
unemployment benefits (although this interpretation is also not as straightforward as it
seems, but still seems plausible). On the other hand, the interpretation of the results
itself must also often remain somewhat ambiguous in the end, simply because the data
do not speak for themselves and the results need to be interpreted. The interpretation
of empirical results, however, is most often open to some debate in the end, because we
never know how the data were ”generated” in the first place. And, it is of course also
true that empirical research itself is often more ”art” than ”science”, since you have to
compromise a lot because real–world data never perfectly fit any one econometric model.
Still and finally, I am convinced that empirical research has a lot to offer with respect
to our pursuit of understanding how the social world is working.
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